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Philosophical theories of religion often appeal to supposed 
facts about the way religions change and, in particular, to 
the role of innovators. This, is true of theories that stress 
the priority of experience and the priority of language. In 
this thesis an historical case study of innovation in religion 
is used as evidence of the inadequacy of both these sorts of 
theories and to suggest that same form of 'institutional' 
theory would form a base for a more satisfactory theory of 
religion. 
Consideration is given to William James' and Alasdair 
McIntyre's accounts of religion and the implications of these 
for the roles of innovators. A case study of George Fox, wham 
they both invoke, is shown to validate neither, but to raise 
several general requirements for a theory of religion if it is 
satisfactorily to characterize innovation. 
The problems that arise in meeting these requirements in 
both empiricist theories and current theories derived fran 
Wittgenstein's ideas about language are surveyed. Problems 
encountered in attempts at setting up institutional theories 
in the field of aesthetics are considered. 
Any sort of essentialist theory or theories which see 
institutions solely in terms of bodies of people are rejected. 
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Institutions are characterized'rather as repetitive forms of 
behaviour that have special representative or expressive 
meaning for a human community. 
It is demonstrated that the central concepts of religions - 
religious activities, religious objects and religious 
experiences - are institutional concepts. 
The criticisms that an institutional theory will inevitably 
lead to unacceptable forms of essentialism, relativism and 
naturalism, are faced and shown to be unfounded. It is 
concluded that it is possible to set up an institutional 
theory of religion that offers a satisfactory characterization 
of innovation in religion. 
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SECTION 1: INNOVATION IN RFr. GION: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
1.1: Introduction 
Histories of religions involve accounts of innovators - people 
who rebel against current religious beliefs, who come up with 
new religious ideas, and whether intentionally or not, start 
new religious movements. 
Since the impact of innovators is such a significant factor 
in the growth and development of religions, theories about the 
nature of religion need to acccmTK)date them in some way. And 
most claim they do. 
It is, however, surprising to discover that the same 
historical characters are used to exemplify what appear to be 
incaxpatible theories of innovation. William James, who 
believes, "that feeling is the deeper source of religion and 
that philosophical and theological formulas are secondary 
products, like translations of a text into another tonguell, (1) 
claims that no better example can be found for his theories 
than George Fox, the founder of the Quaker movement. (2) 
Alasdair MacIntyre, who believes that language is "prior to... 
and in a sense formative of, " our religious experiences, (3) 
appeals to the same man. George Fox is, he says (with Martin 
Luther and St Paul) a good example of how a religious 
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tradition originates in the discovery of a new rule upon which 
a new system of worship and belief can be built(4). 
This section will examine the relevant work of William 
Jams and Alasdair MacIntyre in order to clarify what each is 
saying about the role of innovators in religion, and then look 
at 'some contributions from other philosophers to the debate 
about innovation in religion. 
Notes 
1) William Jarres The Varieties of Religious Experience 
pp414-415 
2) Ibid p30 
3) Alasdair MacIntyre "The Logical Status of Religious 
Belief" p177 
4) Ibid p200 (fn) 
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1.2: William Janes 
1.2.1: William James makes a distinction between two kinds of 
religious believers. - Firstly he describes, "your ordinary, 
religious believer, who follows the conventional observances 
of his country... His religion has been made for him by 
others, communicated to him by tradition, determined to fixed 
forms by imitation, and retained by habit". (1) But, James 
observes, "every imitative phenomenon must once have had its 
original". (2) So he goes on to search for the people who, 
have, "the original experiences which are the pattern setters 
to all this mass of suggested feeling and imitated 
conduct". (3) 
Personal religion should be considered primordial, says 
James. "Churches, when once established live at second hand 
upon tradition, but the founders of every church owed their 
power originally to the fact of their direct caTmunion with 
the divine. Not only the superhuman founders, the Christ, the 
i3uddha, Mahonet, but all the originators of Christian sects 
have been in this case. "(4) 
James was clear that religious concepts could be acquired 
by training and could then have an active role in the 
intepretation and the forrution of experiences. (5) But, he 
claimed, there was a more fundamental process, whereby people 
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act creatively with regard to religious concepts. when this 
happens, it takes the form of a response to inner experiences. 
Experiences are primary in religion because without them, 
James argues, there would be no need for religious concepts; 
they constitute both its subject matter and its motivation. 
"In a world in which no religious feeling had ever existed, " 
he says, "I doubt whether any philosophic theology could ever 
have been framed"; (6) they produce its energy and its 
conviction: "Our impulsive belief is here always what sets up 
the original body of truth... The unreasoned and immediate 
assurance is the deep thing in us, the reasoned argument is 
but a surface exhibition"; (7) they are also the source of the 
idea of God and the very meaning of the word 'God' itself: 
These direct experiences of a wider spiritual life... form 
the primary inass of direct religious experience on which 
all hearsay religion rests, and which furnish that notion 
of an ever-present God, out of which systematic theology 
thereupon proceeds to make capital in its own unreal 
pedantic way. What the word 'God' means is just those 
passive and active experiences of your life ... They need 
not be infallible. But they are certainly the originals 
of the God-idea and theology is the translation. (8) 
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1.2.2; These ren-arks about the priority of experience in the 
innovatory processes of religion need to be seen in the 
context of Jarries' basically errpiricist view of the world. (9) 
Jarres claimed that reality was directly revealed to us in 
experience and could be transforimd into beliefs, knowledge 
and action without the intervention of conceptual thought. 
Ralph Barton Perry says of Jams that, "The notion of pure 
experience was his deepest insight, his most constructive idea 
and his favourite solvent for the traditional philosophical 
difficulties". (10) James was cammitted to the view that 
reality and the field of consciousness were one and the 
same. (11) For James, "reality is immediately given in 
experience... is experience when the tem is properly 
construed". 02) James says in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience, "So long as we deal with the cosmic and the 
general, we deal only with the symbols of reality, -but as-soon 
as we deal with private and personal phencnie-na as such, we 
deal with realities in the ccrnpletest sense of the tenn". (13) 
James believed that experience, as well as being prior to, 
and uncontaminated by, thought, could without its intervention 
flow through a person producing beliefs, knowledge and 
action. (14) He saw evidence for this in what he perceived as 
similarities in the feelings and actions prescribed by various 
religions, ccnipared with the differences in their conceptual 
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suggest new religious practices. The innovator recognizes 
these special experiences because he perceives them as 
communion with what he considers to be divine. (21) He leaves 
to his followers a new set of concepts which will help thern 
attend more closely to their own religious experiences. 
A view opposed to this empiricist account of imovation in 
religion has been developed by Alasdair macIntyre. 
Notes 
1) William James The Varieties of Religious Experience p29 
2) Ibid p204 
3) Ibid p29 
4) Ibid p49 
5) eg Ibid p416 "The philosophic climate of our time 
inevitably forces its own clothing on us. " And see pp69/70. 
6) Ibid p415 
7) Ibid p88 
8) William James "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical 
Results" p357 
9) James is usually characterized as a pragmatist but he is 
also widely claimed to be the father of empiricism. See eg A 
J Ayer The Originsof Pragamatism p183 
10) Ralph Barton Perry The Thought and Character of William 
Jams Vol II p385 
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11) Ibid p589 
12) Ibid p603 
13) William James The Varieties of Religious Experience p476 
14) William James What the Will Effects p240 
15) See for eg William Jams The Varieties of Religious 
Experience p481 
16) William Jarres "The Sentimnt of Rationality" p57 and The 
Varieties of Religious Experience pp415/6 
17) William Jams The Principles of Psychology Vol 1 p78 
18) Ibid p8l 
19) Ralph Barton Perry The Thouqht and Character of William 
Jan-es Vol II p663p 
20) William Jarres The Varieties of Reliqious Experience, p415 
21) Ibid p5O 
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1.3: Alasdair MacIntyre 
1.3.1: Alasdair MacIntyre refers to the founders of religions in a 
footnote. (l) He has been attacking the role that empiricist 
philosophers give to experience in religion. what we say 
about God is not derived fram evidence, (2) he says, but 
grounded in the acceptance of an authoritative rule, that 
defines a system of worship and belief. The footnote has been 
added to allay misunderstanding. He is, he says, "rerely 
asserting that in religious practice there are methods of 
determining which religious utterances are authentic. These 
mthods operate by referring to criteria. The criteria are 
thus treated as authoritative. " He then explains that the 
presence of authoritative rules does not, as it might seem, 
exclude the possibility of radical innovation, for an appeal 
to personal religious experience can be counted as an appeal 
to just such a criterion. 
MacIntyre continues: 
The rule, "What I came to feel (or see or hear) on such and 
such an occasion is %bat I judge theological utterances 
it by, is a ccurmn enough criterion. Where one is concerned 
with the origin of a religious tradition (George Fox, 
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Martin Luther -or St Paul) such an appeal 
to experience is 
inevitable. Fbr from the original eýperience the tradition 
which supplied criteria, to 'later 
believers is itself 
defined. I am not of course asserting that those who have 
pre-eminent religious experiences infer their beliefs from 
their experiences. -If they did their inferences would be 
invalid ... What is learnt by the original experiencel ray 
be used to discrinunate between subsequent experiences, 
scue being rejected as non-genuine because discordant with 
the original. But it is always open to a man to nuke his 
own experience his authority and so beccoe the founder of 
his own religion. (1) (2) 
1.3.2: Again it is necessary to put these remarks about innovation 
into the context of MacIntyrels ideas about the nature of 
religion. These ideas at first seem totally opposed to 
James. Commenting on the suggestion that religious 
expressions refer to inner experiences which only scm people 
recognize, he says, . 
"To say this is simply to cannit a 
mistake. " This is firstly because many religious expressions 
are such that according to the normal rules of meaning and 
syntax in English it is impossible to demonstrate that they 
refer to inner experiences. Secondly he draws his readers' 
attention to Wittgenstein's demonstration that this can not be 
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how language is acquired. That theological experiences have 
private Reanings by referring to private experiences is, 
"ruled out by the fact that no expressions can derive their 
meaning this way... It is not that we have private experiences 
and invent words for them". He continues: 
But we learn the words and find their application in our 
experience. The language is in a sense prior to and 
even although this could be ndsleading, in a sense 
formtive of - the experience. This is as true of 
religious language as of any other. In so far as it refers 
to private experience, we learn that it does so because the 
neaning of the expressions can be taught publicly. (3) 
It would however be wrong to interpret these remarks as a 
direct contradiction of James. MacIntyre is not 'claiming 
that the propositional language of formulated beliefs is 
primary in religion, rather, that the vocative, performative 
and metaphorical language of worship is where religion starts. 
IvIt is not just that as a matter of historical fact the 
practice of worship precedes the explicit formulation of 
belief, " he says', ' "but that we can worship without being able 
to say clearly what we believe ... In formulating doctrine we 
are trying to say what we do when we pray. So the language 
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of liturgy is at the heart of the matter. "M 
MacIntyre goes on to explain that what is characteristic of 
religious belief s is that they are defined by reference to 
what people accept as authoritive criteria in religious 
rmtters. He says, "The existence of an authoritative rule or. 
set of rules is a necessary condition of there being a 
determinate religion. And if we supplen-ent reference to such 
a rule by saying that religion is always concerned with how 
mn are to live and with what their fundamental attitudes are 
to be, we produce as near a satisfactory definition of 
religion as we are likely to get". (5)- - 
1.3.3: So while James sees religion primarily as a sort - of 
experience - an experience of spiritual reality - that 
innovators feel particularly strongly, MacIntyre sees 
religions primarily as sets of attitudes and practices that 
are governed by an authoritative criterion that innovators 
question and change. 
According to MacIntyre we learn how to use religious 
concepts by learning their publicly observable criteria of 
use, particularly by participating in the liturgy of worship. 
We learn from this training which of our experiences tell us 
about God. We accept a religion if and when we accept the 
authority of its criteria on such subjects as what counts as 
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an experience of God or an authentic religious utterance. (6) 
"We accept authority because we discover some p2iýnt in the 
world at which we worship, at which we, accept the lordship of 
scrmthing not ourselves... So samone my discover the 
possibility of worship in the life of the Reformed Churches 
and accept the Bible as authoritative; or in the Roman Church 
and accept Papal authority. "(7) 
MacIntyre does not deny that experiences such as-"awe, 
intimations of immortality and the like" can be involved in 
such a decision, but he adds, "They only form, a path to 
religious belief in the full sense when they lead to an 
acceptance of authority. "(8) "If a man then asks how is he to 
accept this (the Christian religion), the only possible answer 
is ' that he must accept either the, Bible itself as 
authoritative or scme other authority such as that of the 
Church which refers him to the Bible. "(9) i. 
1.3.4: We can now see that while Jarres might have problems in 
explaining the continuity of tradition in religious faith, 
Macintyre. might, have, the' contrary problem of explaining 
innovation in religion. For what sort of things could make 
people want to challenge and change religious authorities? 
obviously ,I experiences I, in the Jarm sian sense, are prim 
candidates but,, within this theory, there are problems with 
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argLunents of this kind. According to MacIntyre a religious 
system cannot be inferred fran, or assessed by, pecple's 
experiences because both their experiences and the sort of 
reasons they use are determined by the system itself. There 
is no source of experiences or reasons outside it. There can 
therefore be no logical relationship between sareone's 
experiences and their subsequent beliefs. "Either a man will 
find himself brought to say, 'My Lord and my God, ' or he will 
not. "(10) It is therefore hard to see how anyone's 
experiences can lead to the rejection of me religious system 
based on one set of authoritiative criteria and the*setting up 
of another. 
MacIntyre's answer to this dilenve is to propose that in 
the case of innovators, a particular experience can play an 
unusual role; it can itself beccme the criterion by which 
subsequent experiences are judged to be authentic and 
subsequent claims and utterances are judged to be genuine. (11) 
Not only is this, in MacInyre's view,, a possible scenario for 
religious innovation, he claims that, "Where one is concerned 
with the origin of a religious tradition ... such an appeal to 
experiences is inevitable". 02) 
According to MacIntyre's theory we would therefore expect a 
religious innovator to learn from his religious training, 
especially frcrn his participation in worship, what God is like 
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", t 
and how to know which experiences and utterances are of 
religious value. Scme experience (which might seem to the 
onlooker, irrelevant(13)) would lead him to reject the 
authoritative criteria on which this religious tradition is 
founded and, without infering anything from his experience, 
set up some new criteria (the experience itself? ) -a 
different way of deciding which experiences, utterances and 
practices have religious authenticity and value. Then 
somehow, although MacIntyre does not suggest how, a new system 
of worship and belief develops from this new rule. The 
innovator would leave as a legacy to his followers, a new 
religious syst . 6ý, based upon a new^criteria of authority - the 
founder's own religious experience. 
But can experiences play this sort of role in the 
develcpmnt of religions? Does it make sense even within the 
system MacIntyre has set up for himself? Can it be shown ever 
tO have happened in this way? 
I1 .1 Notes 
1 Alasdair McIntyre "The Iogica, l Status of Religious 
Beliefs" p200 
ý2) Alasdair MacIntyre's arg=Lenýsabout experience as evidence 
are enlarged upon in "Visions". He says, "We could never know 
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frm such experiences that they had the character of messages 
fran the divine, unless we already possessed a prior knowledge 
of the divine and of the way messages frcm it were to be 
identified" p256 
3) Alasdair MacIntyre "The Logical Status of Religious 
Beliefs" ppl76/177 
4) Ibid p188 
5) Ibid p201 
6) ibid p199 "The acceptance or rejection of a religion is 
thus the acceptance or rejection of such an authority. " 
7) Ibid p202 
8) Ibid p204 
9) II 
10) Ibid P205 
11) Ibid footnote to page 200 
12) 
13) Ibid p210- "Any explanation can provide an occasion for 
conversion. " MacIntyre quotes the return of Shatov's wife in 
Dostoevsky's The Devils, and Wordsworth's brother's death, and 
com-nents that only those over-inpressed by metaphysics would 
want to suggest that any logical process is involved. 
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1-4: Scme other omtributions to the debate 1: Richard Swinburne 
arid Alister Hardy. 
There has been little continuing debate about innovation in 
religion among empiricist philosophers. Equipped with the 
assumptions and vocabulary of empiricism, William Jams' 
analysis appears to provide an adequate explanation. 
Whether empiricism, can adequately account for innovation in 
religion is a subject that will be dealt with in scme detail 
later; this chapter will examine briefly scm ccnrerits of 
Richard Swinburne and a research project undertaken by Alister 
Hardy. 
1.4.1: in his book The Existence of God Richard Swinburne sets out 
to construct an cumulative inductive argument for the 
existence of God. In the course of the argument he enters 
into debate with Alasdair MacIntyre on the subject of 
religious experience. 
Swinburne argues, "Many have experienced God (or scime 
supernatural things connected with God) and hence know and can 
tell us of his existence". (J) If this is so religious 
innovators are clearly those who have fresh experiences of God 
and express them in ways that are relevant to their cultural 
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situation. "God may, 11 Swinburne says, "be known under 
different names to different cultures". (2) 
Like James he believes that all real religious experiences 
are perceptions of the same thing: 
Religious experiences in non-Christian traditions are 
experiences apparently of beings who are supposed to have 
sirdlar properties to those of God, or experiences 
apparently of lesser beings, or experiences apparently of 
states of affairs, but hardly experiences apparently of any 
'person or state whose existence is incon-patible with that 
of God. If there were vastly many experiences apparently 
of an onmipotent Devil, then that sort of evidence would 
exist; but there are not such experiences. (3) 
Swinburne assumes the accustcn-ed enpiricist def initions and 
ways of talking. "An experiences is, " he says, Ila conscious 
mental going-on. "(4) He notes that descriptions of 
experiences include words like 'seems' or 'appears'.. If these 
words are used to describe what the subject is inclined to 
believe on the basis- of his present sensory experience, 
Swinburne calls their use lepistemicl. If they are used to 
ccq: )are what an object looks like with the way other objects 
normally look, he calls their use Icarparativel. He then 
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defines a religious experience as an experience, "which seem 
(epistemically) to the subject to be an experience of God 
(either of his just being there, or doing or bringing about 
scnething) or of some other supernatural thing". (5) Like 
William Janes he points out that the crucial feature of this 
definition is that what n-akes an experience religious is the 
way it seems to the subject. (6) He then goes on to ask what 
it is for the subject to be right. 
He launches into talk of perceptions not mediated by the 
normal senses, (7) of private perceptions (which are not 
private in the sense of my being the only one with a 
telescope, or the only one with a hand in my pocket, but are 
like toothache, or dream in that we only 'experience' them in 
the enpiricist sense, when they are our own). And even of 
private objects, which he defines as objects "which can cause 
certain persons to have the experience of it seenung to them 
that (the object) is there without there havingýthat effect on 
all other attentive persons who occupy similar positions and 
have similar sense-organs and concepts-,. (8) As an example of 
aI private object he offers: "a person who can choose whom to 
cause to have the experience of its seerdng to them that (he) 
is there". (9) Swinburne classifies religious experiences in 
a way that is similar to Jame's. He has five categories: an 
apparent perception of a supernatural object 
in the perception 
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of an ordinary, or of an unusual public object, a private 
sensation of a normal or of an unusual kind, and an experience 
which does not involve sensations. He calls it an exclusive 
and exhaustive list, (10) but it is hard to see wbat it 
excludes. In fact Swinburne says himself, "Many people view 
almost all the events of their life not merely under their 
ordinary description but as God, s handiwork. 11 (11) 
Anmd with these assurrptions and this vocabulary Swinburne 
takes issue with MacIntyre. He suggests a 'Principle of 
Credulity' which states that in the absence of special 
considerations, when it seems (epistemically) to sarreone that 
something is present, then it probably is present. (12) 
MacIntyre had suggested(13) that there were special 
conditions that had to be taken into account when looking at 
religious experiences. In Swinburne's words he said, "Our 
supposing that the way things seem is the way things are, is 
not an ultirrate principle of rationality, but itself requires 
inductive justification. " MacIntyre believed this 
justification was not available in religious experiences in 
the same way that it was in ordinary experiences; we can 
infer from seeing smoke to the existence of a fire, or from 
seeing signals change to the existence of a train only if we 
have previously experienced a connection between the two. 
When we are talking about God, MacIntyre had suggested, even 
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the possibility of making such a connection is absent. 
Swinburne appears to overlook MacIntyre Is point that a 
connection can only be made if it is possible to have an 
undisputed perception of the object in question. An onset of 
asthma can count as a perceptim of there being a cat in the 
room if on previous occasions on which an asthm attack has 
struck we have incontrovertibly seen the cat in the rocin. 
This is possible becaus e it is part of the concept of a cat 
that we all know what counts as a perception of one. An onset 
of shivering n-ay not in the same way count as a perception of 
the Devil being in the rom, as long as it is part of the 
concept of the Devil that he is usually invisible and can 
appear to scmone 'privately' in an infinite nunber of forms. 
If we do not know what counts as an incontrovertible 
perception of the Devil we can never establish the connection 
that shivering is caused by, his presence. 
It is of course an inportant theological truth that devils 
are not the same sorts of things as cats. And theologians, on 
the whole,, realize that we need different procedures for 
establishing the, authenticity of appearances of spiritual 
beings. 
ýSwinburne, , bases his argmnent on the perception of tables. 
,,, it 
is ordinarily supposed, " he says, "that people are 
Justified, in taking what loc)ks like a table to be one even if 
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they do not at the sarm tine recall their past experiences 
with tables, and even if they cannot imrediately do so. "(14) 
We can agree that people are justified in taking what looks 
like a table to be one when they have learnt how to use the 
word 'table', that is, when they know what counts as a 
perception of a table. Swinburne has not yet established 
how 
we know what counts as a perception of God. 
Swinburne goes on to say it is clear that people can 
recognize things they have never seen before by being given a 
description of their properties. God, he suggests, can be 
recognized by his description as, "A 'person' without a 'body' 
who is unlimited in his 'power', 'knowledge' and 
I freedom' 0 5) 1 am sure I am not alone in being lost as to 
what would count as a perception of a person without a body 
(with or without quote marks around the words); there is no 
agreed use for this concept. 
Swinburne's own assessment of the special conditions under 
which apparent perception my be seriously questioned includes 
those, "of a kind with others which proved in the past not to 
be genuine perceptions". (16) The crucial question, which 
Swinburne does not ask, is how one knows whether or not past 
perceptions of a particular class of object were genuine or 
not if there is no agreed way of telling what counts as a 
genuine perception of objects in that class. 
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MacIntyre's argument raised the difference between apparent 
perceptions which can under same set of circumstances be 
proved to be genuine and apparent perceptions which cannot be 
proved to be genuine under any set of circumstances. 
Swinburne's description of God as a private object, whatever 
else it means, clearly puts God into the second category. 
(This is of course an empiricist philosopher's description of 
God, not one used by ahy living religious tradition. ) 
For people to recognize God in their experiences they must 
already be in possession of a concept of God which specifies 
some Ways of telling which experiences are of religious value. 
This is what religious traditions do. 
If Swinburne's argument falls here, which I believe 
MacIntyre to have shown, the en-piricistis analysis Of 
religious imovation has been seriously undermined. 
1.4.2: The practical problems that arise if an attenpt is made to 
apply an empiricist analysis of innovation in religion are 
interestingly illustrated by the work of another n-on. Sir 
Alister Hardy was not a Philosopher; he was a natural 
scientist, but his atten-pt to set up a research prograrnme on 
religious exper 
- 
ience', based on eiTpiricist assurrptiOns is 
illuminating. 
Hardy held a sinplified version of William Jarms' idea that 
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all religions derive fran a specific universal feeling: 
Just as science is science in any country of the world, so 
the fundamental 
-nature 
of religious experience may be 
recognized as universal and as the basis of all the world's 
faiths... What man calls God is a human experience. Any 
authority in the sacred writings of the various religions 
of the world is derived from the experience of the holy men 
of each of these particular faiths. It is tliee nature of 
this initial experience that has again and again been 
distorted by the speculative theories which theologians of 
the different cultures have built over it. (17) 
In 1969, having retired fran a distinguished career in the 
natural sciences, Sir Alister founded the Religious Experience 
Research Unit in Oxford, (now the Alister Hardy Research 
Centre) in order to begin a scientific study of religious 
experience. The plan was to collect and classify accounts of 
such experiences in order to find out what the experiences 
were like, who had them, under what conditions, and what 
effects they had in their lives. 
Fran the start the researchers had a problem that is as far 
frcm a solution today as it ever was. It is this: if you 
believe there is a certain kind of experience that is prior to 
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any kind of theology (any kind of talk), and you want to find 
out what it is like, what question do you ask in order to get 
people to talk about it? They resisted naming the 
experiences as 'religious' because they wanted to get behind 
the formulated language of organized religion, and they could 
not describe the experience because that would prejudice the 
responses they got. 
They were trying to investigate what they believed to be 
perceptions of the spiritual world. But, in the language of 
eirpiricism, such experiences are private, that is there are no 
independent or public ways of indentifying them. How then are 
people to know which experiences to tell the researchers 
about? 
After years of work the Alister Hardy Research Centre 
settled on the following question: "Have you ever been aware, 
or influenced by, a presence - whether you call it God or not 
- which is different from your everyday self. "(18) 
That seems like an admission of defeat. The question does 
not define the category of experiences they want to hear 
about; we are aware of the presence of thunderstorms, catst 
houseplants and foreigners, which are all, in very significant 
ways, different fran our everyday selves, but the researchers 
do not want to hear of our experiences with these mundane 
objects; while the unit in fact includes in its reports, 
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accounts of experiences openly described . as "coming from 
within the self". (20) The question, as it stands, does not 
define the sort of experience considered sacred by any known 
religion and, lastly, and probably more seriously, it does not 
avoid prejudicing-the answers received because it contains the 
trigger-word 'God', even if it then tries to distance itself 
frcm it. 
Without that word a large range of mundane experience 
would fit the question, with it, the question works; people 
respond, sometimes it is admitted with some extra prcnpting, 
by talking about experiences of strange light, feelings of a 
benevolent presence or of being moved to virtue or courage. 
But why do they tell of these experiences? They have almost 
certainly also had experiences of strange darkness, of feeling 
completely alone and -abandoned, or of being moved to 
imnorality and cowardice. These also exactly fit the question 
as it stands. The crucial point is that they have a concept 
of God, which they have learnt from their culture, however 
hazy and however far they have tried to distance themselves 
from it. They know that God stands for light and love and 
righteousness. 
The project is going confidently ahead, but the 
philosophical problems that it stands upon, illustrate the 
difficulty of applying enpiricist ideas about the priority of 
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experience in religion. 
If it is not possible to pick out which experiences can 
tell us about God unless, we have a concept that tells us what 
he-is like and what counts as a perception of him, our concept 
of God cannot, in the way the enipiricists describe, derive 
fran our experiences, and innovation in religion cannot be 
accounted for in the way they describe. 
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1-5: Scue other contributions to the debate 2: Peter Winch and DZ 
Phillips 
Some philosophers influenced by the work of wittgenstein have 
attacked empiricism in religion from somewIzt different 
positions to that of MacIntyre, which raise different 
implications for innovation in religion. Ihe failure of 
theories based on the priority of language to ccme up with a 
satisfactory account of innovation in religion will be 
considered in more detail later; this chapter will exardne 
briefly sme relevant ccmnents made by Peter Winch and DZ 
Phillips. 
1.5.1: Peter Winch enters into a debate with MacIntyre about the 
possibility of change in the basic rules of a language system. 
Without going into the details of Winch's complex ideas about 
the nature of social institutions, he suggests that all 
meaningful behaviour is governed by rules and that these rules 
are to be found embedded in the institutions of societies. 0) 
The criteria for what counts as real and true, and for what 
counts as evidence and proof, all belong to the social 
institutions within, which any questions are asked. our 
language and our social relations are so closely related they 
are "just two different sides of the saiTie coin". (2) 
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MacIntyre questions this argument on the grounds that, if 
standards of intelligibility originate in social institutions, 
the possibility of their developing by criticism is ruled 
out(3) -a situation that would deny the possibility of one 
sort of innnovation in religion. winch replies that he 
enTihasized the open character of the rules. "In changing 
social situations, " he says, "reasoned decisions have to be 
made about what is to count as 'going on in the same way' ... 
In my view the point is that what determines this is the 
further development of rules and principles already inplicit 
in- the previous ways of acting and talking. "(4) Winch 
imagines the situation as one wtiere people are trained to 
follow norms which involve the phrase, land so on'. They are 
then open to new possibilities in the interpretation and use 
of this phrase-(5) Modifications in gram-ar are possible, but 
only if they are intelligibly related to existing ways of 
speaking. (6) MacIntyre has, Winch says, overlooked the fact 
that criteria and concepts have a history. (7) 
Winch is open to the possibility of change in religious 
institutions and language, but he is as closed as MacIntyre to 
the suggestion that independent rational deliberation on what 
Jams would have called 'experiences of the real world' can 
have a role in such change. He agrees that it is inportant 
not to lose sight of the fact that peoples' ideas and beliefs 
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must be checkable by reference to sane independent reality. 
But on the subject of the role of 'the independently real' in 
peoples' thoughts, he mentions two things. Firstly that it is 
only within a particular system of language that the concept 
of reality has a use: "God's reality is certainly independent 
of what any man ray care to think, " he says,, "but what that 
reality amounts to can only be seen from the religious 
traditions in which the concept of God is used .. It is within 
the religious use of language that the conception of God's 
reality has its place. "(8) 
Secondly he says that reality is not what gives language 
its sense: "What is real and what is unreal shows itself in 
the sense that language has. Further, both the distinction 
between the real and the unreal and the concept -of agreenent 
with reality themselves belong to our language. "(9) Nature 
does make herself heard, but this is only, "by way of the 
factual circumstances in which language is applied". 00) 
This enphasis on, the arbitrary and self-contained nature of 
language systems, characteristic of a particular 
Wittgensteinian tradition, clearly leaves sone question marks 
over the mechanism of innovation in religion. MacIntyre's 
statement-that a rran can make me of his own experiences his 
criterion of- authority and Winch's, observation that criteria 
and concepts have a history, only go so far in providing any 
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answers. 
This enphasis, if pressed strongly in relation to religion, 
would lead us to expect that innovation in religion can only 
take the form of gradual internal developrents that are not 
determined by any experiences or reasons that originate from 
any source external to a particular set of religious 
institutions. 
Winch however is neither committed to the totally 
arbitrary, nor the totally independent, nature of religious 
languge systems. He makes the suggestion (to which MacIntyre 
also aludes, (11)) that religions are not primarily kinds of 
language systems at all, but systems of practices or 
activities and suggests that we think of religious talk, "as 
growing out of the primitive ritualistic observances. "(12) 
of course such talk could have cane first, he concedes, but 
until it is connected with rituals of reverence or worship we, 
"should have no reason to attach any religious significance to 
it. "(13) The difficulties with this view will be discussed 
later along with an unsatisfactory analogy Winch draws between 
the relationship between behaviour and language in pain and 
religion -0 4) 
Winch does not develop these ideas in relation to innovation 
in religion but they clearly have some bearing on the subject. 
Religious practices are, he says, expressions of the feeling 
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for "a sense of the significance of human life. "(15) They 
arise as "a man tries to contenplate the sense of his life as 
a whole", (16) or as "a primitive, human response to certain 
characteristic human situations and predicaments, that is, to 
use a phrase of Wittgenstein's - part of the natural history 
of inankind". (17) 
Winch also sees the relation between practice and theory in 
religion as being two-way. Although there are ditferent 
pressure on each, the traffic between them, "goes in both 
directions and there is give and take, " he says(18). 
For Winch therefore, although he does not develop the idea, 
there seems a possibility that what we might call pre-lingual 
social institutions, such as religious rituals could change in 
response to the changing historical situations of human 
communities, and that such changes could produce subsequent 
changes in religious language systems. 
Winch writes about the grammar of religious language. it 
is, he says, the philosopher's task to, "understand the 
granrnar, the proper application, of such expressions within 
the sort of discourse to which they belong. "(19) And this my 
not be as straightfoward a task as it might seem f or both 
observing philosophers and believers themselves may be 
mistaken about the actual application of such talk in the 
context of the lives of the people who use it. (20) 
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1.5.2: In his early writing DZ Phillips takes up the idea lof 
theology as grammar and, developing it scmewhat, further than 
winch, raises some different thoughts about innovation in 
religion. He rehearses similar arguments against empiricism 
in religion: 
Religion is not the product of an individual. A religion 
existed before the birth of the individual and will 
continue to exist after his death. He acquires his 
religion in the way he acquires his language, namely by 
being born into a particular_ society... His hopes and 
fears, thoughts and plans, are only intelligible in the 
context of the society in which he lives. (21) 
He makes similar statments about the criteria of use of such 
concepts as truth, facts, evidence and reality. It is within 
religious discourse that we find what is rreant by the reality 
of God, he says. There is, "no question of a general 
justification of the criteria for distinguishing between the 
real and the unreal". (22) 
Phillips concludes from these two ideas, and frcm his 
observations of the role religious beliefs play, that theology 
has an internal role in religion, and religious language an 
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expressive role in the life of the believer. 
Because our language tells us what our experiences r-P-an, 
there is no possibility of seeing a move fram experience to 
formulated religious beliefs as any sort of conclusion from 
evidence or any sort of rational inference, and because there 
is no possibility of a general, independent criteria for 
distinguishing the real from the unreal, the true from the 
false, religions cannot be justified or disproved from outside 
the language systems which ccnprize them. Finding or losing 
faith, Phillips concludes, can never be the result of 
collecting evidence or thinking rationally; when it is said 
that people must be given reasons for believing in God, he 
sinply does not understand, "what is involved in this 
enterprise. "(23) The role of theology can not be the 
justification of religious statenents frcm a supposedly 
external viewpoint, nor any kind of inference, explanationr 
or interpretation of our pristine experiences of the world; it 
can only have an internal role. (24) 
Phillips' elucidation of the gramTar of religious language 
also leads him to argue that talking about God - an absolute, 
eternal, necessary being - is nothing like talking about a 
Physical object that we can touch and see and that might or 
might not exist. (This God is again rmre of a philosophical 
construction than a theological me. ) Religious beliefs have 
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an unshakeable character that-is not like having an opinion; 
they are not reached by assessing evidence or collecting facts 
and, since they cannot be falsified by factual evidence, using 
them is not like using a, hypothesis or a theory. In fact as 
nothing counts either for or against them, they cannot count 
as assertions- about how the world is. Believers and 
unbelievers do not contradict each other; they just use 
different language games. 
Phillips concludes that religious language is expressive. 
Although it my sound, on the-surface, as though believers are 
asserting propositions about'how things are, their language is 
in 1act just showing sarething about the way they feel about 
the meaning of life and death - emphasizing what seems to them 
to be significant. It does not refer to, describe or mean 
anything beyond itself. (25) - Religious language is used to 
express what goes deep in people's lives, (26) to show the 
force of what is being said or done. GOirig on to draw 
metaphysical conclusions from such language is a mistake, 
caused by "confusion about-the granvar of Our laLnguage". (27) 
It makes no sense to -ask why people use such forms of 
language, Phillips says. - The only answer is - they just do. 
Speaking of a belief in the reality of the dead Phillips says, 
"a) explanaticn of the beliefs can be given which reduces them 
to fantasies born of prior conditions. If Ope asks why people 
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should believe in the reality of the dead, why the dead should 
be held in awe, reverence or dread, me can' only reply that 
people do react to the dead in this way, that is all. "(28) 
h1hat interests me here is the mechanism by which people 
might change their reactions to the dead. Phillips' rernarks 
on how religious beliefs can change, are related to his 
discussion of the Wittgensteinian idea of world pictures - 
pictures that people use to regulate their lives. (29) He 
asks if religious beliefs are similar to Wittgenstein's world 
pictures. His answer is that they are similar in that they 
seem to form a bedrock beyond which questions seem senselessr 
and disagreements about them cannot be located within the nx)de 
of' discourse in which they are expressed. Such disagreements 
are not disagreements about facts but disagreements about ways 
of looking at the world. It makes no sense to ask if the 
pictures people use are correct since notions of correctness 
Only have a meaning within a world picture. ý In this sense 
they can be said to be groundless. But religious beliefs are 
different from world pictures in that someone who cuts himself 
Off trCm religious beliefs can not be said to have cut himself 
off from reason, rather there seem to be alternatives that he 
can reasonably claim. -Dissenters do not so much contradict 
what is being said as decide they have no use for the whole 
perspective represented by it. ' 
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Phillips talks about people losing their faith in God. It 
is not, he says, a rratter of disbelieving, "me thing among 
many of the sane kind, but to see no sense in anything of that 
kind. What has became neaningless is not same feature of a 
form of life, but a form of life as such". 00) 
How this can happen, Phillips discusses in a dialogue with 
JR Jmes. (31) If no sort of evidence is involved in 
assessing the truth of a religious picture how is it that 
scepticism can undermine religious belief? - Jones asks. 
Phillips answers that when an individual loses his faith it is 
a question of his attention being won over by a rival secular 
picture -a question of his energies being focussed in another 
direction, and the old picture, once powerful in his life, 
losing its grip. But, he continues, we- must distinguish 
between cases like this, and cases where changes in the culture 
lead to religious pictures losing their hold. Jones asks him 
why, when this happens, it doesn't make sense to suppose that 
people could make up new pictures and then try and induce 
beliet in them. Phillips answers that it is because: 
These pictures have a life of their own, a possibility of 
sustaining those who adhere to them. Part of the answer... 
to the question why it would be nonsensical to imagine 
theologians... creating pictures... to meet the crisis of 
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the age... is that whatever they created would precisely be 
their creation, and you would have a curious reversal of 
the enphasis needed in religion, where the believer does 
not want to say that he measures these pictures and finds 
that they are right or finds that they are wanting. on the 
contrary, the believers wish to claim that it isn't they 
who measure the pictures, since in a sense, the pictures 
measure them. (32) 
JR Jones adds that the problem with new pictures is that they 
uould be "trying to be rrade to became, operative as beliefs... 
in the absence of the surroundings of, belief - all that goes 
with believing in a tradition of belief... in an historical 
faith. " He adds, "I can't see that anything could be a 
substitute for that". 03) 
Phillips' view of religion seems here to restrict the 
possibility of religious innovation to camunities, or 
individuals within conuunitities, beginning to react to and 
talk about the deep things'in thýir lives in a different wayl 
so that the traditional world pictures they have been using 
begin to lose their hold. But it seems that these changes in 
reaction can not be logically related to anything that happens 
in their lives any rational thought about their experiences 
and that they happen in spite of the fact that the way the 
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world looks and feels to them is determined by the language 
system they have inherited. As with MacIntyre there does not 
seem to be any intelligible mechanism, or even room for any 
mechanism, by which new religious world pictures are 
constructed. 
And yet, like Winch, Phillips does not want to be so 
restrictive. In a book written scn-e years after these remarks 
he denied both that he meant what people had taken him to be 
saying, and that Wittgenstein's ideas required any such 
interpretation. "Rightly understood... nothing Wittgenstein 
says rules out the possibility of dialogue, understanding, 
criticism, change or decline where religious beliefs are 
concerned. "(34) "If we cannot give any rational justification 
for religious beliefs, " he asks, "does it not follow that 
religious beliefs have been made safe, incapable of being 
affected by personal, social or cultural events? " But the 
answer is, "No such conclusion does follow, and it is 
certainly not one that I have ever errbraced". (35) "Certain 
religious pictures decline... a picture may die in a culture, 
because believing it is not an isolated activity... other 
cultural changes can affect people's worship. "(36) 
He continues to uphold Wittgenstein's remarks that, "Logic 
is to be found not 'outside' language but only within the 
various language games themselves, " but says that taken at 
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face value this claim "runs counter to what actually happens. 
Surely people do respond to religious beliefs by sayinge 'That 
belief makes no sense' ... Religious beliefs and pratices are 
criticized. "(37) He tries to resolve the dilemma by 
proposing that we see religious rites and practices as a form 
of language and that we see an interaction - "a two way 
traffic" - between the different language games. When 
religions celebrate the harvest, he says, "My not aspects'of 
the rituals and prayers themselves be changed by these various 
events and activities?.. There is no reason to think that 
Wittgenstein cannot allow such an answer. "(38) 
So again the answer appears to lie in seeing religions not 
prima rily as language systems but as aspects of culture, whose 
institutions interact in same way with other institutions and 
other aspects of culture. "Christianity does not wear culture 
like a garment, " Phillips says, "Christianity is a part of the 
culture... The religious element is a contribution to the 
culture and not simply a reflection of it. "(39) 
1-5.3: MacIntyrels, Winch's and Phillips' accounts of religious 
belief, although based on sound philosophical theory, seem to 
leave several questions unanswered. They see a variety of 
ways in which individuals and camunities can be related to 
religious belief system; they can inherit them, they can use 
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them to regulate their lives, and they can stop using them, 
while in coffmunities they can develop and they can lose their 
hold. 
But where, if they exist, do James' "makers of religions" 
and MacIntyre's "founders" fit into this scheme? How, if at 
all, are new world pictures created by individuals or 
ccmmnities? How far and in what way can factors external to 
a religious language system affect its development or use? Do 
individuals and cammunities make choices and judgements about 
world pictures and if so on what basis? 
It is in search of answers to these questions that I turn 
now to the story of a religious innovator. 
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SEMON 2: INNOVATION IN RELIGION -A CASE STUDY 
2.1: Introduction 
2.1.1: We have seen how sm-e philosophers use historical characters 
to exemplify the case they are trying to make, and how, when 
the subject is religious innovation, the character most 
likely to be mentioned is the founder of the Quaker movemento, 
George Fox. This section will consider the story of this 
alarming man, who railed against the religious people of his 
day and introduced a subversive branch of religious thought 
based on the belief that people can find God in the quiet of 
their own minds. it will consider the background to his life 
and the things he said about himself and his experiences and 
beliefs in his journals, as well as the records of historians 
and Quaker commentators. 
But first the use of historical case studies in 
philosophical enquiry needs to be defended. Scme philosophers 
argue that theories are neither enhanced nor damaged by case 
histories: their truth and value does not depend upon what 
happened at any particular point in time, but on internal 
consistency, elegance and fruitfulness. The theoretical 
weaknesses of present theories of innovation in religion will 
be dealt with in scme detail in a future section of this 
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thesis, so what is the role of an historical case study at 
this point? 
Philosophical theories that take the form of an analysis or 
explanation of social phencmena need, in order to be of 
substantial use, to keep scrre sort of hold on actual 
instances. It is open to such theorists to say that their 
analysis outlines the essential elements of the phencuenon and 
that instances that do not fit their theory are inauthentic or 
idiosyncratic, but there cames a point at which such theories 
lose credibility because they cannot be nade to tit what are 
generally agreed definitive or standard instances. A theory 
of the nature of religion loses credibility in this way if, 
for instance, it sirrply assums that the nature of religious 
activity is quite difterent, from what most religious believers 
take it to be. 
Trying to fit the story of a particular instance to a 
theory that claims to explain a human phenomnon can be 
helpful in philosophy even when the story is an entirely 
fictional one; for one, theory the exercise my reveal that no 
plausible story can be told that fits it, for another, the 
story rray so engage our imagination that we are persuaded that 
it could be correct. Good exanples of this procedure can be 
found in philosophical writing on the subject of 
self-deception. (1) And if fiction can help philosophers' 
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arguments in this way, how much more can biography, where the 
story told has its roots in history rather than imagination. 
Viben two inccapatibly opposed theorists both choosep from a 
wide range of possibilities, the same sequence of historical 
events to exen-plify their theories, the situation begs 
investigation, but we should be wary of claiming too much from 
thezesults. The role of the case study in this thesis is not 
to provide any kind of proof of the inadequacy of empiricist 
or priority-of-language theories of innovation in religion, 
but to raise questions and suggest alternative avenues of 
thought. 
The choice of George Fox rests not only on James' and 
DbcIntyrels use of his story. We have, in his case, the 
advantage of access to his personal Journals, numerous 
independent primary sources and wide and fairly uncontentious 
reports of the historical events through which he lived. But 
of course we do not have direct access to his experiences; we 
can only surmize the facts, of his upbringing and there is 
ample evidence - not only that parts of his journals were 
written long after the events they describe, but also that 
they were doctored by Fox's followers. (2) Nor should we 
forget that Fox, his editors, and later camientators, all had 
their own theories about how religions change and grow. 
. It is hoped that some justification for the method will be 
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found in its results - that it will beccn-e apparent that the 
recorded events cast serious doubt on the adequacy of the 
philscphical theories which claim to be supported by them, and 
point towards a nore fruitful approach to explaining 
innovation in religion 
The min question under review in this section is how well 
the story of George Fox fits with William Jan-es' and Alasdair 
macintyre's theories - about the process of religious 
innovation. But it will begin by asking what should be 
expected fran the story of George Fox if either of these two 
theories were correct. 
2.1.2: William James II 
If George Fox is to exemplify . williarn jan-es, ideas about 
religious innovation we would expect to find that Foxis 
religious training would be of little inportance -to the new 
ideas he developed, since he rejected the religious concepts 
he was trained in, the religious experiences of his elders and 
conterporaries and the religious ýpractices he had become 
accuston-ed to; while his intellectual, emotional, social and 
political training would be irrelevant, except in so far as it 
led him to attend more closely than his fellows to a special 
kind of experience. The beliefs he came to hold, and the 
concepts in which he expressed them, would not be born out of 
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his acquaintance with the religious or intellectual ideas of 
his day, but be inferred fran his own experience of an 
unchanging spiritual world. The difference between Fox and 
his predecessors uuuld priwarily be explained in tems of 
differences in the extent to which he had, and attended to, a 
certain kind of experience, rather than any other differences 
in upbringing. 
Fox would be able to describe sane of his experiences as 
religious because of their special quality. He would 
'recognize' them as 'direct communion with the divine'. Due 
to the unchanging nature of these spiritual experiences we 
should expect to find that his new ideas had more continuity 
with the ideas of other religious innovators than with the 
cu. rrent religious or secular ideas of his own time. 
Fox would find the religious concepts of his day inadequate 
to make sense of his religious experiences. By attending 
carefully to his own special experiences he would be able to 
re-define what God was like and coin new ways of talking about 
him. - These new concepts would 'be nams for'the things he 
becarrie acquainted with in his own experience and they would be 
discontinuous with the religious concepts of his day. 
By teaching others these new concepts Fox would enable them 
to attend more closely and respond more effectively to their 
own religious experiences. 'To scn-e,, the advantages of these 
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new cmcepts would becare clear and they would accept and 
appropriate thern. The religious irK: )vemmt started by Fbx would 
be discontinuous with the religion of his day because the 
Quakers would take more notice of a universally available 
experience and have a new set of concepts for talking about 
it. 
2.1.3: Alasdair MacIntyre 
If George Fox is to exemplify MacIntyre's ideas about 
religious innovation we would expect to find that Fox's 
religious training, especially his participation in worship, 
would teach him wtot God was like and how to know which 
experiences tell us about him. His training in language 
would teach him the publicly observable criteria of use of the 
current religous concepts. 
Fox would know which of his experiences had religious 
significance and value because of this training. Some of 
these experiences, or some other experience of life would lead 
him, by a non-logical route, to reject the current sources of 
religious authority and to comdt himself to a different one - 
a different way of deciding which experiences, utterances and 
practices have religious authenticity. 
In rejecting the idea of religious authority which he 
inherited, Fox would reject the system of ideas and practices 
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that was based upon it. He would set up a new criterion - 
that religious utterances were henceforth to be judged in the 
light of what he had experienced. It is not clear how a new 
set of concepts and a new belief systern %iould en-erge from a 
criterion of this sort except that it would not be logicallY 
inferred from anyone's experiences. 
Fox would be seen to have started a new religion by setting 
up a new criterion of religious authority - his own religious 
experience - frm which would grow a new system of thought and 
behaviour, used by those who accepted this criterion as their 
own. The rnavcment he started would be discontinuous with the 
religion of his day because it would be built upon a new 
source of authority, which was a particular kind of 
experience. 
Notes 
1) See eg sorený Kierkegaard The Sickness unto Death, John 
, Douglas Mullen Kierkeqaard's 
Philosophy and Ilman Dilman and 
DZ Phillips Sense and Delusion 
2) See the prefaces and introduction to Journal of Georqe 
Fox, John Nickalls(ed)-,. 
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2.2: George Fox 
2.2.1: The background 
George Fox was born in 1624 into an era of political, social 
and religious turmoil and anarchy. John Ian-pen says of these 
times: 
The revolution in religious thought which had challenged 
the monolithic medieval church and produced the Reforrration 
was over 100 years old. The years of Camnonwealth in 
England were a time of extreme and independent views, 
bitter controversy, and uncertainty about the nature of 
religious authority. Many groups of people had been 
abandoned by the established churches or withdrawn from 
them: generally known as-, 'Seekers', they waited for a 
revelation of God's truth-M 
The period in which he grew up, developed his ideas and set 
off on his rdssion - (In 1642, at the age of 19 he left how 
on a spiritual search; An 1647 he resolved his problems and 
began life as a travelling preacher) - were arguably one of 
the most disruptive periods in English history and not-- least 
in the English church. Everything Fox said and did must 
therefore be set against a background of economic, 
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agricultural, industrial, political, socialj, intellectual and 
educational revolution. 
Between the years 1629 and 1640 England was ruled by 
Charles 1, with the assistance of Archbishop Iaud and his 
bishops. They set out to increase the power of the priesthood 
and to impose anti-puritan measures on a largely 
unco-cperative populace. In 1640, when Fox was eleven, public 
distaste explodes and Archbishop Laud is impeached and 
imprisoned; in 1641 a censorship that has been in force for 
years is lifted; in early 1642 the bishops are excluded from 
the House of Lords and, by that summer, civil war, with all 
the consequent extra mobility and disruption of traditional 
standards and hieraches, has broken out; in 1643 episcopacy is 
abolished and a mostly Presbyterian Assembly of Divines is set 
up to reform the Church of England. By 1644 numrous radical 
religious movements are beginning to emerge - for example it 
is this year that the Particular Baptists sign their first 
confession at faith. In 1646 when Fox is seventeen, the 
Levellers, the first democratic political movement in modern 
history develops, led by John Lilburne and in 1649 the first 
carmunist commnity is set up by the'Diggers, led by Gerrard 
Winstanley. (Both of these men are later to became Quakers. ) 
By the end of 1648 the King is beheaded, Oliver Cranwell has 
been made Lord Protector and the whole country has been set on 
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its head. 
In spite of the fact that. George Fox makes almost no 
mention of these events in his journals, it must be inpossible 
I 
to understand or evaluate his life and ideas without reference 
to the fact that he lived through a period when, for a mixture 
of reasons, long accepted and firmly fixed forms of social 
authority and goverrrrent fell apart and men were forced to 
re-think many of the theories they had depended on for 
centuries. 
Another factor, the significance of which cannot be 
over-estirrated,, was the fairly recent arrival of the printed 
English Bible (the first complete Bible in English was printed 
98 years before George Fox was born) and its gradual 
distribution armng an increasingly literate laity. Fox's 
forebears had grown up under the guidance of an educated 
priesthood with exclusive access to a Latin Bible. The very 
idea of lay people having opinions and making judgements in 
religious matters was a new and inportant developrmnt. 
2.2.2: Fox's religious training 
By the tirm of Fox's childhood, Puritans, and other 
Separatists, as well as Calvinists within the Church of 
England, were preaching the inportance of the individualls 
conscience and experience over the institutions of the Church. 
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They were pressing for the iniportance of studying the Bible 
and questioning Church traditions and ceremnies. They were 
crying out against the power of the priests and the injustice 
of their tithes. New ideas were giving people the courage to 
stand up to their social superiors and to kick against the 
authority, traditionally seen to extend fran their fathers, 
through the local gentry, to the King and thence to God 
himself . 
An interesting insight into this world can be seen fram 
reports of Archibishop Laud's Metropolitan Visitation of the 
Province of Canterbury, n-ade in 1634 and five by his Vicar 
General, Nathaniel Brent. (2) In many instances there are 
reports of the Vicar General having to charge the clergy of 
"divers points of incamformity". 
In St Fdmundsbury in April he took away a licence to preach 
fran a Mr Peartree, "in regard of his great ignorance, being 
not abl'e to tell me what lecclesial did signify, " and in 
Oundle in May he had to admonish the schoolmster for 
instructing his scholars out the wrong catechism. A 
comentary on these passages(3) explains that Radical 
Protestants of this time believed that lecclesial or 'church' 
wearit the congregation, not the ruling heirachy of biShOPsr 
with the implication that church discipline should be 
controlled den=ratically, not from above, while the 'Wrong 
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catechism' was "almost certainly a Geneva Calvinist 
catechism". 
In his journals Fox tells us that his father was known as 
"a Righteous Christer" and his mother was, "an upright vxman 
... of the stock of the martyrs". Fox says of his childhood 
that he, "had a gravity and stayedness of mind and spirit not 
usual in children", and a dislike for seeing adults, "carry 
themselves lightly and wantonly towards each other... %lien I 
owe to eleven years of age, " he says, "I knew pureness and 
righteousness, for while I was a child I was taught how to 
walk to be kept pure. The Lord taught me to be faithful in 
all things. "M 
It is clear that, looking back on his childhood many years 
later, Fox felt tirstly that he had been trained in godly 
living; he spoke of himself as having been, "brought up into 
the covenant, as sanctified by the word which was in the 
beginning... ". He contrasted himself with those who, "being 
strangers to the covenant of life with God, they eat and drink 
to make themselves wanton with the creation, devouring them 
upon their own lusts, and living in all filthiness... without 
a3 He felt secondly that this trainlng depended Un )dI -(5) po 
the fact that from a young age he had been able to recogiliz, 
the voice of God. Since Fox does not malce it clear what he 
mans by the phrase, "the Lord showed 
which he uses of 
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his childhood, we cannot satistactorily answer scme of the 
questicns posed. (But it is perhaps significant that, unlike 
the great majority of later Quaker journalists, Fox does not 
recount any specific religious experiences in his childhood. ) 
Up to age of 18, we can presurre that Fox was absorbing the 
religious practice and concepts of his day from at least three 
sources: from the ceremonies of the Laudian priests, frcm. the 
preaching of the Armenians and Calvinists and from his own 
reading of the Bible. 
That this is so is supported by scme early entries in his 
journal. When at the age of 19 he sets off on a spiritual 
search, at the ccnuiand of God, he recounts how he pursues his 
target in several different ways and ends in despair. At 
first he "went to many a priest to look for comfort but found 
no canfort frcm, them". (6) He "would get into the orchard or 
the field with my Bible by myself". (7) But then: 
After I had received that opening from the Lord that to be 
bred at oxford or Cambridge was not sufficient to fit a man 
to be a minister of Christ, I regarded the priests less and 
looked more and more after the dissenting people... But as 
I had forsaken all theý priests, so I left the separate 
preachers also, and those called the most experienced 
pecple; for: I, saw there none armng them all that could 
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speak to my condition. (8) 
2.2.3: Fox's religious experiences 
2.2.3.1: One of the most striking things about George Fox's journals, 
in the light of the expectations with which one ccmes to them, 
is the small amount of space he gives to decriptims of his 
religious experiences. -In the nearly 800 pages of his diaries 
in their present edition,. the word 'experience' occurs only 
six times and only just over 20 dreams and visions are 
described in any detail. Yet in another sense Fox's day by 
day life is ýdescribed as a continuing experience of God's 
guidance, protection and instruction. 
The following passage from the journals will give the 
flavour. Here- Fox describes a vision in characteristically 
sparce detail and goes on to use two much loved phrases, "I 
was moved of the Lord, " and, "The Lord opened to me": 
And the next day we passed on, warning people as we rret 
them of the day of the Lord that was coming upon them. As 
we went I spied a great high hill called Pendle Hill, and I 
went on the top of it with rruch-ado, it was so steep; but i 
was moved of the Lord to go atop of it; and when I came 
atop ot it I saw Lancashire sea; and there atop of the 
hill I was moved to sound the day of the Lord; and the Lord 
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let me see a-top of the hill in what places he had a great 
people to be gathered. As I went down, on the hill side I 
found a spring of water and refreshed myself, for I had 
eaten little and drunk little for several days. 
And so at night we c&ie to an alehouse and stayed all 
night and declared much to the man of the house, and writ a 
paper to the priests and professors concerning the day of 
the Lord and how Christ was cmie to teach people himself by 
his power and spirit and to bring them off all the world's 
ways and teachers to his own free teaching, who had brought 
them- and was -the Saviour. And the man of the house did 
spread the paper up and down and was. mightly affected with 
Truth. And the Lord opened to nie at that place and led me 
to see a great people in white raiment by a river's side 
coming to the Lord, and the place was near John Blaykling's 
where Richard-Robinson lived. 
And the next day we passed on among the fell countries 
. and at night we got a little ferns and brackens and lay 
upon a, ccamn- and the next morning went to a town where 
Richard Farnsworth parted with me and I was alone again. (9) 
It is inportant to note here that in the period in which Fox 
wrote his diary, Athis, -early portion was dictated to his 
stepson-in-law in 1675)1,, the . recounting - of religious 
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experience was a ccmTon, if fairly new, activity. An 
historian camrrents of this time: 
A particular feature of sectarianism was the extension of 
the Puritan enphasis on the individual's relationship with 
God. An important expression of this was the need to have 
had some sort of conversion, to have experienced God 
personally. Recounting this experience of God became a 
condition of membership in scime independent and -sectarian 
congregations... The reporting of religious experiences 
acquired a tremendous importance. Many people kept diaries 
and many spiritual autobiographies were published. (10) 
Tnere is an example of such an account, written in 1653, 
shortly before Fox dictated his journal, by John Rogers. He 
begins, "we have sufficiently proved... the assertion-, of the 
use of experiences declared in the Church, being much for the 
honour and glory of God... " he then continues to give, 
"testimony to the truth or further experience of John Rogers, 
preacher of the Gospel... In every year since I can remember, 
I have been enriched with so many and such remarkable 
experiences; as might make some of you rather admire than 
believe. " He recounts some of these, beginning from the age, 
of 10. At one point he speaks of, "inward malady and 
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melancholy, " and goes on: 
This sad cmdition day and night lasted upon met until I 
was persuaded that there was a God... and he would hear 
prayers if I continued but knocking... I threw myself upon 
the bed, whilst my eyes were glazed with tears! and there I 
lay, in a sudden sleep which seized upon me... when I 
awakened I was so much'changed that I was amazed at myself, 
at the suddenness of it; for I dreamt I was ccniforted, and 
my heart filled with joy, and when I awaked it was so 
indeed... And after that I began plainly to see myself... 
w1hy I despaired and was soIcng and so lamentably lostr 
that was because I sought in the wrong place for 
Justification, and'therefore'a, wrong way for salvation-01) 
2.2.3.2: To returnýto, Foxls journals, -the experience that in 1642, at 
nearly 19 years 'of ager set - Fox' off' on his spiritual 
pilgrimage is-recounted in his journals as follows: at a fair 
two friends, me of whom was Fox's cousin and both of whcm he 
calls , professors (meaning that they inad6' a profession of 
religious faith) propose a drinking game and Fox is shocked 
and grieved, - "that any that made profession of religion should 
offer to do so. ", "He leaves them, but being unable to sleeP 
that, night he recounts that he: "cried to I the Lord, who said 
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unto me, 'Thou seest how young people go together into vanity 
and old people into the earth, and thou must forsake all, both 
young and old, and keep out of all, and be as a stranger to 
all. Then at the command of God, " he says,, "I left my 
relations and brake off all famdliarlity or fellowship with 
young and old. "(12) 
For the next few years. Fox wandered in various degrees of 
temptation and despair: "under great misery and trouble". (13) 
Typically he visits a priest at 'Mancetterl and, "reasoned 
with him about the ground of despair and temptation, - but he 
bid me take tobacco and sing psalms". (14) 
2.2.3.3: In 1646 Fox begins to speak about 'openings'. The first-four 
things that he says the Lord 'opened' to him were these - that 
Ctiristians nmst have a personal experience of God, that Oxtord 
and Canbridge-trained gentry should not have a mnopoly of the 
priesthood, that the Church does not consist of buildings but 
of pecple and that God could speak directly to people's 
hearts. (15) 
Without intending to belittle these insights in any way or 
pass judgemnt on their source, it needs to be pointed out 
that the four ideas they express represented fairly ccn=n 
solutions to the ccrrmn problem being faced by English people 
in the first half of the seventeenth century, nor would they 
PAGE 67 
have been seen exclusively as religious ideas, for in that 
period the religious and secular worlds were irretrievably 
intertwined. 
We have already seen how lay access to the Bibles, the 
teachings of the Puritans, growing nobility and literacy, and 
the break up of family traditions were contributing to make 
the intrusive rules of the established Church under Archbishop 
Iaud repugnant to large numbers of ordinary English folk. 
These disruptions were also leading the Puritans towards a 
more personal religion, the ordinary folk towards a suspicion 
of the gentry and the, Calvinists towards a rejection of the 
hierachy, censorship and discipline imposed by the priests. 
Nor is it hard to speculate on the way these ideas hang 
together, for if authority in matters of religion is not to be 
the perogative of an elite group, there nust be another 
source of authority that is accessible to ordinary folk. 
What could be more accessible to them than their own 
experiences? 
That these ideas were cam-on property is confirmed by 
contemporary documents. Thomas Edwards (in 1645, the year 
that Fox's openings begin), decrys the spread of, "the sects 
and sectaries. " He mentions around ten different sects that he 
knew and points out how they are all intermixed, with the 
same, "great vein going through the whole; ' in one word ... 
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liberty of conscience and liberty of preaching. " Listing the 
practices they have in common he mentions, "The disturbance 
and overthrow of economical, ecclesiastical and political 
relations and government - insolences, pride and arrogancy, 
acts of inTnodesty and incivility - power and will, carrying 
all before them and throwing down all that stands in their 
way. "(16) Such could well describe the path that George Fox 
had revealed to him in the 'openings' of that year. 
The second document was written by Thomas Hall in 1651. He 
lists the tenets held by the Anabaptists of his time. Among 
them ýare - that all gifted persons may preach without 
ordination - that God reveals his will not only by the written 
word, ýbut also by dreams and visions - that the Saints in this 
life are pure, without spot and need not use the petition, 
"Forgive us our sins, " - that no Christian ought without a 
safe conscience take an oath, nor by oath promise fidelity to 
a magistrate - and that universities, humane arts and learning 
are needless. He continues: "They deny that preaching, 
praying, sacrament, singing of psalms and all ordinances are 
legal. The spirit is all. They give a supreme and 
independent power, in all ecclesiasticallcauses and censures, 
to their single congregations. "(17) one could be forgiven for 
mistaking that for a description of George Fox and his 
followers. 
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Fox' s openings are remarkable in that they are not unique 
for his time, rather they are inspired by the general 
intellectual problems of his day, answered by Bible truths, 
expressed in biblical language and defended by reference to 
Bible passages. Fox himself later refers to them as, 
"openings of the Scriptures" - "When I had an opening they 
answered one another, " he says, "and answered the 
Scriptures. "(18) For an example of this we could look at 
Fox's opening, "That God who made the world does not dwell in 
teaples made with hands. " This exact phrase is used by 
Stephen in his sermon in Acts 7.48 and again by Paul in his 
lecture to the Greeks in Acts 17.24. Fox argues for the truth 
of his opening frcrn this very fact. He says, "The Lord showed 
me, so that I did clearly see that he did not dwell in these 
temples ... for both Stephen and the Apostle Paul bore 
testimony. 11 (19) 
As we look at Fox's account of this period of searching for 
religious truth, written, we should not forget, scn-e 26 years 
later, it is most obviously interpreted as a period in which, 
inýcannon with nany of his fellows, Fox was struggling to 
establis ha religious authority for-himself. 
There were three factors jostling in contention. There was 
the authority of the religious'establishrmnt, the authority of 
the Bible and the authority of his own insights, wtdch he felt 
PAGE 70 
cane directly fram Christ. I would suggest that it is 
in-possible to see this personal crisis of authority separate, 
from the pressing intellectual problem of Fox's day - the 
crisis of political sovereignty, which we can see coming to 
fruition sam years later, notably in Thcras Hobbes' 
I, eviathan written in 1651. 
During this period of unrest we can see Fbx increasingly 
rejecting the authority of the'priests and preachers, who do 
not seern to be able to help him find peace, and turning to the 
authority of his own openings. 
The feeling that the priests could not help him, partly 
because- their moral standards were so low, but that God could 
teach him himself, grows and -culminates in 1647 in the 
experience that brings Fbx peace and on which the rest of, his 
life is built. -Having, forsaken all the priests and the 
separate preachers for "there was none armng them. that could, 
speak to nTy condition. And when all rry hopes in them and in 
all ren were gone, so that I had nothing outwardly to help M,, 
nor could tell what to do, then, Oh then, I heard a voice 
which said, 'There is one, even Christ Jesus that can speak 
to thy condition', and when I heard it my heart did leap for 
joy. "(20) 
Fox resolved his inner conflict in a way that satisfied him 
for the rest of his life by resolving the question of. 
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religious authority. He determined to be guided solely by his 
own inner light. He says, "my desires after the Lord grew 
stronger, and zeal in the pure knowledge of God and of Christ 
alone, without the help of any ron, book or writing. For 
though I read the Scriptures that spoke of Christ and of Gode 
yet I knew him not but by revelation, as he who hath the key 
did open and as the Father of life drew me to his Son by his 
Spirit. "(20) 
Although Quaker ccmTentators take this claim of Fox's 
seriously, (21) the influence of the language and thought of 
the Bible on the content and expression of his openings is so 
abundantly obvious that they cannot ignore it. Geoffrey 
Nuttall in his introduction to The Journals says, "His 
principle of loving forebearance, to take a single but telling 
instance, was clearly influenced as much by the example of 
Jesus in the Gospels as by any iryward voice. No one, in facto 
knew,.. his Bible better than Fox did, nor could quote it in 
argument more devastatingly. "(22) 
And Philip Wragge -says that the "inward teacher" was 
independent of "the outward one: -rather was the forrwr 
inforn-ed by-the Scriptures and guidance checked by them, and 
Fox usually referred to them in controversy... Yet, " says 
Wragge, "he was not over dependent on-the outward letter" for 
he saw, '-- "in that light and spirit which were before the 
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Scriptures were given forth and which led the holy rrien of God 
to give them forth. "(23) 
This 'unity in the truth' was something that later Quakers 
cam to expect. John Lanipen says, "Early Friends found that 
their experiences bore out the Scripture -, 'He will guide you 
into all truth'. That is they expected to find that the 
insight given by the Spirit to one man, could not contradict 
that given to another, nor could it disagree with the 
teachings of Jesus. "(24) In practice of course this 'unity' 
was not so much a discovery as a criterion of authenticity. 
Quaker cam-entators seem more easily -able 
to ignore the 
equally obvious connection between Fox's ideas and both the 
pressing intellectual problem of his day. and the. range of 
answers being proposed by his fellows. Geoffrey Nuttall, in 
his introduction to The Journals says, "Like Paul, (Fox) was 
anxious to claim independence of others inthe-discovery. of 
his message; and in fact no substantial dependence has been 
established. " He then concedes: 
For centuries weavers had bourne a name for independence 
and radicalism in religion. In Leicestershire Lollard 
traditions had lingered since Wycliffe was Rector of 
Lutterworth, not so far from Fenny Drayton were, Fbx was 
born. To the atmosphere of his own tine he owed more than 
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he knew or would allow. - To all intents and purposes, 
nevertheless, Fox was, what Penn calls him, an originalt 
being no man's copy'. (25) 
2.2'. 3.4: Apart frm Fox's openings which continue for the rest of his 
life, he recounts in his journals dreams, visions and voicest 
rapture, prophesy, discernmnts and healings, answered prayer, 
and natural and unnatural events that he sees as God's 
preservation, guidance and vengeance on his enemies. It 
cannot be disputed that Fox's journals present him as an 
extraordinarily charismatic, probably psychic and powerful 
character with a highly developed conscience. But one of the 
things which stands out when you read his journals is the lack 
of description of anything that you could call a 'religious 
experience, in- the sense in which someone like william Jan-es* 
uses the expression. A few dreams are described in sane 
detail, - butýmostly it is the information he concludes fran the 
vision that is recorded, and much of that is in very everyday 
language. 
ý"The in-pression 1, given I is not that sare experiences in Fox's 
life' stand out -for`Fox- as, being, from God because of their 
special quality, but, that everything"that happens to him, 
everything he feels'and thinks and does, is seen in terms Of 
his relationship With God. 
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A rare exanple of a vision described in sctm detail and in 
rich dream language is recounted in The journals: 
And I had a vision about the time that I was in this 
travail and sufferings, that I was walking in the fields 
and many Friends were with me, and I bid them dig in the 
11 
earth, and they did and I went down. And there was a 
mighty vault top-full of people kept under the earth, 
rocks, and ston es. So I bid them break open the earth and 
let all the people out, and they did, and all the people 
came forth to liberty; and it was a mighty place... And I 
went on again and bid them dig again, and Friends said unto 
me, 'George, thou finds out all things, ' and so there they 
digged, and I went down, and went along the vault; and 
there sat a woman in white looking at time how it passed 
away. And there followed me a urman down in the vault, in 
which vault was the treasure; and so she laid her hand on 
the treasure on my left hand and then time whisked on 
apace; but I clapped my hand upon her and said, 'Touch not 
the treasure. ' And then time passed not so swift. (26) 
A more characteristic account can be found on page 14: 
And one day when I had been walking solitarily abroad and 
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was care harej I was taken up into the love of God# so that 
I could not but admire the greatness of his love. And 
while I was in that condition it was opened unto me by the 
eternal Light and power, and I therein saw clearly that all 
was done and to be dme in and by Christ, and how he 
conquers and destroys this tenpter, the Devil and all his 
works, and is atop of him, and that all these troubles were 
good for me, and tenptaticns for the trial of my faith 
which Christ had given me. 
Fox recounts occasions when he was able to prophesy events 
that occurred later. on page 147 he tells how, in 1653 he was 
with a judge and a colonel and, "was moved to tell them before 
that, day fortnight the Lcng'Parliarrent should be broken up and 
the Speaker plucked cut of his chair. And that day fortnight 
Colonel Benson came again and was speaking to Judge Fell and 
said that now he saw that George Fox was a true prophet; for 
Oliver had broken up the parliament by that time. " 
It also appears that Fox had a gift of healing. Page 631 
of his journals has an incredible story of a man in Barbados 
who- fell, fran a horse and was found dead frm a broken neck. 
Fox mmipulated his-neck'and brought'him, back to life so that 
he was able to continue hisjourney the next-day. 
As an exawle of, answered prayer, guidance and protectiont 
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the following section is frcm one of Fox's journeys by ship, 
in lb73: 
And when we carre near Cape Henry, about the 8th hour, in 
the morning, we espied a ship on the coast where pirates 
used to be, which occasioned same fear and trouble to fall 
upon the seamen. But the Lord God, whose I am and we are, 
-let me see in a vision. two ships to the westward that 
should make towards us but should do us no hurt. So when 
about three or four days after we espied another ship 
westward, which occasioned scme fearý to the seamen, the 
Lord opened it unto me that was the other ship he showed in 
in the vision, which was no enemy. - And then I desired of 
, the Lord God that if it was his will we might see no, more 
ships until we came to England, to keep the fear out of the 
pecple,, and the Lord, answered me, so that we saw none until 
we came into King's Road, the Bristol harbour. (27) 
Another example of how Fox interprets events as acts of God 
can be found on page 505. Fbx has been mentioning same who 
stood against him. "When I came into the country again, " he 
says, "all these aforesaid were dead and ruined in their 
estates and several others of our persecutors whom the Lord 
blasted and ruined; and though I did not. seek to execute the 
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law upon them for their acting contrary to their own laws 
against me, yet the Lord had executed his vengeance upon 
them. " 
John Lampen tells' a story about Fox fran a source other 
than the journals and draws out fran it his view of the 
distinctiveness of-Fox's religious experiences: 
A girl in Dorset on her way for the first tiire to hear 
George Fox preach, found herself thinking, IIINbat is it that 
condemns me when I do evil and justifies me when i do 
well? "... '' After a while'in the meting George Fox stood up 
and said: "Who are thou that queriest in thy mind, 'What is 
it I feel...? '' I will tell thee. Lo.... the Lord of Hosts 
'is his nare. ' It"is He, by his Spirit, that condemns thee 
for evil and justifieth thee when thou- dost well. Keep 
-under its dictates, -and He willýbe thy preserver to the 
end. "'(28) 
This story,, John IaTpen ccimrents: 
brings beautifully together a number of the strands which 
confirmed for the early Triends their'experience of God 
"Within th6rmelves. '_ Not''conscience itself, which is a 
human- facultyllý--`but -the Light '-which illuninates it; the 
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awareness of truth and love and beauty in the deep parts of 
our minds; the sense of the power of nature..; the inpetus... 
to action which scmetimes comes most inconveniently..; the 
almost miraculous syýqpathy with the feelings'and thoughts of 
another, which most of us know rarely, but Ebx had to a high 
degree: all these are familiar to agnostic and 'irreligious' 
people. But Fox calls us to recognize them as the traces of 
'that of God' in us, and to identify them with the God 
revealed in the Bible working through his Spirit. (28) 
This quote brings out what the Journals themselves clearly 
suggest, that it was not that Fox had a different range of 
experiences from other people; others feel the pull of 
conscience, have dreams, psychic visions and sudden, insights, 
but they do not give them any religious importance. In fact 
SCM m: )dern Quakers pursue the sam experiences today within 
an almost completely secular framework of thought. FbX 
differed from his contenporaries by attending to a different 
set of experiences as being of religious value - he saw in the 
everyday events of his life the hand and the voice of God. 
2.2.4: Fox's religious concepts 
Fox's disputes with the priests were not about creeds and 
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doctrines, but about authority and practice - about the nature 
of the church, and about how Christians should behave. Early 
in his career (1647) Fox was, "rmved to go to the steeplehouse 
to tell the people and the priest, and to bid them to, cease 
fran man whose breath was in their nostrils, and to tell them 
where their teacher was, within them, the spirit and the light 
of Jesus". (29) 
On page 35 Fox describes the mission which to which he felt 
God had called him: 
I was, glad that I was conranded to turn people to that 
-inward 'light,,, spirit and 'grace 
by which all might know 
, their salvation,, and their way to God... I was to bring 
, people off from all 
the world's religions which are vain, 
- that they might know the pure religion, and might visit the 
,. fatherless, -,, the -widows and-the strangers and keep 
themselvesýfrcm-the-spots of the_ world... And I was to 
bring, - them ý of f ,,. 
from al the , world Isf ellowships and 
--prayings and singings_which stood in forms, without power. 
And, from Jewish ceremonies, and, from heathenish fables, and 
from men's inventions and windy doctrines... and fran all 
their images and crosses and sprinkling of, infants with all 





Moreaver when the Lord sent me forth into the 
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world, he forbad ne to put of my hat to any, high or low, 
and I was required to Itheel, and 'thou' all men and wamen 
without any respect of rich or poor, great or suall. (30) 
Two points emerge f ran these quotes -f irstly the uninportance 
of conceptual fornulations to Fox, and secondly his constant 
use of the concepts of the Bible. The first of these points 
is one that is still important to Quakers. George Gorman 
says, "In this atteapt to present a picture of Quakers in the 
1980s no reference had been made' to- Quaker priests or 
udnisters, nor to a Quaker creed or the use of- outward 
sacrarmnts. - The simple fact is- that Quakers do not have 
thern. " (3 1)- 
The second point nowseems to be -irrelevant; speaking of 
the spirit that binds Quakers together, Gorman says, "Friends 
speak of this in a number of -ways. Some, sinply say, 'the 
spirit' or 'love'. For others the name 'Holy Spirit', 'Inward 
Light' or 'the living Christ' is the most appropriate 
narm. 11 (32) Lampen says: 
Although he (Fox) protested against the formal and dogmatic 
elements in the religious teaching and practice of his day, 
he used the traditional language of theology, which may now 
seen outdated or unfamiliar to sane readers. The religious 
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debates of his time had the advantage of this agreed 
-vocabulary, the language of the Bible ... For nany of us 
this language has now been so debased that it no lmger 
gives us the words in which to talk about experiences which 
are intensely meaningful to us. (33) 
And yet Fox did introduce some unfamiliar concepts. One of 
these, is 'the inward light'. John Iampen tells us that this 
light is identified with the 'Word' of John's Gospel. (34) In 
fact it is lifted directly fran John 1.9 and is detailed by 
John's other New Testament writings. (The difference between 
the Quakers and the mainstream of Christianity has, in fact, 
been explained in terms of their over-dependence upon the 
writing of John, and relative neglect of the writings of St 
Paul. This can be demonstrated by Fbx1s and the later 
Quakers' unorthodox view of salvation, described by Nutall as, 
being transported "even in this life into paradise, into such 
a-paradise as Adam and: Eve knew. before they fell, thus giving 
men, triumph over their sinfulýprqpensitiesll. (35)) 
We should not forget however that Fox claimed that all his 
theology was revealed to him directly from God. On page 34, 
having propounded variousýorthodcx Christian doctrines in the 
words, of the Bible,, Fox, says,, "These things I did not see by 
the help of, man, nor by the'letter, though they are written in 
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the letter, but I saw them in the light of the Lord zTesus 
Christ and by his inyrediate Spirit and power, as did the holy 
men of God, by whcm the Holy Scriptures were written, ... and 
what the Inrd opened in rrie I afterwards found was agreeable to 
them. 
However this strange claim is to be interpreted the records 
are not consistent with the idea that Fbx made up concepts in 
order to name and-respond more effectively to things he became 
acquainted with in his religious experiences; the concepts 
were already in existence. 
2.2.5 Fox's'religious legacy 
If Fox did not leave his followers a new set of concepts, what 
was it 'he left, that inspired a religious movement that is 
still vigorous today? Was it a belief system, creeds or 
doctrines? Was it a new criterion for religious authority? 
Was it access to a certain sort of experience? Historial 
records and Quaker conuentators seem unanimous. To a minor 
extent it included all of these but only in so far as they 
were all wrapped up in his unique legacy. 
George Gorman puts it this way: "The unique Quaker 
contribution in the eighties as in all previous decades, is in 
the nenner of their silent corporate worship, for the Quaker 
meeting for worship is the core of the Religious Society of 
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Friends. " (36) Earlier he had said,, "While most modern Friends 
... would not naturally use Fbxls-language to describe their 
experience, they would be absolutely at one with him in his 
strong conviction that in being quiet and still, it is 
possible to discover a life giving, creative power in the 
depths of human personality. "(37) Philip Wragge says: 
Fox also had a great organizing ability... it was soon 
apparent that some fom of Church organization was neededr 
especially in an age when sane Protestants tended to 
confuse liberty with licence. Fox aimed at a 
Christ-governed Society of Friends; guidance was given as 
. the gathered group. waited ýupon God and the 
individual 
leading must be checked by thejudgement of the group. He 
saw that discipline was necessary to maximize freedom and 
on his release- from Scarborough jn 1666, he spent four 
years setting up Monthly and Quarterly meetings... His 
, organization- gave -. -shape,, -stability -and permanency to 
Quakerism without crarping--individual liberty and 
rermins aln-ost. unaltered down-to the present day. (38) 
it 
Howard Brinton -says-of the me-eting, for worship, "In the form 
here'described,, this is the only practice of the Society of 
Friends, which, has existed from-the start. without going through 
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a process of develoEment. Its discovery was the discovery Of 
Quakerism"(39). 
What Fbx left his followers was, in the opinion of all 
these comentators, a practice,, a rrethod, an activity with a 
neaning - an institution. As far as concepts , ideas and 
beliefs are concerned those that Fox left and have endured are 
those that relate to the Meeting. Brinton, says: 
The Quaker bases his mthod on belief in a God-centered 
spiritual universe, the inner truth and meaning of which is 
in some degree accessible to inan... As scientists agree on 
a certain well established body Of scientific facts 
inherited from the research and discovery of the past and 
subject to continual revision so the Quakers have accepted 
a certain body of religious and social doctrines inherited 
fram the past and subject always to new interpretations as 
more Truth is apprehended. (40) 
As far as criteria of orthodoxy are cOncerrIed Brinton says, 
"The basis of the test is not facts arrived at but the method 
used ... The Society of Friends accePts : 
Lrito membership a 
person who is willing to follow the Q-1ak---r rmthod regardless 
of where it may lead. " 
The process by which the Meet: Lr'cJ to have this 
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authority is illuminating. The idea of each person following 
their own inner light was bound to lead to crisis in a 
developing organization, and it did. In 1656 George Fox 
clashed violently and with devastating results with another 
emerging Quaker leader, James Naylor. (41) Although Fbx does 
not tell the whole story in his journals we do have the 
letters he wrote for general distribution at this time. (42) 
They reveal him rejecting the one obvious solution and 
making no attenpt to set up his experiences or his teaching as 
any sort of authority. (William Penn says of Fox thatt "He 
exercised no authority except over evil". (43)) And yet it was 
clear to all that same sort of discipline was necessary in the 
new church. Fox reminds the Quakers about, "the witness Of 
God in everyone, in which they caTýe into peace... and 
fellowship with one another. " And his direct exhortation is 
that they, ý"Keep your meetings in the power of the Lord. " In 
reponse to the need for control in the church, Fox repeats his 
belief in the authority of 'the inner light of every man' and 
'the unity of truth', and refuses to set up any other 
criterion of judgement on what God might reveal to those who 
wait upon him. In his third letter he n-akes this even mre 
clear, "Let it be'ýour-joy to hear or see the springs break 
forth in an y, through which you have all unity in the sane 
feeling, life and power. And above all take heed of judging, 
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ever, any one openly in your meeting. " He continues with a 
few suggestions about how to keep order but the principle 
remains, "So in all this you have. order, you have edification, 
you have wisdam ... which takes away the occasion of stumbling 
the weak and occasioning the spirits of the world to get up. 
You will hear and feel and see the power of God. " 
To this day Fox's method of reaching truth remains. In 
his Guide to Quaker Practice, Howard Brinton explains that the 
principle set up by Fox is not one of the anarchy of 
individual insight but, "The principle of corporate guidance 
according to which the Spirit can inspire the group as a whole 
is central. Since, there, is but one Truth, its Spirit, if 
followed, will produce unity. To achieve this unity is always 
possible and the Society of Friends has practiced the method 
of achieving it with considerable success for three 
centuries. "(44) 
Certainly Fox left access to a certain sort of experience - 
the experience of waiting in silence in a ccnmnity for a 
unified revelation from the spirit of truth. Fox's legacy to 
the world was an institution, justified and explained by a set 
of beliefs, acting in itself as a criterion of authority and 
creating a range of experiences, beliefs and behaviour 
patterns for those who practise it. Fox's new institution was 
explained in terms of a very old set of concepts that to many 
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Quakers today are obselete, although the institution still has 
its power. 
There is in fact little doubt that it was Fox's action in 
instigating an institutional structure upon his sect that 
ensured its survival; for other sects which spoke in very 
similar, if not identical terms about very similar, if not 
identical experiences, melted away when their leaders died. 
- But from where did Fox get the idea behind this particular 
institution - that authority and power could safely and 
usefully be invested in the agreement of ordinary men and 
wcmen? He would undoubtedly have said that God revealed it 
to him. Let no judgenmt be rode about the source but merely 
note, -that England was, in, this half of this centurYt 
struggling through the birth of modern democracy. 
As an exaiTple of the view from which people were moving we 
could look at The Canons. of June 1640. The parish clergy were 
to read the following 'explanation of the regal power, at 
morning prayer once in every quarter: 
The most-high and sacred Order of-Kings is of Divine Right, 
being the ordinance of God himself, founded in the prirm 
laws of nature, and clearly established by express texts 
both of -the . Old and New Testan-ents. A suprem power 
is 
given, to-this rmst excellent'Order by God hinself in the 
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Scriptures, which is, that kings should rule and cammand in 
their several dominions all persons of what rank or estate 
soever whether ecclesiastical or civil... Fbr any person or 
persons to set up, maintain or avow in any their said 
realms or territories respectively, under any pretence 
whatsoever, any independent coactive power... is to 
undermine their great royal office, and cunningly to 
overthrow that most sacred ordinance which God himself hath 
established, and so is treasonable against God as well as 
against the King. (45) 
But that view was under attack. A very contrary one was being 
expressed for exanple by the Levellers - "the first democratic 
political movement in modern history", (46) which developed 
under the leadership ofýJohn Lilburne; also by the Diggers, 
who took steps towards setting up a ccrmTunist society in'1649 
under the leadership ofýGerrard Winstanley. 
Richard Overton wrote a paper addressed to Cramvell's 
parliament on behalf of the Levellers in 1649: 
Ye were chosen to work our deliverance, " it says, "and to 
establish us in natural and just libertY agreeable to 
Reason, ard ccnTmn equity, for whatever our forefathers 
were, or whatever they did or sufferedr or were enforced to 
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yield unto, we are the men of the present age and ought to 
be absolutely free from all kinds of exorbitancies,, 
, molestations or arbitrary power, and you we chose 
to free 
us from all without exception or limitation, either in 
respect of persons, officers, degrees or things: and we 
were full of confidence, that ye would have dealt 
impartially on our behalf, and made us the most absolute 
. 
free people in the world. Ye should, in the first place, 
declare, and set forth King Charles his wickedness openly 
before the world, and withal, to show the intolerable 
inconvenience of having a kingly government... Ye only are 
chosen by us the people, and therefore in you only is the 
power of binding the whole nation, by making, altering or 
abolishing the laws. (47) 
Thomas Edwards, outraged by the stand taken by Overton and 
Lilburne describes them in 1646 as, "against religion and 
civil_ governmnt tending to nothing else but the overthrow of 
the fundamntal constitution of this Kingdom in Kings, Lords 
and Cannons and setting up the body of the cam-on people, as 
sovereign lord and king". (48) 
Gerrard'Winstanley, like John Lilburne later to becane a 
Quaker, argues for den=racy in secular governrmnt in words 
and ideas remarkably sindlar to those Fox used to argue for 
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derrkocracy in church government: 
Not one word was spoken in the beginning, that one branch 
of mankind should rule over another. And the reason is 
this, every single man, male or female, is a perfect 
creature of himself; and the same spirit that nude the 
globe dwells in man to govern the globe; so that the flesh 
of man being subject to reason, his maker, hath him to be 
his teacher and ruler within himself, therefore needs not 
to run abroad after any teacher and ruler without him; for 
he needs not that any man should teach him, for the same 
anointing that ruled in the Son of Man teacheth him all 
things(49). 
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2.3: An assessrwnt 
We can now look back at the expectations aroused by William 
Jarms and Alasdair, MacIntyre in the light of the story of 
George Fox, to see if it doest as they claim, support what 
each sees to be the n-echanism of religious innovation. 
2.3.1: William Jan-es' theory seems to have fared very badly. Not 
only does what we have learned -about FbxIs life fail to 
exemplify it, it is hard to imagine any possible-set of facts 
that could. Fbx Is - three-pronged training f ran the 
established church, the Sectarians and his own reading of the 
Bible, instructed him in various views about what God is-like 
and how to tell which experiences have religious significance 
and value. If he had not been thus instructed in the concept 
of divinity, it is hard to see how he could have recognized 
any experience as being 'communion with the divine'. 
If we look at the experiences that Fox saw as having 
religious significance it does not appear that these were 
substantially different from the experiences of his 
contemporaries, nor that he recognized them by their special 
spiritual quality. Certainly Fox's conscience and his sense 
of calling were highly developed, his psychic visions were 
clear and frequent and the quiet voice within was strong and 
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consistent, but his decision that these amounted to cmmmion 
with God is most plausibly seen as an interpretation, only 
possible because of his training. 
It is just contrary to the facts of the case both that Fox 
rejected the religious concepts of his day, in isolation, and 
as a result of his private religious experiences, and that he 
coined new concepts to name the things he had experienced. He 
rejected the practices of the priests and the institutional 
structures that authenticated them, in ccmmn with -a great 
many of his contemporaries, in an intelligible response to a 
particular historical situation. He embraced what he saw to 
be the concepts and practices of the New Testament as they 
appeared to him to apply to the intellectual and practical 
necessities of his own life. 
His ideas show a, marked similarity to, and the'definite 
influence of, many I of the secular and religious ideas of his 
time. Fox did not teach his followers a new set of concepts 
for talking about an old experience; he introduced them to a 
new institution. 
2.3-2: MacIntyre's language theory fared better. It does seem 
consistent withý what we, know of Fox's life that his training 
in religious language - by sharing in the liturgy of the 
established church, -'listening to the Sectarian preachers and 
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studying the Bible - were formative of his religious ideas and 
his assessment and interpretation of his experiences.. But 
samething led him to reject all the established religious 
authorities. We can agree with MacIntyre that non-rational 
factors way have had a part to play in this decision (his 
reaction to his cousin's drinking habits? ) But I think we 
must also acknowledge, in disagreement with MacIntyre, that he 
found the religious instituticns of his day inappropriate for 
reasons that we can appreciate and understand even looking 
back from several hundred years later.. Also the new 
institution that he introduced, quite clearly fitted the 
demands of the situation. 
Fox introduced a new source of religious authority, but 
Macintyre must be wrong when he says that the criterion of 
authority for this, new religion was -one of Fox's own 
experiences. In the place of. the established. criteria.. Fbx 
took as his own authority in religion his own inner voice, 
although it is unlikely that this idea was original, and what 
Fox accepted as genuine camiunication from God was in fact 
rigorously judged by what he read in the Bible. But the 
quality or content of his experience did not become an 
authority. for anycne else. Fbx himself never suggested that 
they be used in this way, nor in fact did he teach that each 
listen uncritically to his own inner voice; the source of 
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religious authority that he set up was the authority of the 
fleeting, to which all had to submit. 
Quite apart from the record of history surely it is not 
possible for a memory of an experience to became a test of 
canparison, even for subsequent experiences of the same 
person, let alone those of others. (1) The only thing that 
could become such a test would be what someone said about his 
experiences, but Fbx did not leave detailed descriptions of 
his experiences by which others could judge theirs. What he 
left was a method of recreating a certain kind of experience 
and a method for testing its genuineness. , 
Within MacIntyre's theory it is hard to see the role that 
experience has, both in the decision of an individual to 
reject the current religious criteria of authenticity and in 
the setting up of a new system of worship and belief based 
upon new criteria. But it is'not hard to see why Fox rejected 
the religious institutions of his day. It was a move that in 
some ways seems almost inevitable in view of the historical 
situation. It is also not only easy to imagine how new 
religious experiences and beliefs and new ways of talking 
about them, can arise from the practice of a new institution; 
it is possible to follow it happening in the growth of the 
early Quaker movement. (2) 
So while many of the other new religious and political 
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movements spawned at this time faded away, Fbx's one inspired 
and original religious idea, secured the survival of the 
Quaker movement. And to this day Quakers seek religious truth 
by sitting in silence waiting for a unified revelation from 
the Spirit of Truth. 
This case study has raised several problems with James' and 
macintyre's ideas about innovation in religion. In the next 
section the theoretical problems of explaining innovation in 
religion from an enpiricist position and a position based on 
the priority of language, will be examined. 
Notes 
1) See eg Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investiclations 1 
para 258 
2) See eg the growth of the Quaker cannitment to pacifism and 
reason under the leadership of William Penn 
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SECTION 3: CRITIQUE OF EMPIRICIST AND PRIORITY OF LANGUAGE 
THEORIES OF INNOVATION IN RET GION. 
3.1: Critique of enpiricist, theories 
The idea of radical innovation, in religions raises problems 
within theories that are based on experience having a 
priority. The story of George Fox had also been shown to fail 
quite notably to exen-plify them. (1) The theoretical failure 
of enpiricism in relation to religion has been attacked by a 
wide range of arguments from modern philosophers and 
theologians. This section will briefly cam-kent on them and 
the problems they raise for accounting for innovation in 
religion fram an empiricist base. 
An empiricist theory of innovation in religion would, put 
sin-ply, be saTiething like this; we have some experiences which 
are a direct perception of 'the spiritual world', or of 
supernatural beings. These experiences are private by nature,, 
and are the source of our religious concepts and beliefs, 
activities and institutions. Innovation in religion occurs 
when individuals have these experiences in a specially intense 
or fresh way, feel-that they recognize them for what they are, 
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see them as evidence for the existence of a supernatural world 
and use them to criticize and change the religious concepts 
and institutions of their day. 
The main difficulties with this moael are: 1) the 
eTpiricists' general concept of 'an experience' and their mre 
specific concept of a 'religious experience' and 'a private 
experience' are -indefensibly ancmalcus; 2) the sort of 
experiences* they refer to cannot be recognized as 'religious' 
prior to the possession of religious concepts and therefore 
cannot be the source of concepts and beliefs; 3) they can be 
used neither as evidence for the existence of a supernatural 
world nor, 4) to criticize and change religious concepts and 
institutions. 
3.1 1: The anaralousness of the enpricists I concepts 
Nicholas Lash expresses the view that the empiricists' concept 
of experiences as 'conscious mental goings on' is a strange 
one. He asks: "lAby on earth should this exceedingly queer 
account of experience in general, and of religious experiences 
in particular, prove so persuasive that many highly 
intelligent people sinply take it for granted? "(2) A painful 
experience at the dentist or a distressing experience after 
over-indulgence in food and drink, or an irritating experience 
in a canTdttee meeting, are not 'conscious mental goings on' 
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but, "aspects of my interaction in the public world of flesh 
and facts and language, with dentist's drills, indigestion, 
good caTpany and tedious discussion. " Lash accuses William 
Jarres of underestirrating, "the public institutional, 
structured character of all our experience", (3) and concludes 
that finding God is not like coating across a particular fact 
or thing. God is rather to be found, "in all the kinds of 
things which we do and suffer, achieve and undergo". (4) 
TR Miles says, "Those who have equated 'experiences' with 
'rrental events' have introduced an innovation without being 
aware that they were doing so, and that the result is 
gratuitous confusion. "(5) His conclusion is: 
A person can describe his religious experiences - that is, 
his experiences when he tries to ccue to terms with cosmic 
issues - in the same way logically as he can describe, for 
instance, the experiences wtiich he had last sunmr in 
Norway; in neither case does it make sense to ask if his 
experiences were mental events or if they made him aware of 
sonething non-material. (6) 
When we examine the experiences which people, not 
over-influenced by empiricist philosophy, call religious, (7) 
we see that they include descriptions of shared events and 
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activities, of encounters with a range of ordinary objects and 
people, as well as descriptions of feelings, emotions, n-cments 
of insight, and more unusual, inner sensations. They do not 
appear always to see 'the experience' as an inner sensation 
that accoupanied their participation in an event or encounter; 
perceiving the happening or the meeting is, for them, the 
experience, and it is often one that is shared. 
Empiricists see religious experiences as perceptions of 
spiritual reality. These perceptions differ frm what we 
nLight call 'perceptions of material reality' in that they are 
privat6, but this idea of a private perception is an odd one. 
if I am standing in a crowd and, putting my hand in my 
pocket, discover I have scme keys there that I should have 
left at hcme, I haver in one sense, had a private perception; 
no-one around has shared the discovery with me. But this is 
not the sort of experience that-- the empiricists are 
describing. Swinburne explains that a religious experience, 
if it is a perception, is nornially a perception that scnve-one 
else in the same physical relation to the object, with the 
san-b-- instruments, sense organs and concepts and the sane 
amount of attention, does not perceive. (8) Gods, according to 
Swinburne, can chose to whan (and to how mny) they reveal 
themselves. This leads him to talk about God as a private 
object. But this is an ancmalous use of the word 'object'. 
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The nearest example seems to be f ound in talk about dreams or 
pains, but we do not normally refer to objects in relation to 
either of these subjects without scme clear qualification or 
much confusion. 
The problem with purely private experiences isr as 
Wittgenstein has pointed out, (9) that it is impossible to see 
how words referring to them can be formulated and used. In 
order for a concept to become part of a language it must have 
same publicly observable criteria of use, so that people can 
agree what are correct and what are incorrect instances of its 
use. 
Not all empiricists are caTmitted to all of Swinburne's 
arguments. it is possible to be an empiricist and find roan 
for the idea of a shared religious experience, but any idea of 
a special kind of perception of a non-material world raises 
similar problems with criteria of use. 
3.1-2: Experiences camot be recognized as religious prior to the 
DC ssession of reliqious concents and therefore camot be the 
source of concepts and beliefs 
The enpiricist. model of religious innovation depends upon the 
supposition that people can recognize experiences as having 
religious authenticity and value prior to, and independently 
of, the religious beliefs and concepts they have inherited 
PAGE 104 
fran their culture. It depends, that' is, upon religious 
experiences being distinguishableý from non-religious 
experiences by their quality. "The essence of religious 
experiences, " says Jams, "the thing by which we finally mast 
judge thein, must be that element or quality in them which we 
can meet nowhere else. "(10) 
William Jan-es' immense catalogue of the varieties of 
religious experience, covering almost every imaginable human 
emotion and sensation, would seen to deny this; can they all 
have a common quality? More plausible is James' alternative 
and in some ways incompatible, suggestion that peoples' 
experiences are religious in so far as they are recognized by 
them as being related in scrre way to what they consider to be 
divineo, (11) a suggestion that in-plies the priority of concepts 
over percepts. 
Similar, but no less explicit, accounts of religious 
experience are to be found in more recent writers. Sir 
Alister Hardy claimed in1979 that he had collected, "over 
4,000 first-hand accounts, which show that a large number of 
people even today possess a deep awareness of a benevolent 
non-physical power which appears to be partly or wholly 
beyond, and far greater than, the individual self". He 
continues: 
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The experience when it ccmes has always been quite 
different frcxn any other type of experience they have ever 
had. They do not necessarily call it a religious feeling, 
nor does it occur only to those who belong to an 
institutional religion or who indulge in corporate acts of 
worship... it usually induces in the person concerned a 
conviction that the everyday world is not the whole of 
reality: that there is another dimension to life. (12) 
Like James he discovers that people experience "the abstract 
power" in a wide variety of ways - he suggests 92 categories 
in which to put them - and adds: "Spiritual awareness appears 
to be universal to human kind. "(13) 
Sir Alister's evidence and the conclusions he draws from it 
are flimsy. I do not want to argue that it is false that 
people all over the world experience same sort of help, - 
c%xnfort, strength or peace from a not obviously physical or 
merely internal source, at certain tines in their lives. I 
want to point out that they, at other times, experience 
dereliction, overwhelming temptation, despair and anxiety. 
The question that needs to be asked is how people decide which 
of all their varied experiences to tell Sir Alister's 
researchers about? 
Sir Alister argues that he is not interested in the 
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experiences people call 'religious, or 'spiritual',, but with 
experiences of a certain kind, whatever people want to call 
them. This puts him in an insoluble linguistic dilemma, for, 
in order not to prejudice the results, he neither wants to 
name the experiences he wants to hear about, nor to say what 
they are like. The problems with the question he asks have 
been discussed in Section 1.4 The stories that it evokes(14) 
reveal that it is peoples' personal theology, which may differ 
from, but is always continuous with, the theology of their 
culture, which deternLines which, if any, of their experiences 
they choose to put in Sir Alister's nameless category. This 
is the common thread that, holds the 4,000 accounts together. 
There is no common quality running through them by which they 
could be recognized. The practical problems of this research 
progranm, based on enpiricist assumptions. about religious 
experience, support quite vividly the argument that, it is not 
possible to recognize experiences as religious - as coming 
from God, or as being experiences of a spiritual world - 
without same training in religious concepts. The experiences 
cannot therefore be the source of the cOncepts. 
As a final argument on this point, there is an alternative 
way in which we can be said to perceive something different 
from the people inuiediately around us - that is if we see the 
same object, but see it as samet1iing clif ferent. (15) A group 
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of people see a dark shape cross the lawn: the hunter sees it 
as a leopard. An audience listen to a piece of music; the 
music expert hears it as a sonata. A family watch a show of 
tenper; the mother sees it as an expression of jealousy. The 
notable thing about 'seeing as' is that inorder to recognize 
a perception as a perception of something in particular, it is 
necessary to be in possession of the appropriate concept - to 
know, that is, what counts as a perception of that class of 
thing. The hunter knows what features of a dark shadow make 
it correct to describe it as a leopard. The music experts 
know what features of a piece of music make it correct to 
describe it as a sonata. The mother knows how to recognize 
jealousy when she sees it. 
This seems to assume that in every religious experience 
there is some thing being perceived, which is not always the 
case; when we hear God speaking through meditating on a Bible 
story there is no thing that we experience as the voice of 
God, in the way a primitive tribe might interpret a roll of 
thunder. 
John Hick in fact develops this analogy to cover the 
believer's experience of "living within the arrbience of the 
unseen God", (16) of the prophets' "consciousness of God as 
actively present in their contemporary history", (17) 'the 
disciples "seeing Jesus as the Christ", (18) or bread and wine 
being 
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"experienced as channels of divine grace". 09) But, however it 
is interpreted this ability to apply a particular concept to a 
particular experience, ccmes not fram having fresh and clear 
perceptions, but from having been trained in the use of words. 
Private experiences, in the enpiricist sense, cannot be the 
source of religious concepts. 
3.1.3: Experiences cannot be used as evidence for the existence of a 
supernatural world 
TR Miles asks the question: in what sense can religious 
experience be campelling? His answer is: "Certain experiences 
can invite a particular answer to cosmic questions; they 
cannot logically dermnstrate that such an answer is 
correct. "(20) Alasdair McIntyre says: 
An experience of a distinctively 'mental' kind, a feeling 
state or an image cannot of itself yield any information 
about anything other than the experience. We could never 
know frcm such experiences that they had the character of 
messages frcm the divine, unless we already possessed a 
prior knowledge of the divine and of the way in which 
messages from it were to be identified. The decisive 
evidence for the claim would then be anterior to the 
experience and not derived from it, whereas what we are 
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concerned with here is how f ar the experience itself can 
provide such evidence. (21) 
He goes on to point out that,, in order to establish that 
experiences of a certain kind count as evidence for the 
existence of scmething else, one must have an agreed rule of 
inference(22). 
It is just these sorts of publicly agreed rules that are 
precluded by the private nature of the expiricist's concept of 
religious experience. As was seen in Section 1.4 we can count 
the onset of an asthma attack as evidence that there is a cat 
in the room, because we are agreed on the normal way of 
telling if a cat is present (we know wtiat cats look like) and 
we have established that this person's asthma has in the past 
invariably connected with the presence of a cat. If the devil 
is a private object in the enpiricist sense, there is no way 
of establishing that an onset of shivering is invariably 
connected with his presence, because there are no agreed 
criteria by which we can decide what counts as an 
incontrovertible instance of his appearing. Shivering is 
therefore not evidence that he is present. In fact, if he is 
a private object, nothing can be. 
3.1.4: Experiences'cannot be used to criticize and chanqe religious 
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s and institutions 
Peter Winch points out a problem involved in the idea of an 
experience being used to criticize and change concepts and 
institutions. The problem arises for Winch because he 
believes that what our experiences nean is determined by our 
social institutions. This is because questions about criteria 
for what counts as real and true, for what counts as evidence 
and proof, belong to the social institutions in which the 
questions are asked. Winch recognizes that social 
institutions change over tine but he does not see a role in 
these changes for what he calls, experiences of the 
independently real: 
God's reality is certainly independent of what any nian rray 
chose to think, but what that reality aimunts to can only 
be seen fran the religious tradition in which the concept 
of God is used... The point is that it is within the 
religious use of language that the conception of God's 
reality has its place... Reality is not wtat gives language 
sense. What is real and what is unreal shows itself in the 
sense that language has. Further, both the distinction 
between the real and the unreal and the concept of 
agreement with reality thenselves belong to our 
language-(23) 
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If it is only within a particular language system, a 
particular religious tradition, that the reality of God has a 
place, and it is this reality that determines which of our 
experiences have religious authenticity and value, we are left 
with a serious problem as to how experiences of God can be 
used to criticize or change that tradition - within, that is, 
the enpiricists' theory of innovation in religion 
Notes 
1) See Sections 1.2.1.4 and 2 
2) Nicholas Lash Theology on the Way to Ramus p144 
3) Ibid p146 
4) Ibid p154 
5) TR Miles Religious Experience p13 
6) Ibid p23 
7) This will be done in Section 6.4 
8) See Richard Swinburne The Existence of God pp248/9 
9) Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations see eg. I 
paras 258 and 293 , 
10) William Jams The Varieties of Religious Experience p62 
11) Ibid p5o 
12) Alister Hardy The Spiritual Nature of Man pl 
13) Ibid P2 
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14) For a selection of these accounts see Sir Alister Hardy's 
book The Spiritual Nature of Man 
15) See John Hick "Religious, Faith, as Experiencing-as" 
pp20ff 
16) Ibid p27 
17) Ibid p3l 
18) Ibid p32 
19) Ibid p35 
20) TR Miles. Religious Experience p56 
21) Alasdair McIntyre "Visions" p256 
22) Ibid p257 
23) Peter Winch "Understanding a Primitive Society" pp12/13 
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3-2: Critique of priority of language theories 
3.2-1: The problem 
The idea of radical innovation in religions , raises scrne 
problems within theories that are based on language having a 
priority in religion. (1) 
As the discussion of the case study suggested, the problem 
with these theories is not, as it was for empiricist theories, 
a case of there being major difficulties with the 
philosophical assumptions on which they are based. It is 
rather that the particular ways in which these assumptions 
have been applied to religion, has produced problems for 
explaining the role of innovators. 
Put simply, a model of innovation in religions based on 
the priority of language would look like this: religions are 
not the product of individuals; they belong, in the first 
place to communities. Religions, as language systems, are 
rule-following activities. Individuals learn about them by 
being trained in the use of the language of a particular 
religious tradition. They learn how the concepts of truthr 
reality, evidence and proof are to be used in a religious 
context, ' and they learn to recognize which experiencest 
actions and utterances are authentic and have religious value. 
Innovators are those who at scme stage in their lives reject 
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this training and suggest a change in the rules; they, 
introduce new ways of talking - different rules for using the 
relevant concepts, different criteria for assessing religious 
experiences,, actions and utterances. Their success depends 
upon the reception of these, new rules by what then beccms a 
new religious cammanity-,, 
The major problem area for these sorts of models is that if 
our concepts of reality, the meaning of our experiences and 
our ways of reasoning, are detern-Lined by the rule-following 
systems we learn through cultural training, neither 
independent rational deliberation nor experiences of an 
independently perceived world, can have a role in the 
criticism and change of such system. 
This basic position will be maintained inthis thesis, but 
the further one presses this position the mare intractible 
the problems seem, to, become in accounting for, radical 
innovation in a rule-following system. The more religions are 
seen solely in termsý of language systenn and the mre 
arbitrary and isolated language systems are seen to be, both 
in relation to one another and in relation to the world of our 
experience, the more difficult it becomes to give a coherent 
and plausible explanation for the phenomenon of religious 
innovation. For, as the case-study suggested, innovators do 
criticize and change religions, and they appear to be 
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responding to their experience of changing historical 
situations, and to produce solutions that are intelligibly 
related to the problems those situations have set. 
If religions are primarily language systems and if language 
systems are isolated and arbitrary, it follows that religious 
beliefs cannot be justified or disproved from outside, nor can 
the criteria on which they are based be questioned fran within 
it. They are, in this sense, groundless, and this would 
appear to have three implications that are relevant to 
innovation. 
3.2-1-1: Changes in allegiance frcrn one set of beliefs to another 
cannot be seen as conclusions frcn evidence or any sort of 
rational inference fram experience. 
As MacIntyre puts it, when he hears the Christian story 
"either a man will find himself brought to say, 'My Lord and 
my God' or he will not". (2) 
But biographies confirm that for many individuals the 'leap 
of faith' that is involved in cam-dtment to sources of 
religious authority is-felt to be precipitated or even forced 
by- reasons that are not divorced from rationality and 
experience. Many ordinary Christians are ready to tell the 
Story of how they came to faith. 'Rational arguments from 
relevant experiences figure too frequently for us to accept 
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Macjntyre Is remarks without question. (3) 
3.2.1.2: Theology has an exclusively internal role within the language 
system that constitutes the religion. 
It is not there to justify religious statements fram a 
supposedly external viewpoint, nor to try to draw conclusions 
fram, or impose an order on, the facts we independently 
encounter in the world. "Theology is, " Phillips says,, "the 
granm-ar of religious language. "(4) 
But, if this is right, it is hard to account for 2000 years 
of Christian argument, apologetics and preaching. Theology 
does have an internal, or granmtical role, that starts with 
the authority of Scripture, Church and Spirit, but it has also 
been producing arguments for faith since the apostles and the 
Greek Fathers-(5) It is concerned with answering the 
apparent human need for cognitive order, for-explanations of 
what our lives man, the significance of particular events and 
the construction of coherent and consistent answers to 
questions about the meaning and destiny of human life. 
Theology, rather than being exclusively concerned with 
internal consistency, is vitally concerned with its own 
relationship to secular thought, language and behaviour, and 
with a rational assessment of their conpeting claims. The 
history of religions suggests that religions survive and fall 
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on their ability to adapt to changing intellectual climates 
and social experiences. Perhaps a religion with an exclusively 
internal theology (Christianity without apologetics, social 
ethics, feminist, urban or liberation theology) could survive, 
but it would not bear much relation to any of the religims 
with which we are most familiar. 
3.2.1.3: The construction of new religious belief systerm is 
arbitrary. (6) 
How do radically new, or radically changed, conceptual belief 
systenz ccme into being if they are not, in any sense, 
intelligible moves frm experience? How are world views - the 
pictures that people use to make sense of their lives - 
constructed if they are not the result of rational 
deliberation on, or appropriate responses to, or provoked by, 
peoples' life histories and changing social experiences? 
(What does St Paul's theology amount to if it is not an 
attenpt to make coherent sense out of the apostles' encounter 
with Jesus? ) Here there are only questions, because if 
religious beliefs are groundless in the sense we have been 
considering, there seem to be no answers. 
3.2.2: Three unsatisfactory answers 
However none of the writers we are considering is ccmitted to 
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the idea that religions are solely ways of talking nor that 
language Systems are completely isolated or completely 
arbitrary. They each make an attempt to explain how religions 
are constructed and develop and how individuals make decisions 
about adopting or abandoning them. 
3.2.2.1: Alasdair MacIntyre believes that religions are justified by 
reference to the acceptance of an ultimate authority. That 
they are ultimate, he says, precludes going beyond them to 
look for any sort of external justification. He believes, that 
is, that the credibility of a religion is established 
internally. But when Winch says that standards of 
intelligibility originate in social institutions that their 
intelliqibility is established internally - MacIntyre argues 
that this cannot be so, because it would rule out the 
develcpment through criticism of the standards of 
intelligibility current in a society. (7) He does not attempt 
to say what the crucial difference is between credibility and 
intelligibilityr that the one can be based on standards 
independent of particular language systems and the other not. 
Nor do I think that such an argument is possible. We learn 
both what it is true to believe and what it makes sense to say 
frcm our language training and yet radical criticism of both 
does arise. This is the nub of the problem and ýIacIntYre has 
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done nothing to solve it. 
As we have already seen, MacIntyre attenpts to solve the 
problem of innovation in religion by suggesting that people 
can start new religions by setting up new criteria for 
deciding what is authentically religious; and that this is 
done by proposing that a pre-eminent experience of their ownt 
will be what future experiences are judged by. (8) There are 
considerable theoretical difficulties with this suggestion 
which Wittgenstein has made clear. (9) The memory of an 
experience cannot be used to test further experiences because 
we have no external criteria by which to judge whether we have 
remeembered it correctly. An innovative interpretation or 
description of an experience could take scmething like this 
role in a new religion, but this leaves us with a still 
unexplained decision on the part of innovators to change the 
rules about how to interpret and describe their experiences. 
Another problem with MacIntyre's proposal is that while 
insisting that religious beliefs cannot be inferred fran 
experiences, he asserts that a new religion can grow from its 
founder's pre-eminent experience. This experience becomes, he 
says, the criterion by which others' experiences are judged to 
be authentic. But he makes no atterpt to explain how the 
beliefs and activities of this new religious co[munity can 
develop from their cam-dtrmnt to this new criterion, nor does 
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such an explanation seem possible within the confines of this 
theory. 
3.2.2.2: Peter Winch respcnds to Macjntyre, s criticism of him by 
explaining bow he believes language systems develop. 
Institutions are, he says, based on rules, but these rules 
have an open character. "In changing social situations, 
reasoned decisions have to be made about what is to count as 
going on in the same way It is a case of, "the further 
develoFment of rules and principles already implicit in the 
previous ways of acting and talking. "(10) 
To Winch language systems change by means of gradual, 
internal develogrents of the rules that govern institutions. 
He appears as closed as MacIntyre and Phillips to the 
suggestion that such developments can be a rational response 
to anything outside the system. This description of how 
religions change is consistent with the assurptions of a 
priority of language theory and is an accurate description of 
one kind of change. Religions do seem to develop gradually in 
response to the need for internal consistency; and new 
religious movements do seem to be logically related to what 
went before. 
And yet it seems inadequate as an explanation of the sort 
of radical innovation that is the subject of this thesis - of 
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changes that appear to be appropriate responses to changes in 
the secular intellectual climate or people's social 
experience, or changes that seem to involve a wholesale 
rejection of the current ways of going on and the proposal of 
a radically new set of rules and criteria. 
There are two areas of Winch's characterization of 
religions that are theoretically unsatisfactory and that are 
relevant to the problem of innovation in religion. He draws 
an analogy between religious language and pain language that 
doesn't work in scme crucial areas and he atterrpts, 
unsuccesfully, to identify a set of practices that can be 
called 'religious' independently of associated beliefs. 
The analogy between religious lanquage and pain lanquaqe 
Windh1s analogy(11) is helpful in many ways. It is helpful to 
see how religious practices have their roots in primitive 
natural activities like mcments of silent contemplation, joy 
or prostration. It is helpful to rýýer that the 'natural 
cry' of pain becames moulded by culture and replaced by 
established institutions, such as talking about pain, and 
that, in the same way, the 'natural' expression of wmder or 
reverence can beccme moulded into, and replaced by, sinple 
worship rituals. 
It is helpful to remember that we learn how to talk about 
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pain by observing natural pain behaviour and to see that we 
also learn to talk about God by participating in worship, but 
at this point the analogy breaks down. For pain is a 
sensation and talk about pain is talk about the sensation. But 
neither God nor religion are sensations. Not only is a 
feeling of aweful reverence a carplicated emotion, rather than 
a simple sensation, but also when we talk about religion or 
about God we are not talking about this emotion. We do not 
learn about God by observing natural expressions of reverence; 
we learn about God by participating in a variety of 
established activities, and when we talk about religions we 
talk about these symbolic, rule following, social practices 
and the beliefs associated with them that, among other social 
functions, express a range of sophisticated en-ations of which 
reverence is only one. 
Being distinctly different frcm talking about pain, talking 
about God does not develop in the same way. Pain is pain, 
however it is expressed, but when radical innovation occurs in 
religion, which emotions and experiences are to be seen as 
authentically religious is among the things that are open to 
criticism and change. It is hard to imagine a revolutionary 
innovator criticizing the pain behaviour of his ccmmmity and 
proposing radically new forms of behaviour that would be 
received by them as an apprippriate development. (12) 
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Identifying practices as religious(13) 
We can recognize creatures who are in pain even though they 
have no concept of pain, in the sense that they have no pain 
language and no beliefs about pain. Possibly, too, we can 
recognize creatures that are in a state of awe even though 
they have no concept of awe. Winch's proposal that we can 
recognize creatures as being engaged in religious activities 
without any reference to religious beliefs is, however, open 
to criticism. 
Wonder and reverence, fear, submission, devotion, and every 
other 'primitive' emotion evoked by religions can also be 
expressed in an entirely mundane or secular context. (Pain 
cannot be expressed in a 'non-pain' context. ) In order to 
call a practice religious we have to have some understanding, 
not only of what the participants are doing, but of what they 
think they are doing. We need to know what the practice means 
to them - what function it has in their lives - even if they 
themselves have never formulated these thoughts or meanings as 
specific beliefs. 
When we say that some creatures must be engaged in 
religious activities, it is because we speculate about what 
they believe, not what they feel. When naturalists say that 
elephants must be engaging in religious activity when they 
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appear to mourn or fete their deadr it is not because they 
think they see, implied in their behaviour, a religious 
emotion; the ermtion they would see would be grief, but grief 
is not specifically religious. They think they see implied a 
religious belief -a belief in the significance of the dead. 
The case of tribesmen looking to the mountains in order to 
show reverence to their gods is, winch maintains, different 
from the case of their looking towards the mountains to seek 
animals to hunt. The latter is an explanation of why they 
look, the former only expresses a conceptual connection. This 
is because, he says, the term 'animal' can be given a sense 
independently of this habit of the tribesmen looking towards 
the mountains while the term 'god' derives its sense only fran 
its connection with the rituals. But does the sense of 
religious concepts derive only from their connection with 
religious activity? On the contrary, religious traditions 
supply public criteria which give a sense to their talk of 
what they see as spiritual realities. (14) In Exodus chapter 
19 Moses explains that God meets his people on the mountain in 
fire and smoke and talks to them in thunder. His presence can 
be confirmed by the fact that if they touch the mountain when 
he is there they will die. God's presence on the mountain is, 
within this tradition, given a sense independent of the habits 
of his worshippers, in much the same way that seeing brown 
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shapes darting amng the bushes gives sense to their activity 
of looking for animals on the mountain. While in scm 
Christian traditions the Eucharist seem to have beccm the 
central focus of the participant's understanding of God, in 
others it still gets its sense from an historical event of 
which it is a memorial. Both the activities and the beliefs 
of a religious tradition are necessary for it to function as, 
and for it to be recognized as, a religion. 
These criticisms of Winch suggest that religions are not 
most helpfully seen primarily as a sort of sensation or 
ennotion, nor as a sort of activity, nor as a sort of language, 
but as a sort of institution, which implies the ccnbination of 
an established practice with an established meaning. 
3.2.2.3: DZ Phillips' characterization of religious language as 
expressive, rather than referential and truth affirrdng(15) 
is crucial to his failure to account adequately for innovation 
in religions. 
Phillips claims that when he looks at the way religious 
believers speak - the role that religious language has in 
their lives - he finds that talking about God is nothing like 
talking about physical objects, and that religious beliefs 
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have an unshakeable, unconditional character that is not like 
having an opinion or using a testable hypothesis. Rather than 
being supported by evidence or reasons, they are stated in a 
way that makes them unfalsifiable. They are held in position 
by their role in undergirding a whole way of talking and 
living. Disagreements between people using different world 
views are not disagreements about facts, but disagreements 
about ways of looking at the world. It makes no sense to ask 
if the pictures they are using are correct since notions of 
correctness only have a meaning within a- world picture. in 
this sense religious beliefs can be said to be groundless 
rather than justified. 
Phillips' argument draws on Wittgenstein's ideas about- 
bedrock propositions and world pictures. (16) Bedrock 
propositions enjoy a special status because of the place they 
occupy in a language system. Within the system they are 
rarely stated and never questioned. They are held to be 
certain, not because they are conclusions frcxn experience, or 
can be justified by reasons, but because, if they were not 
true, the whole way of life that is built upon them would 
collapse. Phillips argues that religious beliefs are like 
wittgenstein's bedrock- propositions. They are held without 
grounds; their necessity is granratical. 
it is this view of religious language that leads him to say 
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that he simply does not understand what could be involved in 
having reasons for believing -in God(17) (or the reality of the 
dead, (18) or theý forgiveness of sins(19)). And it is this 
puzzlement that makes- his explanation of Innavation in 
religion so problematic. 
But is Phillips' characterization of religious language a 
fair me? - and is it a fair interpretation of Wittgenstein's 
remarks? Can one suppose that orthodox monothestic beliefs 
involve no truth claims about a self-subsistent entity who is 
independent of anyone's beliefs? Are the beliefs of ordinary 
religious believers not falsifiable assertions, or not 
supported by any kind of evidence? Do they have a granymtical 
necessity,, and are they always held unconditionally? 
Phillips makes three identifiable mistakes that are all, to 
scme extentr caused firstly by a hardening-up of 
Wittgenstein's remarks, that moves them beyond what he 
intended, and secondly by taking as his observed model, an 
unorthodox, philosophical, form of religious belief rather 
than the beliefs of ordinary believers. 
-Whether a religious belief is meaningful, susceptible to 
evidence, has '-, a grammatical necessity and is held 
unconditionally are separate questions which depend upon the 
actual belief in que'stion and the way it is used by the 
particular believer. 
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The observation that talk of God is not like talk of physical 
objects does not imply that God can have no sort Of 
ontological status and that claims about his existence are 
therefore not meaningful assertions 
That the grammr of talk about God is not, like the granTnar of 
talk about physical objects, has, been accepted and discussed 
in several sections-of this thesis. Saying we believe there is 
a hatstand in the hall next door is not at all the sam as 
saying we believe there is a God in heaven. We can man on 
the on-- hand that we are not. certain whether there is a hat 
stand there or not, we do not care very mach, but know without 
hesitation how to go about finding out. We can man, on the 
other hand, that vie are prepared to live and die by our belief 
that it is so, but cannot see how to prove it to scmeone who 
is not, as nothing that happens seems to count either way. 
Answering the criticism that religious people think they 
are addressing a being when they address God, Phillips says: 
I have no doubt, however that the same believers who say 
that the existence of God is a fact w: )uld, if pressed, 
admdt... that there is no question of God ceasing to exist, 
of having existed-for a certain length of time, or having 
com into existence... I should have thought it followed 
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frm this that the reality of God camot be what Hume 
called a matter of fact and existence. (20) 
But, as NonTan Malcolm argues, it is a mistake to think that 
there is only one kind of meaning for assertions of existence. 
He maintains "There are as many kinds of existential 
propositions as there are kinds of subjects of discourse. "(21) 
Phillips is impressed by 'the Christian's talk of the 
eternal - the absolutely necessary and unlimited - nature of 
God's existence, especially as expressed by Kierkegaard. (22) 
He sees this talk as quite different from the talk about the 
existence of material things, which are finite, contingent and 
may or may not exist at any particular time. (23). 
Theologians who tend towards this view of God have argued 
that beliefs about the existence and nature of God must be 
held unconditionally and his properties must be inalienable, 
on the grounds that belief in a God who might exist, is 
probably faithful and may be able to save, is not religiously 
adequate. It is not adequate, they say, because it can not do 
what religious beliefs are supposed to do, that is - overcome 
the disturbing contingency of human life. (24) 
- But all through history people have believed in gods who 
have contingent, limited, properties and involve themselves 
with their creation. (We can only presume that, if these 
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people's faith is adequate for them, it has same other 
purposes. ) If, as at the time of Joshua, you believe your 
neighbour's gods are unfaithful and vicious, if your god is 
your king, if, as with many Hindus, you have a hierarchy of 
gods with different functions and characteristics, the 
properties of your god are clearly contingent. 
The granTnar of religious language is quite different from 
that of material objects, but we believe in the reality of, 
and make meaningful assertions about, things other than 
material objects. We talk for example of diseases, 
universities, e=tions and ideas. The ontology of material 
objects is not the only ontology we understand. As with 
other kinds of talk, the ways of life in which religious 
language is embedded give us public criteria for talking about 
religious concepts. We talk, for exanple, of images and 
oracles, of theophany and incarnation, of stories and rituals, 
and what are claimed to be contemporary manifestations of the 
divine spirit. It may be impossible to make meaningful 
assertions about the timeless, impassive, necessary God of the 
philosophers., It is not impossible to rake them about the 
gods people worship in living traditions. Joseph Runzo is 
right to talk of Phillips, "lean ontology" which is, he says, 
,, neither the only theological orthodoxy nor the only logical 
orthodoxy". (25) 
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The observatim that religious beliefs can be used in a way 
that qives them gmmiatical necessitv does not rrean that th 
can not also have a 'matter of fact' use that makes them 
susceptible to evidence 
As Wittgenstein suggested, religious beliefs can be used as 
bedrock propositions, held in place not by evidence, but by 
their role in supporting a superstructure of beliefs and 
activities. But it is not the case that religious beliefs, as 
a class, have the granmatical necessity of bedrock 
prcpositicns. Mether a belief is constitutive of the 
conceptual foundation of scmeone's life, depends upon the 
particular instance of its use. Many religious beliefs can be 
shown to have a lipatter of fact' use in the lives of believers 
- to be part of the conceptual superstructure built on the 
foundation. They still may not, in that case, be susceptible 
to evidence fran outside the system, but they are susceptible 
to evidence from within it. 
If we consider a typical religious belief the belief 
that God has spoken(26)-- we find that within the criteria of 
everyday., secular language the belief that God has spoken is 
nonsense; God does not have a muth and noises that we 
recognize as language do not ermrge frm it. (Yet within the 
criteria of a particular religious tradition it has an 
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inperative nature; when God speaks we must obey. ) But 
religious traditions supply . 
public criteria which give the 
statement a sense - thunder is God speaking (perhaps only the 
priests understand what he is saying), or an oracle, or 
dreams, or the words of a prophet, or a sacred book are 
believed to be the voice of God. The belief is, in that 
context, a meaningful, falsifiable assertion. 
The belief that God has spoken iray be used as a bedrock 
proposition. For a believing Jew, for instance, it may be the 
foundation of the whole of his way of thinking and behaving - 
the picture by which he regulates his life. However as a 
claim related to a specific occasion it denies, for exanple, 
that the utterance being considered has been made by a false 
prophet (or that the oracle has not been used correctly). 
Religious traditions supply criteria for deciding about the 
credibility of prophets and oracular messages. Believers know 
what counts as evidence for and against the claim that God 
has, on this particular occasion, spoken or not. The old 
Testamnt is, for exan-ple, clear and consistent about the 
conditions which count against the claim that God has, on a 
, 
Particular occasion, spoken through one of his proPhets. (27) 
In this context the belief that God has spoken lias a Irratter 
of fact', not a granuatical, role in the language of 
believers. 
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Phillips claims that the belief that sins are forgiven is 
held in a grammatical way - that, devoid of justification or 
evidence of arry kind, it is the position from which same 
people choose to view the world - an expression of what they 
feel to be deeply significant about their lives and 
relationships. I find this use of this particular belief 
plausible but idiosyncratic. Within every Christian 
tradition there are reasons for believing in forgiveness and 
judgeme-nt that can be rehearsed and questioned. Prom the 
belief that Jesus is Lord can be derived beliefs about 
channels of authority, ways of arguing and criteria for what 
counts as evidence and justification - all that is needed to 
firmly ground the belief that sins are forgiven-(28) (This 
does not imply that the belief that Jesus is Lord is not 
susceptible to evidence, nor that it is necessarily held 
groundlessly. It can, for example, be derived from the Gospel 
stories or fran beliefs about ethical values. ) 
This is not to deny Wittgenstein's assertion that at the 
bottan of all our beliefs are some beliefs that are held 
groundlessly - beliefs that we do not allow to rise and fall 
with evidence, but are held in place by the way we live. (The 
beliefs that take these positions are different for different 
people and at different times in their lives. ) Nor is it to 
deny that the way of life that rests upon these foundations 
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supplies boundaries within which we can. ask questions, 
construct reasons and make decisions - the criteria by which 
we decide what our experiences man, what is real and valuable 
and true 
what has been demnstrated is that most religious beliefs 
do not, most of the time, have a gramTatical role in the lives 
of believers. These religious beliefs, like most other sorts 
Of beliefs, are part of the building rather than the 
foundation of a thought system. This leaves the question of 
whether there are any religious beliefs that are held 
groundlessly, in the sense that Wittgenstein inplied in his 
discussion in, On Certaint-y. (29) If there are, perhaps the 
place to look for them would be scmewhere like Frazer's Golden 
Bouqh(30) where the apparent belief that the dead must be 
revered, or that sacrifice must be made, is reported to be 
widely shared. 
The observation that religious beliefs can be held 
unconditionally does not mean that they can not also be held 
tentatively. 
Phillips found, fran his observation of religious beliefs that 
they can be held unconditionally, but whether a belief is held 
unconditionally or not is a separate question from whether it 
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is susceptible to evidence. People take a different amount of 
interest in evidence. How easily one accepts the authenticity 
of a divine message is powerfully influenced by how nmch One 
wants or needs it to be true, or untrue. People can hold 
unconditicnally, beliefs that are'sus&eptible to evidence and 
hold tentatively, beliefs that are not. (31) The propositions 
held at one time in our lives as bedrock propositions can, in 
the context of others being held firm, be questioned and 
thoughtfully considered. If religious faith is as Phillips 
appears to claim, people can either participate in itt or be 
uncorrprehending observers. They cannot understand and not 
believe, nor believe and be teqmrary observers. 7he 
experience of meaningful dialogue between believers and 
non-believers makes this claim inplausible. 
For Jewish believers to claim that God has spoken can be, 
for them, a foundational proposition. To reject the claim 
would be for them to reject the history, religion and culture 
of their-'race. It would involve the collapse of a whole way of 
talking and living, a whole way of interpreting their 
experience of the warld. Flor such believers nothing will 
count as evidence against it; in the sense that it is part of 
the'foundation of their world view, we can say that is not 
susceptible to evidence; ' within the tradition it cannot be 
questioned because the tradition rests upon it, but without 
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the criteria of use supplied by the tradition it does not make 
sense. 
This does not mean however that such a belief can never be 
questioned or held tentatively - meaningfully observed frcm 
within or without. 02) Jews do reject their heritage and 
cease to believe. To the hesitant proselyte it is a matter 
for careful calculation whether the eternally faithful God of 
the Jews is or is not a reality. Even an Anglican bishop can 
claim that his faithý is a, "risky ccumitment to a glimpsed 
possibility in the face of reasonable human hesitation about 
whether it is really possible". 03) 
A believing Jew may go to college and discover Marxism. An 
alternative world view opens up before her. The serpent 
whispers, as he did to Adam, "Has God spoken? "(34) How is 
she to chose betweený the two pictures? What now counts as 
evidence or reasons? Phillips answer is - nothing, but the 
fact is that something does count, for Jews do beccim Marxists 
(as Phillips will concede) and scme are happy to discuss 
plausible reasons for their choice (which he will not). 
Phillips' asserts that if we discard our bedrock 
propositions we do not discover that our views are false; we 
experience the collapse of those conditions which make the 
having of any views - true or false - possible. (35) But this 
is not what happens. 
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The society in which we live does not consist of one or two ' 
discrete, monolithic language systems, but a conglcmerate of', 
overlapping and ccmpeting ways of interpreting our experiences 
and living in the world. The beliefs that at any tirm, for 
any individual, form the bedrock, can shift and change. (36) 
Any belief can at scme time be brought to the surface and 
questioned in the context of others being held secure. We can 
slip into an apologetic niode and ccme back to worship, imagine 
to ourselves what it would be like to look at the world 
through the eyes of a Christian, try it and then stop to ask, ' 
as John BetjEman does in his poem "Christmas"A37) whether it 
is'all 'really true'. 
Phillips concedes something like this when he observes that 
rejecting a religious view of life is 'not like cutting oneself 
off'from'reaison. 08) The fact is that we possess several ways 
of using the word 'reality", and have at our disposal a 
variety of' ways of classifying and giving meaning to Our 
experiences and constructing I argurients. If presented with new 
possibilities we can hold scme of these - beliefs secure while 
asking 'questions of others: would taking this on board enrich 
our lives'or disturb our quest for cognitive cmsistency? how 
much of what we presently'use and value would fall if this 
bel ief 'was relinqui - shed, and is it worth it? These sorts of 
questions may not be direct responses to experiencesr 
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especially -, not ., 
experiences in the empiricist sense, but they 
do constitute intelligible reasons for accepting, rejecting or 
reforming our religious beliefs. 
Macintyrels, Winch's and Phillips' attempts to reconcile 
wittgensteinian insights about language with the observed 
phenomena of radical innovation in religion have been shown to 
be, in scm respects, unsatisfactory. The next section will 
consider if there is another way forward. 
Notes 
1) See Sections 1.3,1.5 and 2 
2) Alasdair MacIntyre "The Logical Status of Religious Belief" 
p205 
3) macIntyre choses to consider Wordsworth and Shatov, but he 
could have chosen CS Lewis (see his autobiography Surprised 
by joy ) or Michael Goulder and John Hick (See their dialogue 
why believe in God? ) 
4) DZ Phillips Faith and Philosophical Enquiry p6 
5) A significant factor, in this development of Christianity is 
the fact that the early church spread among the Greeks, who 
were in a sense outsiders in relation to the Hebrew world from 
which it emerged and felt corrpelled to find ways to fit it 
into their ways of thinking. 
6) Phillips' discussion with JR Jones about loss of belief 
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(Faith and Philosophical Enquiry ppl 11 ff ) is referred to in 
section 1.5 
7) MacIntyre's discussion 'with Winch (Peter winch 
"Understanding a Primitive Society" p27) is referred to in 
section 1.3 
8) Alasdair MacIntyre "The Logical status of Religious Belief" 
p200 fn 
9) Ludwig Wittgenstein see for eg: Philosophical' 
Investiqations I paras 258 and 293 
10) Peter Winch "Understanding a Primitive Society" p27 
11) See Peter Winch "Meaning and Religious Language" p197. 
ýty criticism of this analogy is largely inspired by Stuart 
Brown's paper in the same volume pp233ff 
12) It might be thought that the rise of Christian Science 
fitted this description but it involves an altogether wider 
set of proposals than envisaged here and its development in 
fact illustrates the complexity and variety of emotions and 
experiences that can'be considered religious. 
13) See Peter Winch "Neaning . and Religious Language" pp196ff 
14)* (As quoted by Winch later in this paper) Simone Weilt 
First and Last Notebooks p147, "Earthly things are the 
criterion of spiritual things ... only spiritual things are of 
value, but only physical things have a verifiable existence. " 
15) See section 1.5 where Phillip's later denial that he meant 
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what people have taken him to be saying here is also 
discussed. 
16) DZ Phillips Reliqion without Explanation pp160ff 
17) DZ Phillips ýFaith and Philosophical Enquiry p79 
18) DZ Phillips Religion without Explanation pp13311 
19) Ibid p164 
20) DZ Phillips Faith and Philosophical Enquiry p7i 
21) Norman Malcolm "A Contemporary Discussion" p59 
22) Phillips demonstrates the influence of Kierkegaard eg Ibid 
pp33 and 204ff and Religion without Explanation p131 
23) DZ Phillips Religion without Explanation pp174ff 
24) Phillips discusses this view in Faith and Philosophical 
EncfuiKy p60 
25) Joseph Runzo Reasont Relativism and God p180 
26) These arguments were suggested by Stuart Brown, s book Do 
Religious Claims make Sense? 
27) See Deuteronomy 13 and 18-15-19, Jeremiah 23 and Ezekial 
12.21-14.11 If what is said is not consistent with the nature 
of God as revealed to Moses or encourages behaviour contrary 
to the law, the prophet is a false one 
28) See eg Matthew 9 1-7 and Acts 2.38 and 10.39-43 
29) Ludwig Wittgenstein On Certainty paras 110,204,307, 
PAGE 141 
499,559 etc 
30) James Frazer The Golden Bough 
31) Roger Trigg's Reason and Commitment is helpful on how, 
beliefs that one is ccffdtted to can, at the same time, be 
doubted. 
32) Colin Lyas in "The Groundlessness of Religious Belief" 
p189, argues that he holds the belief that his name is not 
Herman Munsterberg unconditionally, although it is technically 
susceptible to evidence. 
33) David Jenkins, the Bishop of Durham, in an interview with 
Walter Schwarz Guardian Weekly November 15 1987 
34) Genesis 3.1 
35) DZ Phillips Religion without Explanation p165 
36) See Ludwig Wittgenstein On Certainty para 97 
37) John Betjen-an John Betjenan's Collected Poems p188- 
And is it true? /And is it true? /This most tremendous tale of 
all ... That God was man in Palestine/And lives today in bread 
and wine? " 
38)'D Z Phillips Reliqion without Explanation p167 
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3.3: The search for a different theory 
3.3.1: What should a good philosophical theory of innovation in 
religion do? It should be philosophically sound - soundly 
argued from sound assumptions, econcmical, and consistent with 
a sound general theory of religion. But it should also be 
possible to tell a plausible story of an instance Of 
innovation in religion that fits the theory in a satisfying 
way. (One way around any problern between these two 
requirements is to describe a form of religious innovation 
that fits the theory being Proposed and go on to claim that 
this', is 'real' religion and that the other forms we may ccme 
across are gratuitous annexations. This is an unsatisfactory 
procedure, especially if the instances generally considered 
, to 
be standard or definitive end up in the second category. ) 
It has been suggested in this thesis that present theories 
based on an enpiricist view of religion fail notably in both 
of these týýo r(: 
ýpirements, while present theories based on the 
priority of language in religion fail most notably in the 
second. It seems in general that enpiricism makes the role 
of tradition unnecessary while priority-of-language theories 
make the role of innovators impossible. 
The task now is to see if it is possible to start from what 
seem to be the sound assumptions of the priority-of-language 
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I 
theories and rove towards a theory of innovation that 
adequately accannodates standard stories of religious 
innovation. 
I begin by accepting that, as adequately argued by 
MacIntyre, Winch and Phillips, the use of the concepts of 
reality and truth (and the cluster of concepts that surround 
them) are learnt, and substantially determined by, cultural 
training; and by accepting the implication of this, namely 
that there is no source of criteria for giving intelligibility 
or credibility to talk or experiences that is independent of, 
culture. 
Religious traditions are systems of beliefs and practices 
that provide such criteria. They depend on the idea of 
following rules and therefore have the internal authority that 
we associate with tradition - the authority of an established 
practice. 
The features of standard forms of religion that our theory 
should accommodate can be summarized as follows: most of the 
major world religions are essentially ccnTnitted to the idea of 
truth. Their adherents do not man that their beliefs are 
true within the criteria of their own culture, but that they 
Some-how correspond to how things stand. They also believe 
that people who have incompatible beliefs are wrong, in a way 
that will one day become evident. They believe that their 
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faith, is not explicable solely in anthropcmorphic term - as 
the product of people and their ideas, but involves, in scn-e 
way, the intervention in human history of samething that is 
beyond it. 
Religions can act as a base for the criticism and change of 
culture. This has been anply demnstrated by the role of the 
church in ca=unist states and it could, of course, also be 
said of other forms of culture, such as art. other aspects of 
a culture can also act as a base for the criticism of a 
religious tradition or its loss of authority. Literary and 
historical criticism can, for exanple, be seen to erode the 
authority of the Bible. 
while it is true that religions, with their determining 
rules, are inherited by individuals, religious innovators can 
criticize and change religious traditions in a way that can be 
seen as an intelligible response to changing historical 
situations. In the process, systems of belief and action, 
including criteria of authority, 'bedrock propositions', and 
'world pictures' are discarded and new ones created, that can 
be seen to be intelligibly related both to what preceded them 
and to the historical changes that precipitated them. 
Whether these new creations take root depends on their 
reception by a group of people, who then form a new religious 
can=ity. The reception of new ideas, and the abandonukent of 
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old ones, is a process that is not detached from an 
individual's experiences, or from reasons. During the process 
systems of thought are questioned and ccnpared and'' 
intelligible decisions are taken. 
One of the roles of theology is to work towards cognitive 
consistency within a particular tradition, but it is also 
concerned with intelligibly relating the'tradition to other 
aspects of the intellectual climate and people's social 
experiences. 
3.3.2: It has been a matter of debate what Wittgenstein intended to 
convey by his remarks about religious beliefs being a form of 
life, theology being grammar, and rule-following activities 
b eing autonomous and isolated. The writers considered in the 
previous section, have in their interpretations, I believer 
taken these reniarks too far. 
In one of Wittgenstein's senses you can not give up a form 
of life and you can not relate to people (or lions)(1) with a 
different form of life. In this sense there can not be 
several independent forms of life in one culture. WD Hudson 
asks if one form of life can isolate itself and claim a 
logical ulitimacy of its own. He ccnrents, "Surely notr if 
the language used to constitute it is ccn=n to other forms of 
guage used to life as well, as most, if not all of the lanc 
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express religious beliefs is. "(2) 
Religious traditions cannot be totally autonomous,, nor 
totally isolated 'from one another, or from other aspects of 
the culture in which they operate; they just, have different 
histories. '' Theology has to be done continually as religious 
traditions relate their institutions to changes in the 
surrounding aspects of culture 
There are several remarks in Wittgenstein's work to suggest 
that forms of life (consisting of both practices and talk) 
are, in some senses, 'constrained by the world and by our 
psychology. (3) -Important- here is his-insistence on the fact 
that, in sow senses, rules are followed blindly(4) - that- it 
is a-"not a kind of seeing ... It is our, acting which lies at 
the bottom of the language game". (5) - And this acting is, 
for Wittgenstein, essentially communal. (6) A proper 
appreciation of these ideas must raise the importance of 
institutions, in the, sense of cc=mally established 
activities, in any consideration of innovation in religion. 
wittgenstein's remarks about rule-following activities do 
not make them immune from intelligible criticism and radical 
change., Anthony O'Hear, for exanple, argues that there is 
scn-ething deeply anti-relativistic about Wittgenstein's 
analysis of rule-following. (7) Flor Wittgenstein the whole 
idea of following a rule depends on the ability to distinguish 
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between being right and thinking one is right. Once pecple, ý. _,, 
have learnt this distinction through marbership of an 
epistemic camunity they can, O'Hear argues, see the-., 
possibility that scme of the beliefs widely held in their. -- 
ccniminity my also be wrong. Wittgenstein is careful to 
point out wbat does not anount, to an effective challenge to,,, 
our life and belief but he does not say there are no 
efffective challenges, nor that such challenges may not, in 
principle, be anenable to scme sort of reasoned assessment. 
Wittgenstein's discussion of the shifting river-bed is 
relevant here. He says, "The sarm propositions my get 
treated at one tirm as scoething to test experience, at 
another- as. a rule of testing. "(8) in fact Wittgenstein, as 
O'Hear points out, -is himself not averse to criticizing 
Practices well-embedded in his own culture. 
3-3-3: The rest of this thesis will explore the possibility of 
reconciling these assumptions with these requirements by 
considering religion, not primarily as a kind ofexperience, 
nor as a kind of, language, but as an aspect of culture .-a 
sort of, social institution - by constructingi that is, an 
institutional theory of religion. 
We have already had some clues as to how this might help- 
Seeing religions as more than language systems will help to 
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explain more clearly 1) the conflicting pressures for 
continuity and for change within an institutioný(tradition v 
innovation), and - the way in which religions are 2) not 
isolated, 3) not arbitrary and 4) assessed and chosen. 
3.3.3.1: Tradition and innovation 
Social institutions involve rules about ways -of talking, 
reasoning and interpreting experience, ways of behaving, both, 
practically, and symbolically and, ways of relating;, they 
involve channels-ofauthority, social, roles and. institutional 
structures. ' -Although , intimately -related, these varioust 
factors, in sow sense, can have lives of their owný - 
developing ' independently and, attracting -an independent. - 
authority -this makes more clear the dynamic -tensions. that 
can arise within a -religion to precipitate change. -. -It-is 
interesting to consider-here the tensions that have arisen 
between liturgy and theology in a changing social climate such 
as that precipitated bytthe feminist movement. 
A symbolic activity. that has a. social function, has within 
it both pressure for continuity and, if the social situation 
changes, the possibility of pressure for change. There can be 
tension between practice (this is how it has always been 
done), and theory (but our lives have changed and it no longer 
means the same to us). These tensions do-not necessarily have, 
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to be conscious or verbalized. A previous feeling of'ýI 
authority just fades (towards the Bible) or people just stop 
using a particular institution (private confession and.,,, 
absolution). Alternatively the conflict can beccm intense 
and can beccim focused on an individual. 
3.3.3.2: Interacting aspects of culture 
Modem cultures are not made up of discrete -world views and 
isolated language systems. A ocnmn language spans a 
profusion of -almost individually tailored combinations Of 
attitudes, beliefs and behaviour. The different spheres of 
life, in which the same people move, are not isolated from 
each, other. A week in a city office, a university ccimmon rom 
or a tower block flat, affects what is looked for in the 
Eucharist on Sunday; concepts leamt in the factory and the 
lecture room-find their way into liturgy; new-ethical problems 
posed in the laboratory demand a new look at scripture, a 
rethinking of old, doctrines; the ideas of writers, artistst 
economists and artisans interact with priests and theologians 
(some of them are in their congregations and classrooms). 
There is no, neutral independent source of reasons or 
experiences fran which to view the worldr butr if religion is 
one aspect of culture among manyt it can be viewed from others 
and ccMpared, combined, reformed or rejected. I 
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3.3.3.3: Culture and life 
If, as Wittgenstein maintained, nature makes, herself 
audible, (9) one way that we hear her is in the rules that 
govern social institutions (in the sense of established, 
symbolic, rule-following, activities). These rituals have 
functions for human societies and for individuals that relate 
to their life histories. They express, focus and give a 
meaning to, and a-'way 'of sharing and controlling, the 
exaltation and anxiety that surrounds a birth, the grief and 
hope that surrounds a death, the pride of adulthood, the 
wonder of harvest, the value of comradeship, the fear of 
battle. Ritual activities attract' an intrinsic authority'' 
(tradition), and the power of (and the function and the need 
for) rituals changes with changing social circumstances. The 
threat of the enemy recedes, the harvest loses its wonder, 
other fears and wonders unimagined by our ancestors, arrive to 
take their place. Life feels different and some adaptation of 
the institutional system is demanded if it is to survive. 
Practices can be adapted or die out, or the same actions can 
be given different meanings, perhaps different words are said 
to accompany or explain them. 
There is no neutral independent source of experiences from 
which to view the world, but changing historical' situations 
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produce changes in how people feel about their lives and 
therefore produce pressure for changes in the social-, 
institutions whose meaning and power derive from those-,,, ' 
feelings. 
3.3.3.4: Choosing a world-view 
If religions are complex institutional sytems interwoven with-r 
. 
other such systems in the lives of modern people, they cano, -. - 
like any part of any system, at some time in a person' s life, : -, 
be taken out and questioned in the context of other parts of-, 
the total system being held firm. Doubters can calculate the, - 
net effect to their cognitive, social and emotional lives of,,,. -, 
retaining or rejecting a belief or an attitude, and make- 
reasoned decisions, about it. These decisions can be ý 
rationally pondered responses to the experience of changing, -'ý 
historical, or personal: circumstances, without depending in 
any way upon general criteria of rationality, or experiences 
Of an independently real world. 
3.3.4: How then are we to suppose changes occur in rule-following 
activities? Soccer is a rule-following activity that serves a 
social functicn. How do changes occur in the rules of the 
game? The rules of how to play football (and the rules 
relating to other roles associated with the g&Te such as 
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referee, managerr spectator, etc) are part of our inherited- 
tradition. As such t1tey have an intrinsic authority which is 
augmented by various local, national and international 
regulating bodies. But pressures for change do emrge that 
are related to factors outside the world of football, and 
succeed in forcing changes that relate intelligibly to the 
source of these pressures. 
changes in the social function of the game (and of course 
its economics) due to the -increasing importance of the 
spectator, have led to changes in the off-side rule., 
An increased level of violence in society has led to the 
introduction of rules about warnings and sending-off, and new 
concepts - the yellow card and the red card. 
changes in the physical conditions in which the game is 
played (in a small hall or yard for instance) lead to changes 
in the rules about the number of players-required. - 
The rise of Rugby Football and its subsequent split into 
rival leagues would make an interesting comparison with the 
rise of a new religion. 
L-verything considered so far seem to point towards the 
importance of seeing religions as social institutions and the 
possiblity that scm kind of institutional theory of religion 
might be a fruitful base for an adequate explanation of 
radical innovation in religion. 
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Institutional theories in the field of art have, however, _ 
not been very successful. 7he next section will consider what 
can be learnt fraii their failure. 
Notes 
1 1) Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations I Para 
223 
2) WD Hudson Wittgenstein and Religious Belief 
3) eg Ludwig Wittgenstein Zettel para. 364 and On Certainty 
paras 616/7 
4) Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations I para. 
219 
5) Ludwig Wittgenstein On Certainty para. 204 
6) Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations I paras 
198-201 
7) Anthony O'Hear - "Wittgenstein and the Transmission of 
Tradition" Frcm the script of a lecture delivered at the 
Royal Insititute of Philosophy in November 1989. It will be 
published by the RIP as a supplement to PhilosoT)hv 
8) Ludwig Wittgenstein On Certainty paras 96-98 
9) Ludwig Wittgenstein Zettel para. 364 
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SECTION 4: INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES OF ART 
4.1: Introduction 
Miat is Art? The question is an old one. Socrates wanted to 
know %bat all the things we call art have in ccnTmnl(l) and 
the question was asked without any very satisfactory answer 
for centuries. It was Wittgenstein who arrested the inquiry - 
by the suggestion: "Don't say: There must be scnething 
conmon... look and see whether there is, "(2) - and by the 
indication of an answer: "The application of. a word is not 
everywhere bounded by rules. "(3) 
The question becane, in sane quarters, no longer 
acceptable. But by the end of the 1960s, with new ways of 
looking at art seaning to indicate the possibility of a new 
sort of answer, scm philosophers(4)- began, to argue that 
perhaps it - was I not an altogýether pointless question. Maybe 
there was a path somewhere between the. Platonic conclusion 
that 'Art, was the name of an inaccessible mystery, and the 
wittgensteinian conclusion that it was not the name of 
anything. Maybe you could say sanething valid and interesting 
about art by looking, not at the natural properties of 
objects, or the natural attitudes of individuals, but at the 
relationship between art and culture - not at brute facts but 
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at institutional cnes-(5) 
Ideas proliferated but actual theories were scarce and 
their critics vociferous. Yet the enterprise has opened up, 
same useful areas of discussion and brought attention to scme 
important characteristics of the vmrld of art. It has added 
to our understanding of the relationship between cultural 
training and experience, between objects and ideas, between 
canmmities and individuals and between practice and theorY. 
Notes 
1) See Plato's The Republic 
2) See for exanple Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical 
Investigations I para 66. These ideas of Wittgenstein's were 
worked out in relation to art notably by Paul Ziff "The Task 
of Defining a Work of Art" and Morris Weitz "The Role of 
Theory in, Aesthet-ics" 
3), Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations 1 para 
84 
4),, Work, in this field will be reviewed in the following 
secticn. 
5), Elizabeth Ansccn-be discusses what brute facts are in "On 
Brute Facts" p6. What institutional facts are will be 
discussed in more detail in Section 5 
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4.2: institutional theories of art 
4.2: A theory of art has traditionally been seen as an attempt to 
answer the question - w-bat is art? The question can be asked 
in a rigorous, way -a search for an essentialist definition of 
art, or in a less rigorous way -a quest for a deeper 
understanding'%of the concept of art. An institutional theory 
of art is an attempt to answer this question, at either level, 
by referring to institutional facts. It does not, that is to 
say, seek to define or clarify the concept of art in terms of 
natural properties or relationships,, but An - terms of 
properties and relationships that depend upoil the agreement of- 
human ccmuinities. (1) 
To explore the field of institutional theories of art this 
section will, briefly review the ideas of i margolis and. 
Richard Wollheim, neither of which tenninates- in. an 
institutional, theory, some works of TJ Diffey. and Arthur C 
Danto, which could be said to point towards an institutional 
theory, and those of George Dickie and-Jerrold Levinson, who 
present just such a theory, although the latter denies that 
that is what he is doing. Their critics will be considered in 
the following section. 
4.2.1: In a paper entitled "Works of, Art as Physically Etbodied. and 
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Culturally Rnergent Entities", J Margolis Points to a 
sindlarity between works of art and persons in that they both 
appear to possess two sets of properties. One set they have 
as physical objects and these they possess, "independently of,. - 
any cultural consideration and even independently of the. ý 
existence of any culture". The other set of properties arel. 
"culturally significant properties, " that, "cannot be ascribed 
to the merely physical objects in which they are enbodied". (2) 
These latter constitute the work of art and areý 
characterized by having an "interior purposiveness". He draws., 
an analogy with a signal; 
A man raises his am to signal; the action has that 
intentional property. Apart frcxn human society there is no 
such action, no more than a movement of the am; within 
the conventions of a culture the action may be seen as 
such, embodied in the am's movement... To identify an act 
of signalling one- must identify a suitable physical 
-movement that by*reference to an appropriate tradition or 
rule or custom or the like may fairly be taken as enbodYing 
the act. So the very existence of the action depends on a 
cultural context. (3) 
Applying the analogy to art he states: "Only relative to scine 
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cultural tradition - normally continuous and congruent from 
society to society,, but not always - can .. anything ýbe 
identified as a work of art. "(4) 
We see raised here the possibility of distinguishing art 
frm non-art by referring to the relationship between objects 
and what may be called institutional facts.. 
4.2.2: In a book entitled Art and its objects, Richard Wollheim 
explores the irrplications of seeing art as a 'form of life' a 
phrase taken from Wittgenstein's later philosophy, (5) a phrase 
which Wollheim says, "appears as descriptive or invocatory ., of,. 
the total cmtext within which alone language can exist: the 
conplex of habits, experiences, skillsý with -which language 
interlocks in that it, could not be operated without them and 
equally, they cannot be -identified. without reference, to 
it" - (6). - 
one of these inplications is-that we, should not think*there 
is scmething which we call the artistic inpulse or intention, 
and which can be identified independently of,. and priar -to, 
the institutions of art: (7) I ., I 
There is no way in which we can ascribe n-anifestations- to 
this artistic instinct until there are already established 
in society certain practices recognized as artistic; the- 
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sexual instinct, on the other hand, manifests itself in 
certain activities, whether or not society recognizes them 
as sexual... In the case of sexuality, the connection 
between the instinct and its satisfaction in the world is 
iawdiate, in the case of art it is mediated by a practice 
or institution (... the parallel in the sexual sphere to 
talking of an artistic instinct would be to postulate a 
'matrimonial I instinct). (8) 
It does not follow that there is no such thing as an artistic' 
inpulse; there is still the inpluse to produce something as a 
work of art, but what gives art its unity "is that the objects 
that : centrally 'belong to it have been produced under the' 
concept of art". (9) 
Later in his essay Wollheim talks about seeking, "not a 
definition, but a general mathod - for- identifying works Of 
art". (10), He--says the method might take the form Of picking 
out certain objects as original, or primary, *works of art, and 
then setting up, scm rules which, successively applied to the 
original works of art, will give us... all'subsequent or 
derivative works of art. 
Wollheim discusses the way in which it could be true to Say 
that art is dependent upon life: 
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It is clear that, when we look at a painting or listen to a 
piece of music, our perception rests upon projection and 
responsiveness to form, processes. w-hich we rmy believe to 
be in operation from the beginnings of consciousness. It 
has been said, with reason, that the crux or core of art 
my be recognized in scme effect as sinple. as the 
ccnpletely satisfying progression from a ccbbled street to 
the srmoth base of a building that grows upward from it. 
Here, then, we have the dependence of art on life. (11) 
He points. out that, in art, -these original processes are., 
constrained, but what is peculiar to art is not a new kind ofl, 
feeling, or perception or awareness, but a new conjunction of-. 
elemnts already in existence. 
These observations of Wollheim's suggest that it might be 
possible to define art - in tenns of its relatimsl4P - ýq - 
institutimal facts. . But this is a terrptatim, which Wol 
lheirn, 
as we shall see later, vigorously resists. 
4.2.3: In a paper called "The Republic of Art", TJ Diffey suggests 
it is the institutionalized presentation of an object that is 
crucial when we claim it is a work of art. We are Potf 
he 
says, expressing a brute fact about the object, but c4n, 
institutional fact. Being a work of art is, Dif fey : 5aYs, a 
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status conferred upon an object by the judgement of the 
public. 02) 
He argues that if, as some claim, there are no necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the apýlication of the term 
'work of art, p the term has no connotation. However, if we 
demand somthing less vigorous we can exhibit the logic Of the 
phrase. As far as it is denotive, one can proceed by listing 
well known works: "That is, " he says, "to enumerate 
institutional facts. "(13) 
But how do you acccmmodate innovators who seek to re-create 
the concept of art? It is the case in art, Diffey maintains, 
that it is possible to re-create the concept of art, but at 
the same'tiue, it is not true that anything anyone choses to 
call art is art. 
To steer between these extrenes it is necessary to consider 
how the status 1ý7ork of art' is conferred on somethinq. He 
suggests this might be done, "by reviving the metaphor of the 
Republic or Ccianonwealth of Letters, extending it to include 
all the arts, and then taking it literally". 04) 
First stage membership of the republic is by self electionr 
and effective, or second-stage, membership is by recognition, 
and 'it is the republic which confers the - status of 'work of 
art, on things that are already identifiable as, for 
instance, a novel, or a play. 
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one can not interxl to produce a work of art, only wish or 
hope that it will be me and, although it seems impossible for 
the republic to make a mistake, in fact, as in the award of 
degrees, value judgements are involved and mistakes can be 
made. (15) Merely personal users of the term may be ignored, 
scorned or fail to carry the support of the republic. 
But Diffey poses several other questions that he does not 
answer: how'does the republic make up its mind? must there be 
reasons for conferring or witholding status? is there one 
republic or many? is this really a single concept? 
Again these ideas point towards an institutional theory of 
art, but, with the author's connivance, fail to arrive at one. 
In a later paper Diffey develops scne of these ideas in a 
different direction. Most of the paper deals with objections 
to institutional theories that suppose that "when we know how 
things are accredited as art we shall know what art is". (16) 
This idea is, he says, subject to a number of philosophical 
objections (which we shall consider later). He adds, 
-Wittgensteinians are right that a formula defining art would 
be useless; for exanple we do not need a definition of art to' 
spot works of art since works of art are identified not by 
philosophical definition but by history. "(17) He pleads for a 
conprcmise between rejecting the question: what is art? 
altogether and answering it by reference to the way works of 
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art are accredited. He wants to urge that the question Of 
what art is, is scmething "which is settled historicallyr 
which yet can legitimately be a matter of dispute". (18) 
4.2.4: Arthur C Danto wrote a paper about New York painting. In'it 
he imagines four identical neck ties - one picasso has painted 
all over blue, me a child has painted blue, one a forger has 
painted blue and one Cezanne painted blue. According to DantO 
only the first tie is a work of art: 
one way to see the matter is this: Picasso used the necktie 
to make a statement, the forger employed the tie to copy 
what Picasso made a statement with but node no statement by 
mans of his... The child and Cezanne are simply making a 
noise. Their objects have no location in the history Of 
art... art had not developed appropriately by the time of 
Cezanne for such a statement to have been intelligible, nor 
can the child in question have sufficiently internalized 
the history and theory of art to make a statementt much 
less this statement. 09) 
Later in this paper Danto introduces the concept of 
ascriptivity, which is a property of predicates when they 
attach to objects by reference to conventions and which apply 
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less on the basis of certain necessary and sufficient 
coryliticns than of defeating corffitions not holding. (20) 
'Artwork', perhaps like 'person', is, he suggests, an 
ascriptive tem rather than an exclusively descriptive 
one. (21) Danto, proposes two defeating conditions for objects 
not to be art works - that they are copies and that they are 
not created by artists. ("But 'artist' is as ascriptive a 
term as 'artwork', " he points out, " and in fact by' is 'as 
ascriptive as either"). (22) 
In a later paper Danto elaborates on his thoughts and 
introduces two important new ideas. Although he does not 
press them into serving an institutional theory, they are, as 
Dickie points out, consistent with, and can be incorporated 
into, an institutional account. 
The two new ideas are the concept of 'the artworld' and the 
role of theories in constituting it. Danto begins by, saying 
that we know which objects are works of art because we know 
how to use the word 'art', and to apply the phrase 'work of 
art', correctly, but he goes on to warn, this is not as simple 
as it might seem, for these days one needs to know about 
artistic theories in order to know that one is on artistic 
terrain. (23) 
Danto looks back at the history of art and, drawing an 
analogy with science, speaks of changes which are not so much 
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revolutions in taste as theoretical revisions of considerable 
proportions, "involving not mly the artistic enfranchizenent, 
of these objects, but an errphasis upon newly significant 
features of accepted artworks, so that quite different 
accounts of their status as artworks would now have to, be 
given". (24) ý,, 1 
Turning to sane 20th century American artists such as 
Robert Rauschenberg and Andy Warhol, Danto explains hcý7 
acquaintance with a particular theory is necessary if One is 
to see how it is that their contributions count as art. (25) 
He refers to one particular exarrple of Andy Warhol's work; 
What in the end makes the difference between a Brillo box 
and a work of art consisting of a Brillo box is a certain 
theory of art. It is the theory that takes it up into the 
world of art, and keeps it from collapsing into the real 
object which it is... of course without the theoryf one is 
unlikely to see it as art, and in order to see it as part 
of the artworld, me n-ust have rrastered a good deal 
artistic theory as well as a considerable amount of the 
history of recent New York painting. (26) 
Danto proceeds to describe the relationship between new art 
theories and existing ones in terms of the addition of new 
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artistically relevant predicates.. Which predicates end up 
being seen as artistically relevant is, he says,, of almost 
purely sociological interest, nor would the things they 
confirm as artworks be artworks, without the theories and 
histories of the Artworld. (27) 
4.2.5: George Didde took the ideas of Arthur Danto and transfonred 
them into 'a full blown institutional theory of art. He did 
not pursue the idea that the continuity of art theories were 
of primary importance in defining art; he turned instead to 
the ccncept of the artworld, amalgamated it with Diffey's idea 
of conferring status and proposed that it 1-zas possible to 
define an art object as, loan artifact... a set of the aspects 
of which, has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for 
appreciation by scme person or persons acting on behalf of a 
certain institution (the artworld)". (28) 
If this theory is to work as a definition it obviously 
needs careful descriptions of what is meant by an artworld and 
an artifact, by acting on behalf of an institution, by 
conferring status and by being a candidate for appreciation. 
These descriptions Dickie outlines. 
He uses Dantols idea of 'the artworldl - the broad social 
institutions in which works of art have their place, but 
refines it: "Men I call, the artworld an institution I am 
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saying that it is an established practice, not that it is an 
established society or corporation. "(29) He takes theatre as 
an exwple of one of the systems within the artworld: "Ih6 
roles of actors and audience are defined by the traditions -Of 
the theatre. What the author, management, and players present 
is artr and it is art because it is presented within the 
theatreworld framework. "(30) Each system within the artworld 
has its own origins and history and each has its cwn 
procedures and lines of authority even if they are on the 
level of customary practices rather than being explicitlY 
codified. (31) But the different systems have in camn the 
fact that they are the frarmwork for the presenting Of 
particular works of art. 
And who belongs to the artworld? Dickie seems to answer 
this question anbiguously. The essential core he seesýas 
consisting of artists who create, presenters and 'goers' who 
appreciate thEm. "All the roles are institutionalized and must 
be learned in one way or another by the participants, " but he 
adds: "In addition, every person who sees hin-self as a nen-ber 
of the artworld, is thereby a member. "(32) 
To explain what he rmans by an artifact Dickie says that a 
natural object such as a piece of driftwood or a painting done 
by a'gorilla, can be rmde into art by such an action as 
hanging it on the wall, or entering it in an art exhibition. 
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It is thereby "artifactualized without the use of tools - 
artifactuality is conferred on the object rather than worked 
on it". 03) A great deal apparently depends upon the. 
institutional setting; -exhibited at- the Field Museum, of 
Natural History in Chicago by her keeper, Betsy the Gorilla's 
paintings are not works of art; exhibited a few miles away at 
the Chicago Art Institute by its director, they have undergone 
a dramatic change. They would remain Betsy's paintings, 
Dickie explains, but "they would be the art of the person 
responsible for their being exhibited". (Betsy not being able 
to ccnceive of herself in such a way as to be a member-of the,.. 
artworld, and hence to confer the- relevant status. )(34), 
Hu, qever any member of the artworld is capable of acting on 
behalf of the institution, even if they act-alone. (35)-- I... 
Dickie describes-the conferring of-status on works of art 
as -analagous to the' way-in wtiich a person, is certified, as. 
qualified for office, or-two persons acquire the status of- 
ccnwn-law marriage within' a legal, system, or a person is 
elected president of the Rotary, - or a person acquires the 
status of wise man within a comnunity., The status of #work of 
art' is acquired, "by a single person acting on behalf of the 
artworld and treating an artifact as a candidate . for 
_appreciation". 
(36) 
But, being a candidate for appreciation does not require 
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that the object be actually appreciated even by one person. -% 
Neither does the theory rely on any special sense of the word. 
'appreciation'. All that is meant by it,, says Dickie, Ifis 
somthing like 'in experiencing the qualities of a thing One I 
finds them worthy or valuable"'. it is the kind of,, 
"institutional structure in which the art object is enbedded, 
not the different kind of appreciation that nukes the) 
difference between the appreciation of art and the 
appreciation of nonart". (37) 
The institutional theory of art may sound like saying a 
work of art is an object of which scrneone has said, "I 
christen this object a work of art". Dickie concludes that it 
is rather like that, "although this does not mean that the 
conferring of the status of art is a simple matter. Tust as 
the christening of a child has as its background the history 
and structure of the church, conferring the status of art has 
as, its , background the Byzantine cmplexity of the 
artworld. "(38) Yet there is a difference - in the case of 
art, there do not seem to be ways in which the conferring can 
go wrong, because the artworld "admits and even encourages 
frivolity and caprice without losing its serious purpose". (39) 
Mistakes can only be made in the sense that one can lose face 
if no one appreciates an object you have proposed, or if it 
turns out to be a fake. 
PAGE 170 
Dickie gives a fuller account of - his theory in a later 
book. Here he argues that the concept of a work of art can be 
used in three different senses -a primary or classificatory 
sense, a secondary or derivative sense and an evaluative 
sense. (40) His definition of art, he claims, applies only to 
the primary sense. Use of this sense, which indicates simply 
that a thing belongs to a certain category of artifacts, 
occurs infrequently because it is usually perfectly clear 
whether or not something is a work of art in this sense. - It 
is, however, Didde claims, a basic concept that structures 
and guides our thinking about our world and its contents. (41)ý, 
We say driftwood is art, he explains,, because it- resembles. 
some paradigm work of art or because it shares properties with 
paradigm works of art. (42) 
At the end of his book Dickie atterrpts to give, not just-an 
institutional analysis -of art, but an institutional-analysis 
of the notion of the aesthetic object. His main thesis is 
that the aspects of a work of art which belong to the 
aesthetic object of that work of art are determined by the 
conventions governing its presentation. This idea is worked- 
out in some detail with regard to theatre and serves to 
re-inforce the role of institutions- in defining art. (43) 
Dickie's most recent book, (44) in which he replies to the 
accumulated criticism of the Institutional Theory of Art will 
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be discussed in Section 4.4. 
4.2.6: The last piece of work to be considered in this section is 
Jerrold Levinson's "Defining Art Historically". In this, 
paper Levinson develops what he calls an alternative to the 
institutional theory of art. in fact he specifically deniesý, - 
that "an analysis of arthood" must involve institutionst and- 
that the institutions of art in a society are essential to- 
art. He says, "The making of art is primary; the social,,: 
frameworks and conventions that grow up around it are 
not. "(45) But he retains, "the crucial idea that artworkhood 
is not an intrinsic exhibited property of a thing, but rather 
a matter of being related in the right way to human activity: 
and thought". (46) He is, I suggest, using the word- 
'institution' in an unusual way here. The activities of human 
ccmmmities are, in the normal use of the word, institutions, 
and if his theory depends upon the relationship between art 
and these activities it is, in that sense, an institutional 
theory, 
Levinson sets out to construct this relationship in terms 
of' the intentions of single, independent, individuals, rather 
than in-terus of acts performed in an institutional setting. 
This intention -nakes reference to the history of art - what 
art has been - as opposed to "that murky and scmewhat 
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exclusive institution, the artworld". (47) The core of his 
proposal is, he says, to give an essential historicity to an 
account of what it is to regard samething as a work of art. 
X is a work of art, he suggests, if it is a thing intended 
for regard as a work of art - that is, regarded in any of the 
ways in which prior art works are or were correctly 
regarded. (48) In order to expand this definition he goes on 
to suggest that the person concerned must have appropriate 
proprietary rights over the object, that he*must intei-ýd in the 
sense of, "iraking, appropriating or conceiving for the 
purposes of, " and he rmst do it in a rmmer Levinson 
characterizes as "non-passingly". By 'correctly regarded', he 
weans to include 'standardly regarded,. He summarizes this 
position by saying: "To be art at (tirre) t is to be 
intentionally related in the required way to smething which 
is art prior to t". (49) The definition is not circular 
because what counts as art prior to the present time is a fact 
(it is what we have called an institutional fact). "To 
eliminate this reflexiveness would, " Levinson says, "be to 
eviscerate the term 'art' of the only universal content which 
it now retains". (50) 
To accaTmodate what he calls revolutionary art, or art that 
calls for a totally unprecedented sort of regard, Levinson 
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argues that if they are to be arto the artists's prinkiry 
intention must be to make his objects art. He =St, ninitially 
direct his audience to take them (or try to take them) in some 
Way that art has been taken",, or to take them,, "in sane other 
way in contrast to and against the background of those ways'l'. 
He nmst as least "consciously nod in the direction of Pas t 
artistic activity". (51) 
This selection of ideas and theories has all been 
extensively criticized, and it is to these criticisms that I 
turn in the next section. 
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4.3: criticisms of institutional theories of art 
4.3: Institutional, theories of art attempt to answer the question: 
what is art? by referring not to brute facts but to 
institutional ones, that is, not to natural properties or 
relationships but to properties or relationships that depend 
upon the agreement of human caTn=ities. 
such theories can vary in the context, vigour and content 
of their claims. They can claim that art is an importantly 
institutional phenonenon, in that one cannot fully understand 
it without taking into account its relationship with culture: 
they can suggest that it is in same way essentially an 
institutional phencmenon, in that one cannot get a grasp of 
the concept at all without refeýence to institutional facts: 
or they can argue that the concept of art, or the concept of a 
work of art, is institutional in the sense that its use is 
regulated by institutions, determined by institutions, or in 
its strongest form, can be defined rigorously in terms of 
institutional facts. 
The theories' critics vary in the denands they make on such 
a theory - whether. it must, for instance, be illuminating or 
con-prehensive, useful or rigorous. 
There is a considerable quantity of literature on the 
criticism of institutional theories of art. This section 
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will identify and discuss what appear to be the nx)st Pertine 
nt' 
criticisms rather than discuss and attribute each of the 
sametimes detailed, scmetines unconvincing and scmet3ims 
repetitive arguments proposed by each writer. 
The critics fall into two classes, those who criticize-the 
entire prograrmie and those w1ho criticize the particular 
theories proposed. 
4.3.1: Critics of the entire progranTm 
4.3.1.1: Some of those who criticize the whole idea of institutional 
theories are, as I have already suggested using the word 
linstitutition' in an unusual way. 
Jerrold Levinson, for exanple, wants to deny that the 
institutions of art in a society are of prirre inportance to 
its art. He does not want art to be defined in terms of "its 
institutional networks" but in terms of "its concrete 
history. He does not want art to be art by reference to the 
"murky... institutions of the artworld", but to the intentions 
of individuals that are, for him, crucially related to the 
history of art - to which objects have been counted as art 
in 
the past. (1) These are of course indisputably institutional 
facts by the usual use of the word. 
It would in fact be very hard to sustain an argument that 
institutions, in the sense in which we are using the term, are 
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not inportant to the concept of art. 
4.3.1.2: other critics seem to be expressing a general dislike for 
rigorous essentialist theories. They want -to 
hold on to 
Morris Weitz's claim that the conditions for a thing to be art 
are indefinitely corrigible. (2) Richard Wollheim, who is 
ccnmitted to demonstrating the institutional character of art, 
denounces institutional theories because they claim to pick 
out works of art by describing properties which. are essential, 
to them. "It is also, just the enterprise that... more 
sceptically . -inclined philosophers, often expressing an 
indebtedness to Wittgensteinian ideas, have declared not 
possible, " he says. (3) 
1<endall L Walton says in a review. of Dickie's book that he, 
w, elcomes its emphasis on, the role of the world of art in 
social. institutions, but adds,, "My own view is that the, search 
for a definition (of art) is a philosophical dead erid- We do 
not need one. " It is not, he explains, that. he thinks the 
concept can not be defined but "sirrply that a definition, would 
serve no good purpose, that it is not likely to Provide any 
significant philosophical insight or illuminatim.. - 
Concepts 
are not mountains, " he says, "Their mere exister1ce in. a 
language does not make them worthy objects of an3lys's and 
since the things we regard as art are "hardly a ln3'ýural 
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will identify and discuss what appear'to be the most pertinent 
criticisms rather than discuss and attribute each of the 
scmtims detailed, sm-etims unconvincing and scmetinies 
repetitive argLments proposed by each writer. 
The critics fall into two classes, those who criticize the 
entire progranme and those who criticize the particular 
theories proposed. 
4.3.1: Critics of the entire proqranm 
. 3.1.1: Son-e of those who criticize the whole idea of 
institutional 
theories are, as I have already suggested using the word 
'institutition' in an unusual way. 
Jerrold Levinson, for exanple, wants to deny that the 
institutions of art in a society are of prime inportance to 
its art. He does not want art to be defined in terms of "its 
institutional networks" but in terms of "its concrete 
history. " He does not want art to be art by reference to the 
"murky... institutions of the artworld", but to the intentims 
of individuals that are, for him, crucially related to the 
history of art - to which objects have been counted as art in 
the past. (1) These are of course indisputably institutional 
facts by the usual use of the word. 
It would in fact be very hard to sustain an argument that 
institutions, in the sense in which we are using the term, are 
4 
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not inportant to the concept of art. 
4.3.1.2: other critics seem to be expressing a general dislike for 
rigorous essentialist theories. They want to hold on to 
morris Weitz's claim that the conditions for a thing to be art 
are indefinitely corrigible. (2) Richard Wollheim, who is 
connitted to demonstrating the institutional character of art, 
denounces institutional theories because they claim to pick 
out works of art by describing properties which are essential 
to them. "It is also. just the enterprise that... more 
sceptically --inclined, philosophers, often expressing an 
indebtedness to Wittgensteinian ideas,, have declared not 
possible, " he says. (3) 
Kendall L Walton says in a review of Dickie's book that he 
welcorms its enphasis on, the role of the world of art in 
social. institutionstbut adds, "my own view is that the search 
for a definition (of art) is a philosophical dead end. We do 
not need one. " It is not, he explains, that, he thinks the 
concept can not be defined but "sirrply that a definition. would 
serve no good purpose, that it is not likely to provide any 
significant philosophical insight or illumination.,.. Concepts 
are not mountains, " he says, "Their mere existence in, a 
language does not make them worthy objects of analysis, " and 
since the things we regard as art are "hardly a 'natural 
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class', the distinction betweeý what belongs to it and what 
does not is, I believe, a useless and uninteresting one". (4) 
Anita Silvers believes that both Dickie and Danto have 
mistaken an explanatory connection for a definitional one. (5) 
4.3.1.3: Another area of general criticism is the extent to which 
institutional theories have been preoccupied with a certain 
style of =: >dern painting and sculpture which, their critics 
say, should have been precipitated frcm, rather than 
accon=dated to, the concept of art. 
There is clearly a sense in which the Dada movement 
(characterized by Ducharrp's entry of a urinal into an art 
exhibition with the title Fountain), was a deliberate attempt, 
not to change the concept of art, but to destroy it. Ted 
Cohen quotes frm a cataloque of the time that, "Dada stands 
opposed to the notion of value or quality in art, "(6) and goes 
on to say, that Duchamp's urinal "is virtually'acccmpanied by 
an announcement that traditional appreciation (if there is 
such a thing) cannot occur. " He thinks no definition of art 
should fit (Ducharrp's Fountain) so ccmfortably. In the face 
of objects like this we should not re-define art so that they 
can be made to fit into the category, but, give up the 
conpulsion to decide whether to rule it in or out, while 
holding on to the conviction that we know what art is. (7) 
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Anita Silver - points out that since Ducharrp Is aim was - to 
create a conceptual crisis, a definition of art on Wilich, his 
readymades "were clear-cut and ccmfortable -instances of the 
application of the term 'art' would be a definition on which 
the works would lose their point". (B) 
In trying to came to grips with readywades, -proponents of 
institutional theories -have -tried to explain how it-is that 
the same object can change its status, but -Silvers disputes 
that it is the same object. The urinal in the builder's yard- 
is not the san-e object as. Fountain, she argues, because., of 
what, Ducharrp did with it. "He artistically caused it to be 
surrounded by an atmosphere in which it was both afforded and 
denied the status of art. "(9) I- 5ý ý. I_. _. -I 
,TJ Diffey says, whether readymades are works, of art 
is no,, 
longer a live issue; it has been settled; but he,, still 
believes there is a point in resisting the incorporation of 
readymades into art: "To think-of anti-art as. merely some 
more recent form of art, is to nullify its significance. "(10) , 
Wollheim makes a similar point. He believes that Dachanpis 
readyniades are highly provocative and altogether ironical. in 
relation to art. To think that they require aesthetic theory 
to be reformulated in such a way as to, represent an object 
like Fountain as a central case, would be, he, says, a total 
misunderstanding of Duchairp's intentions. (11) 
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4.3.1.4: Institutional theories of art all, to scnie extent, depend 
upon the idea of ascription - the idea that to call an object 
a work of art is to give it a status, rather than to recognize 
that it has same natural quality. The theories' critics have 
variously attacked this idea. Melvin Rader(12) follows 
Plato's Euthyphro, by saying definition nmst tell us more than 
what people do with an object. Because their treatment is 
baseless unless it is a response to the object's intrinsic 
nature, what is done must presuppose rather than produce 
definitions of the object. Diffey also rejects the idea that 
art can be understood wholly in terms of the properties of 
works of art - the idea that, "when we -know how things are 
accredited as art we shall know what art is". -He lists his 
objections: 
. 1) Ccmmn sense says that scmething is in a gallery if it 
is a work of art not the other way around: 2) to treat x 
as y does not entail that x is y: 3) to say that scmething 
-gets its status as art through certain sorts of 
accreditation leaves the tem 'art' unanalysed: 4) it does 
-not seem to be a real task or anybody's job to predicate 
'art' of any individual (object): 5) the republic seemsr 
On this argunient, to operate at the level of particulars, 
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rather than genres: 6) it cannot be assumed that questions 
of status and evaluation are not distinct issues. (13) 
4.3.1.5: Diffey has raised another ý substantial criticism of 
institutional theories of art here - the connection between 
classif ication and - evaluation, between status and value. 
Institutional theories my seem to wrench the two apart and to 
assert, perhaps rather, arbitrarily, that the classificatory 
sense is primary to the concept of art and the evaluative 
sense is secondary. 
Richard J Sclafani criticizes , Dickie'for saying that'when 
we take a piece of driftwood to be art, we are using the 
evaluative sense- of the. concept; we 'are saying, that -it- 
resembles or shares same properties with paradigm works of- 
art, not that we really think it is art in the sense that the 
paradigms are. When we say of a cake, "It's a work of art", 
he explains, we do not mean that it is-art in the same way as 
the Mona Lisa, while with the driftwood*exanple we may well 
believe just this. (15) 
This criticism, while disagreeing with Dickie's use of- the 
category distinction, suggests that there is a real 
distinctiOn to be made. But the question remains whether the 
classificatOrY sense is primary. Walton says he does not think 
Dickie's classificatory concept of art is very important in 
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our conceptual scherre. He confesses to be unconvinced by 
Dic)de's argument: "Miat we feel is iniportant about 
paintings, " he says, "can be expressed and understood, not 
Only without stating whether they are art (in Dickie's sense)o, 
but without' assuming even any implicit understanding about 
this. "(15) while Anita Silvers claims that the evaluative 
and classificatory senses are "inextricably bound together in 
usage", (16) and Bruce Morton denies that there is any use in 
camion parlance corresponding to DicIde's classificatory 
sense. (17) 
4.3.1.6: The next criticism of institutional theories of art in 
general, is that they cover only scme areas of art --: that they 
are insufficiently ccrrprehensive. - It is Levinson who puts 
this most strongly. Institutional theory, "con-es close to 
conflating 'art and self-conscious art, *art and socially 
situated art, art and declared 'art", he says. (18) While 
Wollheim says that they distort the fact that, "Art in a 
society'is a far nore coaprehensive phenonmon than the corpus 
of works -of art produced in that society, and its boundaries 
are extremely difficult to draw". (19) 
4.3.1.7: The final criticism is the claim that institutional theories 
wdght lead to a vicious sort of relativism: "if the 
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institutional theory of art is intended to mean that, we are 
all of us trapped in our aesthetic response aoquired. 
exclusively from our own'societies, as if in tightly closed 
boxes of the, societies to which we belong, then the theory can 
be shmm to be false because contrary to fact, " says Frances 
Berenson. (20) 
4.3.2: Specific criticisms of Danto's ideas I 
4.3.2.1: Critics see Danto as having proposed that for an object to be 
a work of art it must be treated relevantly in terms of a 
certain sort of theory. But, Anita Silver says, if there is 
no way of distinguishing acceptable art theories from, 
non-acceptable, ones then, since all objects are candidates,, 
and anyone can call-anything-an art theory, "it makes it too. - 
easy for objects to qualify as art". (21) She also asks why. 
if. a theory can make one. can opener into a work of-art,. is it 
not the case that all can openers are works of art? (22) 
4.3.2.2: , 
George Dickie also criticizes Danto's epistemological claim 
that artistic theories help us to tell artworks frcm 
non-artworks, and his ontological claim that artistic theories 
make art possible. How, he asks, would the Real Theory of Art 
help us to distinguish art objects? And exactly how do art 
theories make. art possible? If he mans they must be 
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consciously held then he is clearly wrong for,, historicallyo, 
art precedes theories. But he nust mean more than simply 
having ideas about what counts as artj as "In this weak sense 
everycne would have a theory about almost everything he 
did. it (2 3) 
Sclafani asks if any art theories of the sort that Danto's 
theory seems to require exist, and concludes that Danto "has 
forced an interpretation which does not fit the facts. "(24) 
I 
4.3.2.3: Sclafani raises another problem by referring to William 
Remick's question, "Which comes first, the first artwork or 
the first theory? "(25) But he resolves this by sayingir "The 
notion of a'first poem, first painting, first work of art is 
as- unintelligible as the notion of the first sentence, first 
belief, first language". (26) He then refers to same of 
Wittgenstein's remarks in On Certainty, (27) and asks if 
getting smeone to see scmething as art is a theory dependent 
activity. Is getting him to see it as art any more than 
bringing it about, -%hat he learn how 'art' and its correlates 
are used in English? And we do this by ordinary example". 
Does a child not play Irish folk music merely because she has 
been brought up in an Irish village? (28) 
4.3.2.4: Other critics of Danto see him as having proposed that for 
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objects to be works of art they have to be relevantly related 
to a certain group of people - the artworld. They find this 
concept too vague and broad. Sclafani says that the concept 
'In-ay turn out to be so general and so vague that it is 
rendered vacuous... or, it may require sharpening up to the 
extent that we will no longer be able to recognize it as a 
picture of the world of art we are ccnuonly familiar 
with". (29) By virtue of what can a person claim maThership 
in tie artworld, how can people avoid it, and exactly how do 
objects beccme enfranchised in it? he asks. (30) 
4.3.3: Criticisms of Dickie's theory 
These questions and others are also asked of Dickie's theory. 
In fact every concept he introduces is, his critics claim, 
vaguely defined and spawn a handful of wtiat seem to be 
unanswerable questions. 
4.3.3.1: The first question, about Dickie's concept of the artworld, 
is whether it is a bundle of practices, as Dickie originally 
claimed, or a group of people, as he goes on to inply by his 
discussion of membership. (How can you act on behalf of a 
practice? Monroe C Beardsley asks, "They seem to lack the 
requisite source of authority. "(31)) It is Dickie's failure 
to get a clear answer to this question that results in many of 
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the following criticisms. 
4.3-3-2: The most frequently asked question''is: who - i6'a member of the 
art uurld? Dickie answers this question arrbiguouslyr which 
leads William Blizek to say, if it is true that everyone who 
sees himself as a member of the artworld is thereby an officer 
of it, "the custorrary practice is likely to be diffuse and the 
institution it defines ambiguous, 11 but if membership is 
limited by the tastes and interests of a select group, the 
official artworld, this is "just what Dickie doesn't want". 
He wants both, "a clearly defined institution (in which case 
art is recognizable and public) and an open door for 
creativity". As Blizek points out, a ccmprcmise is 
difficult. (32) 
Morton suggests that the only answer to this problem is 
both obvious and fatal, "Our artist acquired status within the 
artworld by creating a work of art. That is all. But this 
requires antecedent grounds for identifying works of art. " In 
his view, works of art are logically, and indeed tenporarily, 
pri6r to the institution of the artworld. "The first work of 
art (logically) could never have been created, given Dickie's 
analysis, since there would have been no art world to do the 
Conferring of status. "(33) 
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4.3.3.3: Walton raises a different question about the artworld: how do 
we decide which system are included in the artworld 
bundle? (35) The only feature of systems within the artworld 
that Dickie describes, is that each is a franework for 
representing particular works of art. To avoid circularity 
one must be able to describe the artworld independently of 
art, and Dickie feels this can be done by describing the 
systems of theatre, painting, sculpture, literature, music and 
so on. "This, " says Walton, "leaves us hardly better off than 
we would have been had Dickie explained what art is merely by 
citing paradigms of works of art and inviting us to 
extrapolate from them. "(34) 
Finally on the subject of the concept of the artworld, 
critics claim it has no rules. Anita Silver says, 
"Institutions -are at least partially constituted by rules. " 
She goes on to draw. the conclusion, "Most of us could be rode 
to admit that there are scme artifacts which simply are not 
art, no matter who might say they are". (35) Wollheim claims 
the theory, "must point to positive pratices, conventions, or 
rules, which are all explicit in the society (the artworld), 
even if they are merely implicit in the mind of the actual 
agent". 06) 
4.3.3.4: The concept of an artifact, as Dickie uses it, also cm-L-s 
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under attack. The first half of Dickie's theory stdtes that 
it is a necessary condition of an object being a work of art 
that it be an artifact. But he enpties the concept of much of 
its content by saying that displaying or publicizing a natural 
object can confer artifactuality upon it (although, as Blizek 
points out, noticing doesn't seem sufficient). Blizek goes 
on to say that Dickie offers no justification for its 
necessity as a condition. 07) 
4.3.3-5: Dickie's next concept to come under the critic's scrutiny is 
that of acting on behalf of the artworld. We have already 
seen some of the problens here, for if there are no 
restrictions on who nay act on its behalf, or wbat they rmy do 
on its behalf, the concept loses a great deal of content and 
credibility. Cne area of disagreenent is whether an 
individual can act alone in this way. Levinson is anxious 
that they can not and Blizek is anxious that they can. 
Levinson urges that, "There can be private, isolated art which 
is' constituted as art in the mind of the artist - and On no 
one's behalf but his own and that of potential experiencers of 
it, " and he assumes that, "just that, is not enough to niake 
the artwork or else the notion becames trivial and 
otiose. "(38) While Blizek wants art, "to remain in the public 
dcmain, " which ccnflicts with Dickie's idea that ganY works 
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of art are never seen by anyone but the person who creates 
them, but they are still works of art. "The price to be paid 
for that degree of flexibility is, " he says, "excessive". (39) 
4., 3.3.6: most criticism falls on the concept of conferring status. 
Morton says that it is not a necessary condition for an object 
to be a work of art, because: "Works of art are logically (and 
indeed tenporarily) prior to the institutions of the 
artworld. " And it is not a sufficient condition because a 
christening can fail. (40) Beardsley says it is too broad if 
it can be done by almost anyone, and yet it may be too narrow, 
because it implies that if a non-poet writes a poem it can't 
be an artwork until a poet treats it as such. (41) Cohen 
points out that in the conferring of status in other fields 
there are always rules and defeating conditions. He proposes 
changing the analogy with, "ceremonial acts like christening 
and political licensing, to less canonical ones like 
prcrrLising". (42) He points out that even with prcmising, it 
is possible to try to make a prcrn#e and fail (because wtiat is 
pron-Lised has already happened or is out of the question). 
while there may be a point in making an impossible prcn-dse, it 
can not give the statement the status of a prcn-dse. The 
attention is drawn in such a case, he says, not to the content 
but to the act. "If making a thing art is like an ordinary 
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illocution, " he says, "then there are prior constraints. 
There must be a boundary... between making art, and trying but 
failing to make art. Dickie cannot account for this". (43) 
Wollheim is also puzzled by the idea of conferring status 
because he cannot see any act that it can be describing. 
"Scme independent evidence is required for what the 
representatives of the artworld allegedly do, " he says. (44) 
4.3.3.7: As far as being a candidate for appreciation is concerned, 
and Dickie's insistence that no special sort of appreciation 
is required, Wollheim says: "How can we possibly believe 
that, in -drawing our attention to a certain artifact, (the 
artist) is putting it foward for appreciation, unless we can 
also attribute to him some , idea of what it is about the 
artifact that we should appreciate, and further believe that 
it is because of this that he is drawing our attention to 
it? "(45) 
Materially, Ted Cohen feels that what Dickie says about 
appreciation is, ' "too strong even though very general; 
formally, it lacks a dimension without which it is not acute 
enough to discriminate art from other things. " ne very 
point of Dada, he says, is that the objects were not worthy or 
valuable, therefore, "being a candidate for appreciation in 
any but the emptiest sense of 'appreciation' ... is not part of 
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what it is to be an artwork", (46) while it also lacks any 
idea of constraint or rules. 
These wide and varied criticisms will be assessed in -the 
following section. 
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4.4: The relevance of these criticisms to an institutional theOrY 
of religiai 
4.4.1: Before discussing saw of the most pertinent of these 
criticisms and looking foward to the task of setting up an 
institutional theory of religion, this section will consider 
George Dickie's book The Art Circle in which he replied in 
scm detail to the criticisms that had accumulated against his 
institutional theory of art, and gave the most plausible 
institutional account of art so far. 
, What needs to be borne in mind in this later account is 
that, as Dickie explains, its scope, context, aims and method, 
as well as its conclusions, are substantially different frm 
traditional -theories of. art and previous attempts at- 
institutional theories. (1) He admits that the version of the 
institutional. theory of art which he previously worked out, 
was, "mistaken in a great many of its details". His new 
account is, he says, a contextual theory; what he now means by 
an. institutional approach is all in the modest, but not 
trivial, idea that, "works of art are art as the result of 
the, -position they, occupy within an institutional framework or 
context". (2) This framework he later describes as "a cultural 
practice". (3) 
He now believes no institution, in the sense of a group of 
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persons of wbatever size or. formality, is essential for 
artmaking. As a result he rejects his ideas about conferred 
status and conferred artifactuality, the status of candidate 
for appreciation and the idea of acting on, behalf of- the 
artworld. (4) Instead he states simply that if artists 
create works of art, atý least in part because they have 
thoughts about art (thoughts that involve scme degree of 
understanding about the concept of art, about art itself), 
"derived frcm their language and acculturatim",, a possibility 
is opened up that a condition for their works being works of 
art might be the existence, of some thing we could -call the 
institution of art. (5) 
- He goes on to demonstrate the difficulty of accounting-for 
the production of art outside a framework of this kind, - and 
suggests how art could have begun by describing how artifacts, 
originally associated with such things as religious or-magical- 
activities, could come to have characteristics of. sam 
interest in themselves, "over and above the interest they had 
as elements in the religious or whatever kind of other 
activity in which they we-re embedded. At about this point,,, 
he ccnmnts, "it beccmes meaningful to say that primitive art 
had begun to exist, although the people who had the art might 
not yet have a word for its art". (6) 
such an institutional theory of art places virtually no 
PAGE 197 
restriction on what art may do - there is no specific 
aesthetic function. It requires no specific sort of aesthetic 
experience, perception, appreciation, attitude or set of 
properties, that function as an aspect of the essential nature 
of art. (7) All an institutional theory does, he claims, is 
describe the conditions necessary for a particular activity or 
practice that has emerged as an historical development-M 
Dickie works out these ideas in relation to art with some 
specific definitions and conventional and non-conventional 
rules, but, as stated above, it holds scrne prcmise of being a 
fruitful foundation for an institutional theory of religion. 
It could provide a basis for an exploration of the 
suggestions, already raised in this thesis: that religious 
experiences are religious as a result of the position they 
occupy within an institutional framework (a cultural practice) 
which -has emerged as part of an historical process; that the 
making of sacred objects by consecration also requires just 
such a framework; and that there are probleus in accounting 
for the production of new religious ideas outside a framework 
of, the kind Dickie describes. Dickie's description of how 
art begins, appears to be adaptable to the beginning of 
religions, as the ritual practices of a connuAty beccme 
increasingly specialized; and the idea that no specific sort 
of experience, perception, appreciation, attitude or set of 
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properties, function as an aspect of the essential nature of 
religions seems both plausible and fruitful. 
4-4-2: In the light of this discussion nine of the most pertinent 
criticisms of the institutional theory of art will now be 
briefly assessed and related to the task of setting up an 
institutional theory of religion. Scme of the criticisms are 
not covered, as I see them as failing to enter with any 
goodwill or irragination into the 'ideas of those they 
criticize. (9) 
4.4.2.1: Institutions are not an important feature 
This criticism is rejected since, if the concept of an 
institution (and the corresponding ideas of institutional 
facts, concepts and objeýts) is understood in the way outlined 
by Dic1de in The Art Circle the criticism -loses any 
credibility. At the very least it cannot be denied that njost 
adults in most camunities have an understanding of what 
religion is, derived from encounters with cultural practices. 
This fact alone makes institutions an inportant factor in 
religion, and the extent of their inportance an issue worth 
pursuing. An institutional theory of religion will pursue 
this fact and explore the extent of the in-portance of 
institutions to our understanding of religion. 
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4.4.2.2: Problem connected with essentialist theories 
Monroe C Beardsley(10) sets out the requirements of an 
, essentialist theory of art. Firstly 
it must be possible to 
distinguish which actions and objects are essentially 
institutional and which are not; secondly it must be possible 
to demonstrate that the existence of scme institution is 
included among the truth conditions of 'A is an artwork'. 
A brief look at the sort of things institutions are, and 
the way they begin, and the way in which actions and objects 
beccme institutional, will reveal that the first of these 
requirements can never be met in any rigorous way; and a brief 
consideration of the way language works, will show that the 
second requirement is similarly, if not an impossible aim, an 
undesirable one. For institutions grow out of natural ways of 
doing things(11) and what is essential in the rules of use Of 
a word today may be inessential tcmorrow. (12) Descriptions 
of bow words are used are not binding upon the users; 
metaphor, ellipsis and hyperbole are ccarwn and too often slip 
into st]andard speech. (13) Many words do not have a literal 
and a metaphorical use that are helpfully kept distinct. 
This is why proponents of essentialist theories have to 
distinguish a primary use, and dismiss uses that do not 
conform as metaphor or ellipsis. (They do not really mean the 
cake is art. They really mean it is like a religious 
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experience. ) The problem lies with the fact that both 
institutions and language are living things. 
However the history of the philosophy of religion is 
different fram the history of the philosophy of art. The 
question: what is religion? has never been satisfactorily 
answered but it has never had the ccnpulsion of the question: 
what is art? A possible factor behind this may be a 
difference in the grawar of the two words. Ebr the plural of 
'art' refers to different practices (painting, sculpture, 
, theatre etc) across which 
different theories of art 
(expressionism, cubism, imitation etc) can be seen to apply. 
M-Lile the plural of 'religion' refers to different belief 
systems (Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity etc) across which 
, different practices 
(worship, ceremony, ethics etc) can be 
seen to apply. Why several practices should be called art 
scrwhow seems a more -interesting question than- why several, 
. belief systems should 
be called religions. 
Nineteenth century attempts to reduce religion to scmething 
, _else, 
by such people are Feuerbach, Marx and Freud, (14) and 
early twentieth century searches for an essence of 
Christianity, by such people as Harnack, WagenhamTer and 
Hamilton, (15) can be seen to be differently motivated. 
when an institutional theory is applied to religion, where 
there is no history of an unsatisfied camplusion for, and 
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difficult renunciation of, a search for a unitary concept or 
essentialist definitim, it is more likely to be seen for what 
it is - an inquiry into how far institutional factors 
influence or determine religious experiences, beliefs and 
behaviour, rather than being unfairly presumed to be an 
undesirable and impossible atteirpt to set up a rigorous 
essentialist definition of religion. 
4.4.2.3: The motivation for the project 
Institutional theories of art are criticized for being 
mtivated by the desire to accommodate borderline cases. 
Religion has a problem with borderline cases too; Buddhism and 
Marxism are often seen as such, or more currently Masonry or, 
in the recent disputes over Stone Henge, Druidism. But there 
is nothing like the same passion in the philosophical 
ccmmudty for the discussion of whether they are, or are not, - 
religions. Most people are happy to believe they know what 
religion is without having to make definite decisions about 
borderline cases. The need to acconrodate borderline cases in 
a unitary concept of religion has had no part in the 
motivation behind this thesis. We should not expect the 
theory to give us clear guidelines as to what are and what are 
not religions, but we could hope that it may shed same light 
on ways in which such demarcation disputes have been, and 
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might in the future be, resolved. 
4.4.2.4: Ascription 
The concept of ascription is dramatically illuminated by 
transferring it to the context of religion. Firstly there is 
far less danger of conflating the question: how does scrnething 
becom a sacred object? with the question: wtat is religion? 
This nay be because, although the idea of sacred objects is 
central to scine forms of religion, in others it is of 
negligible importance. There are sane interesting 
similarities and differences here with the question: how does 
salething become a religious experience? (16) 
_-, ýAn act of consecration can 
be identified as a discernible 
(although not necessary) process by which ordinary objects 
,, becmie sacred. An investigation into the reasons for 
r-consecrating -objects, and the-relationship, of the act to the 
, value of the objects, promises to evaporate many of the 
difficult questions posed by critics of institutional theories 
ýof art. 
'Transferred to the world of religion, Diffie's list of 
-. philosophical objections to the concept of ascriptivity loses 
much of its credibility; in the context of a wafer becoming 
the Eýody of Christ, does ccmmon sense say something is. used in 
-a consecration ceremony if it is a sacred object and not vice 
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versa? does treating smie-thing as a sacred object not entail 
that it is one? does it seem to be anyone's real task to 
predicate 'sacred' of any individual object? does it seern 
right that it operates at the level of particulars? can it be 
assumed that questions of status and evaluation are not 
distinct issues? 
Even Wollheim's insistence that there must be reasons for 
doing it, and since these are prior to the act, the 
consecration ceremony can not be an essential feature of the 
making of sacred objects, seems puzzling. Graham FrFee has 
suggested scme answers to these question in relation to art: 
A meudber of the Republic of Art can confer status - or, 
better, take an object to be a work of art - in a way which 
both allows that nothing other than his so taking it makes 
it a work of art (apart frcrn others in the Republic so 
taking it, thus accepting his claim) and that he can still 
offer reasons, give explanations etc., in justification of 
that work's art-status... Perhaps acceptance or 
acknowledgement of the work of art brinqs with it sets of 
reasons or explanations otherwise unavailable... This 
means, of course, that institutional action with respect to 
some particular works, might be said not merely to confer 
art-status on those works but also to create categories of 
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art, which bring'with them, a 'universe' of discourse. (17) 
So an institutional theory of religion Fay help us understand 
rmre about the concept of ascription and in particular of 
sacredness' and acts of consecration, 'how far the properties 
and value of sacred object are culturally erwrgent and how 
they relate to the beliefs, practices and experiences of 
individuals and camunities. 
4.4.2.5: Relativism 
The connection between art theories and truth does not on the 
whole arouse much passion. Although people may want to say 
the art theory they subscribe to is true, it will often be 
argued more in terms of pragmatism and fruitfulness than 
correspondence to the way things stand. RelativisM in the 
arts more usually raises its' head in the.,. cOnte-xt of 
understanding the arts of societies other than our Ovm and, as 
Frances Berenson has pointed out, it is a fact that we cari to 
a remarkable extent understand and join in the artO OfCither 
cultures-08) 
- Similarly in religion, we may not be able to enter rully 
into the feelings and experiences of those of othejý 
faiths or 
noner but we can to a considerable extent understand SCN Of 
thern, and no problem need arise about fitting thO 
fact into 
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an institutional theory of religion. On the subject of 
whether nutual understanding between societies must in 
principle be possible or inpossible, I shall concur with WW 
Sharrock and RJ Anderson, who say: "Wittgenstein's work 
should not provide us with arguments to favour either side in 
this controversy but should fortify us against the risk of 
being tempted to take one... The difficulties of understanding 
that do arise will not result from their being different ways 
of life but from their being the particular ways of life that 
they are. "(19) 
Since in religions, truth is more often a ocre inportant 
issue, is the concern that an institutional theory of religion 
will lead us into an unacceptable form of relativism, a 
serious indictment? It need not be so. An institutional 
theory does not inply that absolute truth clain-s and cognitive 
faith comnituents are necessarily either meaningless or 
uniustified. (20) It may also shed some light on the 
religious, concept of revelation. 
4.4.2.6: The role of theory 
The question of whether art theories are essential to the 
concept of art, or the status of art works, again seems rather 
different when- transferred to the world of religion; the 
questions they raise somehow do not seem so difficult to 
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answer: do beliefs have the role of making religion possible? 
if there are no ways of deciding which beliefs are acceptable, 
is making objects sacred too easy? is seeing something as a 
religious experience, or as a sacred object, a theory-laden 
activity? is there anything more to it than learning how to 
use our language? 
An institutional theory of religion promises to help us see 
more clearly the two-vay relationship between beliefs (both in 
the sense of philosophical theories, and the hopes and 
expectations of ordinary believers) and the religious 
experiences and behaviour, of individuals and ccnmmities. , 
4.4.2.7: The chicken and the egg 
'Do 
the institutions or the objects of the art world ccim, first 
either logically or temporarily? This is a question which, 
transferred. tq religion has been a long-standing topic of 
philosophical interest - is experience or language primary in 
religion? It, is just here that an institutional theory can be 
-expected to illuminate and clarify, such questions as: what 
role does experience have in religion? can it give us 
, information about a 
'spiritual world"? what is the 
relationship between experience- and culture here? what 
, Jactors 




4.4-2.8: The authority of institutions 
What sort of rules apply and who applies them? This seems to 
have been one of the most intractable problems for, 
institutional theories of art,, and at first sight the move to 
religion does not seem to help. The Hindu religion is, for 
instance, as anarchistic as the modern art world, and there is 
as little observable structure to say what goes and what does 
not. But in religion one can perhaps see more clearly the 
force of tradition - not the power of people, but the 
authority of practices - of the established ways of doing 
things. Wittgenstein thinks the word 'agreement' (and we 
think of it here as agreement in forms of life) is related to 
the word 'rule'; "They are cousins, " he says, "If I teach 
anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other 
with it". (21) Peter Winch explains this idea more fully: 
"There is an intirrate conceptual connection between the notion 
of authority on the one hand and, on the other hand, the 
nation of there being a right and a wrong way of doing 
things. " He goes on to explain that all characteristically 
human activities involve a reference to an established way of 
'doing things. This idea, in its turn "presupposes that the 
practices and pronouncements of a certain group of people 
shall be authoritative in connection with the activity in 
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question" But, as he points out, he has made here no 
explicit reference to the idea of one person's will 
influencing another's. Authority, as opposed to power, 
involves an indirect relation between people, and the 
intern-ediary is the established way of performing the activity 
on which they are engaged. (22) 
A satisfactory institutional theory of religion will not be 
based on the idea of the authority of groups of people, or of 
people, acting on behalf of institutions, but prcmises to 
clarify, the idea of the authority of tradition - of 
institutional practices and the way they interact with the 
experiences and behaviour of individuals and ccraTunities. 
4.4.2.9: A_special kind ofappreciation 
George Dickie was concerned that appreciation remain a central 
feature of works of art, but also that the sort Of 
appreciation appropriate to works of art be left open. Ted 
Cohen objected to both these MOvest but not in a way that 
threatens an institutional theory of religion. Wittgenstein 
warns about looking for wtiat is ccranon in aesthetic 
judgements; what we are left with, he says, is "an imrensely 
complicated family of cases ... with the highlight - the 
expression of admiration, a smile or a gesture etc. "(23) 
To say that the objects of Dada were appreciated for the 
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irony that flowed frcm their very plainness, does not enPtY-, 
the notion of appreciation, only of a special aesthetic sort' 
of appreciation. Similarly to call, or mke, an object or iln' 
experience religious is to propose that it is in some 
worthy of appreciation. The specific way in which it can be 
appreciated is, in scm senses open, but for any individual 
placed in a specific social context, it is constrained by 
history - by the way religious objects and experiences have 
been regarded in the past - constrained not by formulated 
rules or structures, nor the wills or power of authoritative 
groups of people, but by tradition - the authority 'of 
established practices. 
An institutional theory of religion may therefore be 
expected to help us understand more clearly the idea of 
religious appreciation, and its relation to religion as 
whole (and perhaps have scmthing to say about religious 
education). 
4.4.2.10: we can summarize the areas in which an institutional theor .y 
of religion might have scuething useful to say as follows: how 
demarcation disputes in religion are resolved; the concept Of 
ascription, sacredness as a culturally erwrgent property and 
its relation to acts of consecration; the idea of revelation; 
the relationship of institutions to the religious beliefs and 
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experiences of individuals and ccmunities; the nature and 
role of religious experience; tradition and authority in 
religion; religious appreciation and its inplication for 
religious education and, the central concern of the thesis; 
how religions begin and how they are renewed - the role of 
innovators in religions. 
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SEMON 5: THE NATURE OF INSTI=ONS 
5.1: Introduction 
Stated most simply an institutional theory of religion says 
that religions are most helpfully seen as aspects of culture. 
It says, in other words, that what is to be considered, 
authentic and significant in religion is substantially 
determined, in each community, by its institutions. 
According to such a theory questions about which activities 
have religious value, which objects are sacred, which 
experiences are religiously significant, where religious 
authority lies - are substantially determined by the 
institutions of particular ccnrunities and cannot be answered 
by reference to universal qualities or properties of physical 
objects, experiences, instincts or activities. 
It is incorrpatible with theories based on the priority of 
experience because it denies that there is any quality Or 
property of anything that can consistently be used to identify 
what is religious independently of, or prior to, cultural 
institutions. It also goes beyond theories based on the 
priority of language because it points not only to what is 
said, but also, and perhaps more significantlyr to what is 
done. 
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I will argue that such a theory can be expressed in a way 
that avoids the unnecessary tangles of essentialist theories 
and highlights some inportant characteristics of religion. I 
will argue that it can beccme. a useful tool for analysing 
religious phenomena and does not necessarily lead to 
unacceptable forms of relativism or naturalism. 
The basis of this argument is a demonstration that 
institutions have roots in unchanging biological and 
psychological facts of the human condition and a lively 
interactive relationship with the experiences and beliefs of 
individuals in changing social situations. 
Crucial to the theory is the use of the word 'institution'. 
The word is caTrnonly used in two distinct ways; firstly it 
is used to refer to forms of behaviour that have becx= 
established in particular human ccnmunities - such as 
marriage, theatre or baptism; secondly it is used to refer to 
groups of people who are joined by their use, understanding or 
control of such forms of behaviour - such as the Law Society, 
the Royal Academy or the Church of Scotland. (1) 
it is clear that, in religion, institutions in both these 
senses have a kind of authority. But as we have seen from our 
look at institutional theories of art, institutional theories 
constructed around the second of these two senses get bogged 
down in problems of one'sort or another. (2) For if we say 
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religious authenticity or value is defined by the beliefs, 
actions or prCnouncemients of a group of people, we end up with 
insoluble difficulties in defining such a group and saying how 
the beliefs, experiences and actions of individuals are 
related to it. (Who counts as a Hindu? How big is a church? 
What does it mean to be authorized to act on behalf of a faith 
or a tradition? ) 
So while not neglecting the undoubted authority of certain 
well defined groups of people in some areas of religion and 
scme periods of history, this attempt to set up an 
institutional theory of religion will concentrate on the first 
of these two uses - institutions as forms of behaviour. 
Notes 
1) Monroe C Beardsley distinguishes between 'institution 
types' which are practices and 'institution tokens' which are 
organizations. "Is Art Essentially Institutional? " p195 
2) See section 4.3 
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5.2: Talking about human behaviour 
Before we begin to ask what forms of behaviour we can call 
institutional we need to consider the way certain words are 
used to talk about human behaviour. Behaviour can be called 
'natural' or Iculturallr, ldirectl or 'symbolic', I individual I 
or social,. These distinctions will be iriportant in our 
characterization of institutional behaviour, but they are all 
difficult - being used in special and scrretirres confusing ways 
by biologists, sociobiologists, anthropologists and 
sociologists. 
5.2.1: W-Itural - cultural and established forms of behaviour 
The word 'natural' is Ofteno, and most usefully for our 
purposes, used in opposition to the idea of being caused, made 
or controlled by -people. 
In biological terms it is used to 
refer to SM-ething that jS genetically determined or 
transmitted rather than ý sarething that is learned or 
culturally transmitted. 
Ted Benton uses it in this way when he distinguishes 
between 'natural' capacities and 'historical' capacities. He 
says natural capacities are those whose possession is 
,, independent of membership in, or aoquisition of, any. ýýcifLc 
culture.,, He gives as "Obvious exanples ... the capacities 
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underlying feeding, locomotion and mating". They are, he 
says, explicable in terms of natural selection and in terms of 
human anatomy and physiology. (1) 
Benton uses the word 'natural' to talk about capacities and 
tendencies rather than behaviour. Using the distinction for 
human behaviour is fraught with difficulties, for in some 
senses all human behaviour is determined by our 'natural' 
inheritance - our genes - and yet no human behaviour is 
completely determined by them. 
This fact is widely recognized by scientists of human 
behaviour. The psychologist Piaget recognizes it in his work 
on intellectual development: (2) the sociologist Raymond 
Williams recognizes it in his work on culture; (3) the 
sociobiologist Edward 0 Wilson recognizes it in his work on 
aggression. He says, "The question of interest is no longer 
whether human social behaviour is genetically determined; it 
is to what extent. The accumulated evidence for a large 
hereditary component is more detailed and compelling than most 
persons, including even geneticists, realize... It is already 
decisive"; (4) Paul Heelas recognizes it in his work on 
emotions; (5) even philosophers have recognized it; Michael 
Rose in a recent paper in Philosophy with Edward Wilson 
says, 
PAGE 218 
There is solid factual evidence for the existence of 
epigenetic rules - constraints rooted in our evolutionary 
biology that affect the way we think. The incest exauple 
shows that these rules, directly related to adaptive 
advantage, extend into the moral sphere; and the hypothesis 
of morality as a product of pure culture is refuted by the 
growing evidence of the co-evolution of genes and 
culture. (6) 
The use of the word 'culture' is, if anything, more entangled 
than the use of the word 'nature' , for as Raymond WilliarrLs 
points out, it has, historically, been used to refer to a 
process, a configuration, the spirit of a community or to 
whole and distinctive ways of life. (7) Scientists of 
behaviour have tended to use it specifically for something 
that is transmitted by learning rather than by genetic 
endowment. In this sense chimpanzees are credited with 
cultural behaviour when, for exaiTple, they learn the use of 
tools from their parents or peers. (8) Ted Benton tries to 
avoid the difficulties of the word by nairting his non-natural 
category of human capacities 'historical' rather than 
'cultural'. He characterizes the category as distinguished 
from natural capacities, "in that its very possession 
presupposes some specific cultural acquisition". (9) His 
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examples are the capacity to cook food and the capacities for 
aesthetic creation and appreciation. He says that the 
possession of any specific historical capacity, "presupposes 
the prior possession and exercise of some set of natural 
capacities". (10) 
An enormous amount has been written about the autoncffy of 
culture, about the power of biology and about the way they 
influence each other. Professional axes have been ground, 
political prejudices have been buttressed and moral arguments__ 
corroborated. We have no space and, in a way no need, t0, 
pursue this here. As Ted Benton observes, a sensible 
consensus seems to have emerged that culture has a relative 
autonomy, which needs to be understood in relation to 
biological contraints. (11) 
Since in sane senses then all human behaviour has a natural 
and a cultural aspect, while no human behaviour is ccnpletely 
determined by either nature or culture, it would be both 
inappropriate and unhelpful to label any specific piece o-f 
human behaviour with either term. 
Scientists of human nature have continued to look for the 
elusive species-wide capacities that underlie human behaviour, 
and to try to follow through individual genetic differences toý 
determine their effect on behaviour. They have tried to 
apportion the relative importance of nature and culture in 
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various fields, but on the whole stopped using the words 
, natural' and 'cultural' to label distinct categories of human 
behaviour. 
is there, therefore, any useful way left for us to make a 
distinction of this kind? In a later section an attempt will 
be made to draw a distinction between descriptions of human 
activities. To signify that the distinction is not the usual 
one between nature and culture we shall call them 'natural' 
and 'established' activities. The following example will 
preview that distinction: the same activity may be described 
as grasping hands' and as 'making a contract'. 'Grasping 
hands' is a description of a natural activity, because it can 
be identified prior to and defined independently of, any 
particular human ccmmmity. 'Making a contract, is a 
description of an established activity because it is a 
practice that has become established in a particular ccn=inity 
and can only be identified and defined in relation to its use 
in that ccmmnitY. 
A similar atteiTpt can be seen in Alasdair MacIntyre's 
distinction between a physical mivement and a human action, 
where physical novements can be explained in terms of a Human 
type of causality, while human actions must be explained 
against the background of, "the customarily recognized rules 
of a particular social order". (12) 
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5.2.2: Direct, syd: )olic and ritual behaviour 
Symbolic behaviour is behaviour that contains a message or aýý` 
meaning behaviour that needs to be understood on at least 
two levels. It can be described in physical terTrs and', inýi 
terms of what it mans. 
The category covers a vast array of behaviour -a rabbit' 
stamps its feet, a bird dances, a chimpanzee grimaces, -a, 
mad-man kills a woman who looks like his mother, a girl tears- 
up the photograph of her lover, or draws a rap, a clergyman" 
sprinkles water on the head of a baby. 
Used in this wide sense it can again be argued that it' is" 
not a helpful distinction for talking about human behaviour. 
'. 
Sinc e- the time I 'of Durkheim(13) sociologists have argued that'' 
all but- the rnost basic aspects of hurran behaviour can OnlY be' 
understood in' terms of- the meaning th . ey have for their 
participants. But again there is a useful distinction that, 
can be rmde. 
Syrrbolic behaviour can be seen to have its roots in' an 
un . con I sclous, expression- 101f mood or readines's to act. , As 
social'lif e develops, anticipating the actions of others has 
an obvious-'survival value. Such expressive behaviour can' 
therefore I develop into a signal system, which not so much 
'generates understanding, as arouses an innate response. These 
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primitive sorts of signalling system can became very ccnplex 
and detailed as in the courtship dances of same birds or the 
cammunication system of the honey bee. 
Wilson talks about "anticipatory action" and "intentional 
movements" being, "in the course of evolution... ritualized 
into communication signals. The waggle dance of the honey bee 
is actually a miniaturized rehearsal of the flight frcm the 
hive to the food, " he says. (14) Eibl-Eibesfeldt puts some 
human behaviour into just. this category. He includes flirting 
and bowing and greeting with an open hand. "When angry, " he 
says, "we may starp with a foot, an intention of attack which 
among Europeans is especially found in small, uncontrolled 
children; adults usually suppress it, " He adds, "I saw the 
sarrie gesture in an angry Bantu boy". (15) Later he says, 
,, Darwin points out that the first act of saying 'no' 
(disapproving) in children is the rejection of food, by 
turning the head to the side from the breast or a spoon. " A 
blind and deaf girl shook her head when she did not want to 
eat, and also when she refused scmething, for exanple, an 
invitation to play-06) 
- Peter Winch says, 
"Action with a sense is syn-boiic., - "The 
analysis of meaningful behaviour must allot a central role to 
the notion of a rule; ... all behaviour which is meaningful 
(therefore all specifically human behaviour) is ipso facto 
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rule , governed. "(17) "All meaningful behaviour must bellz 
social, " he says later, "since it can be meaningful only if-. -, 
governed by rules,, and rules presuppose a social setting"-(18Y: _ 
How' do these remarks relate to this sort Of typically 
non-human behaviour? It seems to me that innate -animal 
ccmTunication* is meaningful, rule following and social. The- 
signal, such as the rabbit's stamping foott or the nodding of-- 
the''courting duck, needs an interpretative rule. The stamp', 
mans the rabbit has perceived danger, the nodding mans the, 
duck is ready to mate. 7he rule could only'develop and would, 
only make sense in a social setting. 'But, the rule is not:, 
'understood' in the sense we usually mean nor does it have to 
be, learned. The animal is programried to respond to'the 
signal. It is, to use Wittgenstein's phrase, at "bedrocki, and 
my spade "is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply 
what I do. "'(19) The meaning of the behaviour can best be 
explained, either in terms of the mood it expresses, the action 
it-, anticipates or the response it generates. We shall refer 
to this kind of behaviour as expressive symbolic behaviour. 
In human beings symbolic behaviour is not seen in this 
basic form except-perhapS in early infancy. In even the most 
Primitive 'societies it 'is developed and nunipulated in a 
variety-of ways. -' 
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5.2.2.1: Firstly it is moulded by culture. ý in human-societies innate 
responses to expressive signalling -behaviour are either 
reinforced, allowed toý atrophy or actively suppressed, but 
they are always adapted into specific cultural forms. 
Eibl-Eiblesfeldt says, ý "Man is extremely inclined to 
culturally mould and change behaviour in a relatively short 
tim". (20) Showing anger by stamping is considered childish 
in our culture; more acceptable is a strongly worded letter. 
Even behaviour as deeply rooted as smiling has to be 
reinforced by feedback. In blind children, it atrophies. 
5.2.2.2: Secondly innate sYmbOlic expressive - behaviour can be 
manipulated so that it not only unconsciously expresses an 
emotional mood but so that it controls one. 
Symbolic actions can be performed to arouse, to relieve, or 
to redirect, a feeling. when rabbits stamp their feet -there 
is no question of their doing it because it makes them feel 
better. But people can stamp their feet to express their 
frustration, as it were to themselves, and so to relieve'it. 
or a battle party can perform a stamping dance to summon up 
aggressive feelings before they join the fight. In these 
kinds of situations the meaning of the behaviour is best 
understood in terms of what it is used for, or what it 
achieves. (To say the ground represents the enemy really adds 
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nothing in understanding or clarity. ) 
Ceremonies that are largely of this type are frustrating tq 
the anthropologist wbo is looking for representative meanings-1, 
Dan Sperber, for instance, argues that the search for the 
meaning of symbolic behaviour is vain, because it does not 
always have any. (21) 
Evans Prichard, perhaps more perceptively, describes 
ceremonies of the Nuer tribe where, 
A study of the syrrdDols tells us nothing of the nature of 
what is spi: )olized ... Wbrds and gestures transport us to a 
-realm of experience when what the eye sees and the ear, 
, -hears is-not the same as what the mind perceives- Hands- 
are raised in supplication to the sky, but the Sky is not 
, being supplicated... We seem indeed to be watching a play 
or,,,, to-be listening to scmeone's account of what he has, 
dreamt., Perhaps when we have this illusion we are 
beginning to understand, for the significance Of the- 
. objects, -actions and events lies not in thenselves but 'in, ' 
what they mean to those who experience them as participants' 
or. assistant ... When we reflect on their maning We- 
percieve they are a dramatic representation of a spiritual- 
ý. experience. (22) 
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DZ Phillips confirms this non-representative use of symbols, 
that is moulded to express or control an emotional mood. He 
describes a ritual of the Seminoles of Florida. If a mother 
is dying in childbirth they hold her infant over her face to 
receive her parting breath. The anthropologist , Tylor 
explains this ritual in terms of the notion of a soul - "A 
thin unsubstantial human image... independently possessing the 
personal consciousness and volition of its corporeal owner, 
past or present. " Phillips remarks, 
A mother has given her life for her child and this is 
expressed in the ritual by the child receiving her parting 
breath. Mat more needs to be said?... these acts are not 
based on hypotheses or opinions concerning strange 
invisible substances which, by mysterious mans, are 
transferred from one person to another. On the contrary, 
the gestures are expressions of scn)ething. (23)- 
I am not suggesting that such symbolic actions are usually 
consciously constructed and perfonred by a society for what 
they achieve. They are just done; the effects follow. 
5.2.2.3: Thirdly human beings have developed representative synbolism. 
- There my 
be a sense in which anilral cOrmimication behaviour 
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can be said to be representaticnal. perhaps the bee's dance 
represents the route to the food. But I think it is clearer 
if we call animal cammunication expressive' behaviour ,,, and 
keep the term 'representative' for -a mre specifically human 
type of behaviour. 
It takes generations for an innate expressive symbolic rule 
to beccme established. Hurran beings can create- 
representative rule in an instant. (The salt cellar is mY car 
and the ash tray is the Rolls. ) Such rules can be almost 
entirely arbitrary or based on scm natural ccnnection or 
innate response, and they can quickly beccme established in a 
human commanity. (It is of some interest but little 
inportance whether or not we concede that chimpanzees can 
generate or learn to use representative rules. ) 
To understand such behaviour you need to ask questions 
, which are not appropriate to ask about expressive behaviour. -_ý 
what -do the 'actions, objects and participants stand. for? 
rather than - what mood does the behaviour express or what is 
, achieved by its'performance? 
- Mary,, Douglas, -ýdescribes a ritual that uses representative 
rules: 
The'ancestors' antique spear is really a new spear recently,. ý 
"bought'froman Arab trader. or the ancestral spearý-, is 
PAGE 228 
non-existent, a man making gestures with it by moving his 
empty hands as if the spear were there. The sacrifical ox 
stands for the sacrifice, but the sacrificer may not be 
present at all, even, the ox may be represented by a 
cucumber. (24) 
Alasdair MacIntyre quotes a more straightfoward example: 
elAccording to Spencer and Gillen some aborigines carry about a 
stick or stone which is treated as if it is or embodies the 
soul of the individual who carries it. If the stick or stone 
is lost, the individual anoints himself as the dead are 
anointed. "(25) 
Ernest Gellner professes to find this behaviour, "simply 
incoherent". He cites it as a case where, one cannot take the 
sense from the use because the use affords no sense. , He then 
says it is easy to give the rules for the use of the concept, 
but adds, "we confront a blank wall here, so far as meaning is 
concemed". (26) 
It appears he can understand the representative component 
of the behaviour but not the expressive component -a feat 
that Peter winch, and I, have no problems with at all. He sees 
it as a simple analogy with the practice of carrying a 
photograph or lock of hair from a lover. (27) 
wittgenstein points to both the representative and the 
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expressive components' of' symbolic behaviour in, the same 
example when he says, "Burning an effigy - kissing the picture 
of a loved one. This is obviously not based on a belief that 
it will have a definite effect, on the object which the picture 
represents. It aims at same satisfaction and achieves it. or 
rather, it does not aim at anything; we act in this way and 
then feel satisfied. "(28) 
It appears that, in same senses, representative symbolism 
grows out of expressive synbolism but, as it develops, 
symbolic behaviour can lose its expressive ccnpment; drawing 
a n-ap we could call merely representational behaviour. 
5-2-2-4: Fourthly human beings tend to be reflective about their 
symbolic behaviour and to develop theoretical explanations for 
it, 'which can take a representative, an expressive or a 
technical form. 
Wittgenstein, talking about art, says, "We don't start from 
certain words, but from certain occasions or activities". (29) 
Although it cannot be stated as a fact in respect of 
institutions as a whole classs, it seeins, for a number of 
reasons, more plausible to suggest that institutional 
activities in general precede, rather than proceed frcm, their 
theoretical justifications. 
Peter Winch' argues for this view. (30) He says that 
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altho - ugh Wittgenstein does not say directly that practices 
pre6ede their explanations, his writing suggests it. This 
argun-ent of Winch' s has been discussed already. (3 1) - Although 
the analogy he draws between the relationship of natural 
-. I expression in talk of religion and in talk of pain is 
unsatisfactory, it does not prejudice the point we are 
interested in here. The analogy is unsatisfactory because 
talk, ý of religion is not talk of natural sensations and their 
natural expression, but this does not mean that such talk can 
not grow in a nx=e ccnplicated way from primitive practices. 
Reasons for what communities do are, according to this 
analysis, constructed, discovered or invented to acccapany the 
rituals used by a community. Once this has happened an 
-interesting interactive relationship develops between 
activities and beliefs, for both appear to have what we might 
call, - 'a life of their own' (at least in relation to the 
individual), while both also profoundly affect the 'life' of 
the other. 
The relationship is complex and too much has been written 
on theý subject to cover conprehensively here. MacIntyre 
summarizes the history of the debate in terms of a "slide from 
the striking and controversial falsehood to the 
non-controversial apparent platitude". Pareto and Marx he 
accuses of starting from the falsehood, "that beliefs are 
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essentially secondary, a by-product. of a social life which 
drives foward independently". The early Weber he accuses of 
starting frcm the contrary falsehood, "that ideas have an 
autonamous and effective role in social life". Both ideas are 
then madified by the admission of counter exanples, "until all 
the protagonists cme together in adherence to a facile 
interactimisrrel. (33) He is himself concerned to point out 
that the relation between belief and action, "is not external 
and contingent, but internal and conceptual". 04) It is, he 
says like the relationship between words and meaning... 
actions may be said to express beliefs. 
We should note firstly that there is a sense in which the 
activities themselves Inake sense of' the chaos of self 
conscious social life - they can without any attenpt at 
theoretical explanation, give a sense of order and control, or 
relief from negative feelings. We can see this to scne extent. 
not only in primitive ccnmunities but in our private neurotic 
rituals. 
Peter Winch suggests that we should not see the rites of 
unfamiliar ccauunities as misguided techniques for producing 
consurmr goods, (as he accuses MacIntyre of doing). On the 
contrary we should consider, "The possible importance that the 
carrying out of certain activities may take on for a man 
trying to conterrplate the sense of his life as a whole. "(34) 
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The rationalizing 'of syrW: )olic behaviour takes many fonrs. 
As we have seen it my or my not'- develop into conscious 
beliefs. JHM Beattie talks about beliefs having, "degrees 
of explicitness f ran vague and unspoken assurrption to formal 
and exact assertion... Confusion may arise, " he says, "from 
the -failure to distinguish between beliefs that are actually 
held by people and those that are not consciously held by 
anyone. 11 
The things believed in, in order to make sense of certain 
fonrLs of behaviour, uay or my not then be assumed to have an 
existential status. "Mat is believed in is not, or need not 
be, 'taken absolutely literally, " says Beattie, 11... but rather 
as essentially metaphorical... as a kind, of poetry in 
fact. "(35) 
To' illustrate thisý point Beattie takes a story fram an 
art: icle' by Bernard Levin in the Times. Sir Mortirrer Meeler, 
so the story goes, was fond of sherry. A wcrnan, ever since 
sh6` heard this, "had put a glass of it on the television set 
whenever he was appearing, so that he might take a sip 
whenever he felt like it". (36) Beattie ccmmnts, "I'm sure 
that Sir mortimer's admirer was really (more or less) aware 
wben she 'entered into the act' so to speak, that she was 
carrying out a ritual, valid as such, and not engaging in a 
"real' relationship. Otherwise she (and the hundreds of 
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others-like her) would really be crazy. "(37) 
On the other hand . scm ccmmnities do move quickly frCxn 
raising hands to the sky in supplication, to believing that 
there is a helpful deity in the sky, fram leaving a gift to 
alleviate the terror of the storm, to believing that there is 
a malevolent storm spirit. We cannot, as some errpiricists 
would have us do, (38)- rule out the clearly ontological 
ccn*ponent of scme of the beliefs associated with synbolic 
behaviour. Mary Douglas says of the Zande witchcraft system, 
To make the institution work new ideas are produced to fit 
-the pieces coherently together or. to sustain the 
credibility -of the whole... The pressure to organize 
-thought introduces new entities into the universe, such as 
-hereditary, witchcraft substance in the intestine... One 
-kind of social, reality (the Zande), built on one kind of 
- --accountability, Invested fellow humans with sinister 
-psychic powers, the other. (the Nuer) subjected a world 
, filled with-spirits and ghosts to the will of a righteous 
'ýgod. (39) 
The consideration of witchcraft leads to another difference in 
the way, camunities rationalize their ritual practices. 
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ccnnmnities can differ in the extent and manner in which they 
credit their symbolic behaviour with a technical efficiency. 
it would be a mistake! to characterize symbolic behaviour as 
-behaviour that 
has no technical efficiency. Evans Pritchard 
has , been accused, by Peter Winch, of making this mistake when 
he. characterizes mystical nations as "patterns of thought that 
attribute to phenomena supra-sensible qualities- which... are 
not- . 
derived from observation or cannot be logically inferred 
frcm it and which they do not possess. " Ritual behaviour he 
describes as, "Any behaviour that is accounted for by mystical 
notions. There is no objective nexus between the behaviour 
and the event it is intended to cause. "(40) 
,, -The problem with this sort of judgement, as Peter Winch 
points out, is that it implies that it is possible to have a 
view of reality and of causal, influence that transcends -its 
actual -use in a language. Winch mentions the fact that, we 
ourselves have varying views about cause and -: effect, 
demonstrated in the difference between the sorts of reasons we 
give for saneone getting married and for apples. falling off 
trees. He continues, "It should not then be. difficult to 
accept that in a society with quite different institutions, and 
, ways of life- from ours, there my be concepts of 'causal 
influence' which behave even more differently. "(41) - 
Quite apart fran all,, the various problems of understanding 
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unfamiliar cultures, even frcm our own conceptions of causal 
influence is it not implausible to suggest that doing a war 
dance might make the participants fight more aggressively and 
that contenplating the grace of God in the symbols of the 
Eucharist might significantly - improve a believer's emotional 
enviroment-and thus his moral behaviour. 
It is also the case that different ccmminities and even 
different individuals within ccmTunities way not agree about 
the rationalization of their symbolic behaviour. The historic 
battles about the efficacy of the Christian Eucharist or the 
more modern batttles about the objective reality of the 
Christian's God could be taken as examples here. (42) 
5.2.2.5: Fifthly, ritual forms of behaviour, settled with their 
theoretical Justifications, seem to undergo a process of 
differentiation.,. . 
This differentiation can be seen in various ways - most 
obviously it follows the way societies tend to fragment into 
functional categories. what in primitive societies, seem all 
of- a piece, in nore developed societies divide into disparate 
aspects of ccmunal life concerned with such functions as 
education, econon-Lics, 'politics, morals, defence, aesthetics 
and religion. 
whether these'categories of ours are appropriate or helpful 
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in understanding unfamiliar cultures is debatable. As Beattie 
says, -"We have, to begin with, 'no alternative to labelling, 
provisionally ý at least, the institutions of other cultures in 
terms of the categories or our own". But he warns that, 
"Social anthropologists, should indeed be constantly aware of 
the difficulties and dangers of extrapolating the terms and 
concepts of their 'own' cultures into their representations of 
other cultures. "(43) 
-- it seems to me - in contrast to wtiat Winch has said about 
recognizing forms of behaviour as religious before there is 
any-religious talk - that it is only when the-ritual behaviour 
of, a ccx=unity beccnes associated with a theoretical 
justification within the ccrummity that we can begin to 
categorize it into differentiated functional categories. If 
we-see an unfamiliar canmmity dancing,. acting, singing, 
dressing up, how do we know if the activity is religious, 
political, social, military or aesthetic unless -they talk 
about why they are doing it - unless they describe the human 
action they think they are performing. 
, z_ I would suggeste 
forinstance, that it is when we discover 
that the ritual is justified or explained in terms of a belief 
in' spirits, or a supreme spirit being, or in terms of finding 
answers to ultimate questions about the meaning and purpose of 
life, -that we categorize it as religious. 
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Trying to categorize the rituals of unfamiliar camLmities 
by guessing at the sort of - justification that we think might 
explain them can easily lead to mistakes, *for our categories 
may be-quite irrelevant to their behaviour. (44) 
Even in our own quite recent 'history we can see this 
differentiation of 'sy: mbolic behaviour'-taking place - for 
moral, religious and aesthetic behaviour has, in living 
memory, been far rmre closely intertwined than it is today. 
It is also inportant to remember Beattie's warning that one 
form of behaviour can have several kinds of significance at 
Once. The service for-thanksgiving-after the British victory 
in'the Faulkland Islands is just one example of a nx)dern form 
of 'symbolic behaviour, with multiple, and to scme extent 
conflicting,, significances to the people participating in it. 
As institutions are seen to fall into a distinct category 
they then tend to be used and controlled by the same group of 
people and ccme to exhibit similarities to other activites in 
that category. This can be illustrated by following the 
developmnt of aesthetic behaviour as it emerged frcm the 
categories of the religious, the econcmic and the social in 
the'quite recent history of'our own culture. 
5.2.2.6: This section has not been*able to do more than touch on the 
very" ccirplex 'area of: -humah- syd: )olic behaviour, but it is 
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important to do so because an understanding of symmlic 
behaviour is crucial to'an understanding of institutions. 
While taking the sociologist's point that all human 
behaviour is layered with meanings for its participants I 
shaii, in line with wnre normal use, keep the term 'symbolic' 
for behaviour that has a signficant representational or 
expressive component. Thus burning a photograph in with a 
bunch of other papers because they are no longer required is 
direct behaviour, and burning a photograph to express the end 
of an affair is syn-bolic behaviour. Raising a piece of 
material up a pole to make a sail is direct behaviour, and 
raising a flag to demonstrate and arouse nationalistic loyalty 
is- symbolic. Ducking to tease or annoy is direct behaviour, 
and baptising to signify repentance and new life is symbolic. 
The word ritual' I shall, in line with normal usage, use 
for repeated synbolic acts, but not, as sanee m: )dern usage 
does, imply that, at the same time, it necessarily has no 
practical efficiency. 
5.2.3: individual, social and camunal behaviour. 
Social behaviour is, usually, behaviour that has to do with 
individuals living in an organized comminity. It is 
behaviour that gets its motivation, sense and character from 
interaction with others. It can, in this sense, be contrasted 
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with individual behaviour. 
Using the word in this way it is clear that much of the 
behaviour Of animals, birds and insects of all kinds is 
social. E0 Wilson says that thousands of the over three 
million species that have been identified are "highly social". 
He mentions particularly colony forming invertebrates such as 
corals, social insects, fish, birds and mammals. (45) 
When however we are talking about human behaviour we again 
find the distinction unsatisfactory, for there is an important 
sense in which all huTian behaviour is undertaken by 
individuals and at the same time there is no human behaviour 
that does not have a social dimension. (46) 
Two things can be drawn from these remarks. Firstly, much 
social behaviour 'is, according to our first distinction, 
natural. The intricate ccrnnunication system to be observed in 
a bee hive, for instance, is undeniably social behaviour, and 
it' is generally understood to be determined and transmitted 
entirely genetically. 
Secondly the distinction between individual and social 
behaviour is not an appropriate or useful distinction to be 
drawn between specific pieces of human behaviour. As we have 
already seen this is particularly true of symbolic behaviour, 
which is essentially based in social life. All Symb0lic 
behaviour arises out of a shared life. 
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-But again we 
can draw out a distinction that will be 
useful, by introducing the category of acmnunal behaviour. 
lamnunal behaviour' will be used for behaviour that is shared 
by nenbers of a particular ccnuunity. 
Plausible candidates for the category of individual human 
-behaviour can now be put foward. It can be largely innate, as 
in the case of behaviour caused by a unique genetic mutation, 
or. largely established, as in the case of an alien. We can 
also see the relevance of the concept of private ritual in, 
I 
for example, an obsessional neurosis, that, rather than 
cementing individuals into their ccmmmity, separates and 
alienates them frcm it. 
it is in fact possible for symbolic behaviour to be 
ccmTunal in a number of different ways. For individuals may or 
rmy not understand the representative rules of a form of 
symbolic behaviour; they may or my not appreciate what it 
is used for, what beliefs it implies or what effect it has on 
the participants, and, they still my or may not 'see the 
point, of joining in. The varied reasons people might have 
for declining to say a Latin grace, could illundnate this at a 
number of different levels. 
on the other hand, people my join in a ritual Without 
understanding it at all, or they might my value it for quite 
idiosyncratic reasons. An atheistic Englishman walking to 
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participate in a Greek Orthodox service in order to keep fit 
iTakes the point. Sharing in behaviour is, therefore, in this 
context, a relative rather than a distinct, concept. 
5-2-4: Conclusion 
Three ways of talking about human behaviour have now been 
discussed. We are left with three useful distinctions, 
natural as opposed to established activities, direct as 
opposed to synbolic (or ritual) behaviour, and individual as 
opposed to communal behaviour. 
It would be unfortunate if the impression had been given 
that these distinctions are clear or easy to apply. On the 
contrary, as we have seen in our discussion, human behaviour 
merges fran one to the other in each case. The aim is that 
these categories will help us to characterize institutions, 
which, it will be argued, are established, Ccnrm3nal, rituals. 
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The nature of institutions can now be explored more closely - 
institutions, it will be argued, are forms of behaviour that 
have the three characteristics of being established, ritual 
and ccurunal, in the senses of those terms outlined in the 
previous section. 
5.3.1: Institutions as established forms of behaviour 
Institutions are forms of ritual behaviour that have beccM 
established in a particular community and can only be defined 
in relation to their use in that community. They can be 
distinguished from natural forms of behaviour- that can be 
identified prior to, and defined independently of, a 
particular social community. 
The use of the word 'community', inplying a social rather 
than- a genetic grouping, is intended to exclude forms of 
behaviour that are are both ritual and shared but have been 
established in genetic groups by natural selection (or 
w4hatever other mechanism). It gives the word 'established' the 
special meaning of established by social interaction rather 
than established by genetic selection. This restricts 
institutions to human communities (and possibly in a limited 
way to, some forms of'behaviour in the higher primates). In 
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line'with norzral usage it associates the word 'institution, - 
with the word 'culture'. 
Innater species-wide ritual behaviour, such as the 
Cour-tship rituals of birds or the ccmnunication system of the 
hone Iy bee are therefore, in line with normal usage, not 
ins , titutions. The innate syn-bolic behaviour of infants, as we 
saw, in the previous section, never survives in its original 
, fo. rm beyond infanthood, but rapidly develops into cultural 
forffs which are specific to a particular ccnvunity. They 
corre, albeit gradually, institutionalized. Fbr instance, 
innate human greeting behaviour - the smile, the open hand - 
is -'developed in all human communities into specific 
established cultural forms of greeting, such as the' 
institutions of hand shakes, salutes and verbal greeting 
rituals. 
-According to this definition, marriage is an institution, 
for, although almost all human communities have something we 
rnight recognize as marriage, what counts as getting niarried 
can only be determined by reference to an established practice 
in a particular community. Taking a nate is, in this sense, a 
natural form of behaviour (even if it involves a shared 
ritual); it is an activity we can recognize, and a concept we 
Can'confidently use, across most social and genetic groups. 
making a contract is an institutional activity; grasping 
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hands is a- natural one. Baptising is an institutional 
activity; washing is a natural one. Performing a ballet is an 
institutional activity; jumping and twirling are natural ones. 
It should be obvious at this point that what we are 
distinguishing are not forms of behaviour per se but 
descriptions of activities. For there is a sort of identity 
between the pairs of descriptions. The handshake is the 
ratification of the contract. When we describe an action as 
baptism, it is an act of washing we are describing. When we 
call a period of jumping and twirling a ballet, we are giving 
the same activity another name. 
But it is not a sinple identity. Both descriptions refer 
to the same activity but they are not interchangeable and each 
brings into play the possibility of a quite different set of 
evaluations, properties, specifications and reactions. 
We can now express another characteristic of institutions. 
They are grounded in nature, for they emerge out of and are 
expressed by, natural activities. They are founded on the 
fact that people-respond to similar situations in similar ways 
and,, that 
, 
they, agree, as Wittgenstein says, not "in opinions, 
but in -form, of life". (1) The relationship between the 
Signifying activity of an institution and its established 
n, eaning ýcan fall anywhere on a scale between the almost 
natural and the almost arbitrary. 
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crying is a natural signal of distress. That people cry 
when in distress is a universal biological and psychological, 
fact of the human condition. It is not an institution because 
it is not an established form of behaviour. As children 
develop, however, their cries beccime mulded by interaction 
wjth others into specific cultural forms. An exanple of such 
a form is the calling of the English word 'help'. Crying, we 
might call the root of the institution of calling 'help'. 
Richard Wollheim describes this point graphically in the 
case of art: "It has been said, with reason, that the crux or 
core, of art may be recognized in scme effect as sinple as the, 
cctTpletely satisfying progression frm a cobbled street to the 
smcoth base 6f a building that grows upward from it. Here, 
then, we have the dependence of art on life". (2) 
,- As institutions move further away fran their roots - the 
relationship between the signifying activity and its 
established meaning'ccime to depend less on nature and more on 
convention. For an exanple at the other end of the scale we 
could look at the activity of sending a semaphore message -a 
thoroughly institutionalized cry for help. 
The activity of sending a semphore message clearly has its 
"roots in such natural activities as waving to attract 
attention, but a semphore message can neither be identified 
nor evaluated without an acquaintance with the established 
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practices and conventions of a particular culture. Unless we 
have been trained in semaphore by the ccrrm3nity that uses it#,,. 
we do not know what counts as an authentic serraphore message, 
and we ' cannot , say 
if a particular message is relieving or,. 
alarming, technically correct, -kind. or cruel, true or 
false.. 
- 
5.3.2: Institutions as ritual (svmbolic) forms of behaviour 
Institutions are activities that are characterized by- a sort, 
of duality. They have both a natural and an institutional 
name. Under their natural description they can be identified, 
and defined without reference to any particular culture., 
Under- their - institutional description,, they., -, cannot 
be 
identified or evaluated without reference to a special meaning 
or significance that the activity has been given by, a 
I 
particular group of people. 
- Seen thus as activities which have been embedded with 
special, meaning-.,. or significance, institutions can be seen to 
have similarities-with words, works of art(3) and people(4), 
in, -that- they.,, cap be described, perceived and responded to (? n 
at least two levels -- on a physical level as the thing that 
signifies'and on what we might call a connotative level as the 
thing that'is signified., - 
, -_They ýhaveý. therefore. two sets of properties: one set of 
natural -properties, and one,, set of. culturally emergent 
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properties. In this sense we can say that institutions are 
symbolic - they are activities with a meaning. 
We have already seen that people use symbolic activities in 
at least two different ways - to represent and to express. If 
we want to understand the expressive ccn-ponent of a form of 
syd: )olic behaviour we -have to ask what emotion or mood this 
behaviour expresses or arouses? If we want to understand the 
meaning of the representational ccuponent, of a form of 
symbolic behaviour we have to ask what this person, object or 
action'represents? 
Symbolic actions can be done once, - like kissing a 
photograph or removing a wedding ring. They become rituals 
when they are regularly repeated. If someone Aisses their 
lover's photograph every night before bed, or touches each 
lamp post whenever they walk down a particular road, their 
symbolic actions become rituals. 
ý, Institutions are therefore regularly repeated forms of 
behaviour that have a 'special meaning because they are 
representative or expressive of something in the life of the 
person peforming them. 
5.3.3: 
_Institutions 
as conTmmal forms of behaviour 
By saying that institutions are conTrunal forms of behaviour we 
mean that institutions are forms of behaviour that are shared 
PAGE 251 
by the menbers of a ccmmmity. 
As was said in the previous section, in order to clarify 
this deceptively simple looking statement it is necessary to 
give scime sense to the idea of ritual forms of behaviour that 
are not shared armng wzbers of a ccmmmity - the idea of 
private ritual. 
Ritual behaviour is meaningful behaviour and is, as Peter', 
Winch has powerfully argued, rule-following, and therefore 
necessarily social. His argument rests on two points: - 1) 
following rules involves the idea that it must, be in principle 
possible for other people to grasp the rule and judge when it 
is being correctly followed; 2) it makes no sense to suggest 
anyone capable of establishing a purely personal standard of 
behaviour if they had never had any experience of human, 
society with its socially established rules. (5) Established 
rules,. are, then, a logically necessary prerequisite of the use, 
of symbols. 
Peter, Winch makes no mention of innate rule-following,, - 
behaviour such as we find in animal ccnn=ication, where the 
rule is established by natural selection. Nor does he 
mention unconsciously motivated and constructed rule-following 
behaviour such as we find in dreams and neuroses, where the 
rule is not necessarily 'grasped' by anyone. 
Neither of , these, cases invalidates either of his 
basic 
PAGE 252 
poiiits or his insistence that all meaningful behaviour is 
socialý- Cmsider Iady Macbeth; burdened by guilt she wanders 
in her sleep peforming endless washing movements with her 
hands.. Is this a ritual? Is it meaningful or syntolic 
behaviour? Does it involve following a rule. Is it socially 
est ablished behaviour? Yes, all these seern to be true and 
yet it, is, in an inportant sense, not ccnrmnal behaviour. it 
, is, a. private ritual. 
-, "., The,, connection between the washing action and the idea of 
removing guilt probably has some roots deep in the nature of 
. the 
human species. It is at the same time culturally moulded 
into the particular form it takes in the sleep-walking of Lady 
ýMacbeth- But, however we believe the connection to be 
establishedr it clearly involves a rule. As such it involves 
the idea of other people being able to grasp the connection, 
and of making a mistake --7 thinking for example that washing is 
connected with revenge rather than guilt. For these reasons 
Winch. is correct when he says that it can only make sense in a 
social setting. 
-Byjabelling behaviour as neurotic we are conceding that 
, 
there is a rule involved, even if no-one can quite get to the 
ýbottorn of it. If we give up the 
idea of there being a rule 
we, at the same time, abandon the idea that it is neurotic 
behaviour and consign it to the category of the randcmly 
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bizarre. 
We can now imagine a scale of ritual behaviour that 
stretches from the individual to the ccmnunal. At one end we 
have idiosyncratic obsessional neuroses that no one quite 
understands. Then there are neuroses which mcst people can 
understand but few actually exhibit, such as Lady Macbeth's. 
Mbich are con-parable with 'one-off I symbolic actions like 
that of Pontius Pilate. ) At the other end of the scale we 
have rituals like baptism, where the same washing/guilt motif, 
culturally adapted in another way, is understood, valued and 
practised by a whole ccmmnity. (Not by the British but, 
theoretically at least, by the Christian Church. ) 
Winch is therefore correct to say that no one is capable of 
establishing an individual rule unless they have behind them 
the experience of human society. But individuals, because' of 
idiosyncratic elements in their genetic make-up or cultural 
training, can establish personal symbolic rules that can be 
either not understood, not valued, or not peforned by the rest 
of the ccm=ity in which they are living. 
In his novels William Golding frequently returns to the 
subject of"symbolic behaviour. In Darkness Visible(6) he 
shows how it can isolate an individual, rather than integrate 
him into a ccmmunity. Just as individuals within a camunity 
can use noises without'it constituting a language, so they can 
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use rituals without it constituting an institution. 
The, subject of the story, Matty, is already isolated by his 
strange beginnings and appearance; as a child he appears 
mysteriously out of a fire, deformed by the bums he has 
sustained. Throughout his life he increasingly rejects spoken 
language, only uttering rare sentences. Golding recounts a 
period of Matty's life spent in Austria; 
., A happy year, all things considered! Only there were 
things... moving about under the surface. If things moved 
about on the surface there was scoething to be done... But 
. 
how if the thing that moves beneath the surface is not to 
be defined but stays there, a must without any 
instructions? Must drove him to things he could not 
explain but only accept as a bit of easing when to do 
nothing was intolerable. Such was the placing of stones in 
a pattern, the making of gestures over them. Such was the 
slow trickling of dust fran the hand and the pouring of 
good water into a hole. (6) 
After Matty's return to England an inner campulsion leads him 
to build matchboxes into a pile and blow on them: 
After seven days Matty addded to his game. He bought a 
clay pot and gathered twigs; and this time when everybody 
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started laughing at his - matchboxes, Matty put the týwigs' 
together into the pot on top and tried to light them' with 
the matches, but could not. 
Matty continues his Igam', day after day and eventually sets 
light to the parking lot and is arrested. The authorities 
jurrp to the wrong conclusions about his activity. "Ybu'ýr6 
wrong in supposing that people can't read your message, 
translate your language, " a kindly official tells him, "of 
course we can. The irony is - the irony always was that 
predictions of calamity have always been understood by the 
inforned, the educated. They have not been understood by ýthe 
very people who suffer most frm them. " 
He asks Fatty, "Do you have scme kind of percepticn, 'scme 
extra-sensory perception, same second-sight - in a word do you 
see?.. I only man, my dear fellow, this inforn-ation' you 
feel called to press on a unheeding world -" Two words ccme 
out of Matty Is mouth like "two gol fbal 1s feel! (7) 
decision to Put it in the category of a ritual depends upon 
the decision that it has a symbolic meaning. The cmpulsion 
Matty's behaviour is not understood or shared. 
Matty feels suggests to us that it is not random behaviour. 
There is a rule there somewhere even if it is an expressive 
rather' than a representative one and even if no-one, including 
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matty,, understands what it is. But this action of Matty's is 




', The trouble with this distinction as with the others is 
that it is a relative rather than an absolute one. There are 
no, , ýanswers to questions about how many people n-ake a 
comminity, or what counts as using a ritual. 
5.3.4: . Def ining 
institutions' 
Institutions are repetitive forms of behaviour that have a 
special- , representative or expressive meaning to their 
participants and are shared by members of a human cammunity. 
While having roots in biological and psychological facts of 
the human condition, they are governed by conventions that 
have, become established by a particular community. 
Before continuing to a discussion of institutions and 
religion it will be helpful to re-emphasize some further 
characteristics of institutions, that have to same extent 
already been mentioned. 
Firstly they attract theoretical justifications and thus 
fall into groups or categories in respect of the sort of 
justification that seems relevant to the cammnity that uses 
them. 
Secondly as we saw frcm our short discussion of the 
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relationship between concepts and institutions, it is 
individuals who think and act, that stand between beliefs 'and 
practices - individuals armed with their own meanings and 
values, intentions and purposes. It is individuals that bath 
are made by and nuke institutions. 
During' the training of children, institutions and their 
associated beliefs and values are internalized and used to 
interpret the world. On the other hand, as experiences change 
in changing historical circumstances, institutions can care 
under pressure. New meanings can be found for them, new 
categories proposed, changes made in the way they are 
practised. - They may spread through a community, wane-in, 
significance, became marginalized or be abandoned. 
I Institutions are therefore characterized by being open., 
Just as with language, meanings, definitions, popularity, - 
grammar -and spelling are always open to change and do change,, 
sometimes -in spite of opposition. so the use of , an--' 
institution is always in principle under review and remins 
responsive to shifting patterns of historical experience, - 
social behaviour and authority structures. 
''The concept of an institution is essentially linked with 
the concept of authority. When human connunities agree in the 
use of a ritual, give it an institutional description and 
imbue it with culturally emrgent propertiesr there arises a 
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ii 
sense - in which a certain procedure becomes the way the thing 
ought to be done. Those who do it in significantly different 
ways. -'can 
be reprimanded for doing it incorrectly. The 
activýty has acquired its own authority. This and not that is 
the'established way of doing it. 
The . force of this authority. 
is sharpened if we consider the 
functions institutions have for communities. It seems to me, 
although this is not intended as a definitive statement, that 
the'general function of institutions is recalling, sharing, 
encouraging, reproducing and enforcing experiences and ways of 
I iving., that are valued; and forgetting, diminishing, 
discouraging and prohibiting experiences and ways of living 
that are devalued. 
They -are for and about 
living together. Thus to dance 
before battle decreases, fear and cowardice and increases 
courage,, and persistence; worshipping a totem increases social 
identity and solidarity; marking the-choosing of a mate with 
vows - ., and prayers 
increases faithfulness and discourages 
prcmiscuity. 
Institutions can thus be seen in this sense to eNbody and 
, ues of a society. They therefore not only 










5.3.5: We are now in a position to distinguish four ways in which 
human activities can be related to institutions, although it 
should be noted at this point firstly that it is descriptions 
of activities that we are considering; several descriptions 
way relate to the same activity. Secondly the distinction 
between the categories can, in real examples, be changeable, 
indistinct and confused. 
A human activity may be: 1) a natural activity in which the, 
institution has its roots; 2) a natural activity which is the. 
signifier of the institution; 3) part of the traditions and 
expectations which surround the institution; 4) the 
institution, which is defined by the conventions of the, 
ccnmnity. 
If we apply this to the institution of marriage - marriage 
can be seen to have its roots in the natural activity, of. 
taking a mate and building a home and family, but it is not 
defined by these activities. In Britain the basic signifying 
activities of marriage are the voluntary exchanging of vows 
and rings before legitimate witnesses and subsequent- 
consummtion in sexual union. many other varied customs, 
expectations and traditions surround these basic activities, - 
such as the stag night party, religious service, honeymoon, 
etc. These are connected with, not definitive ofr the 
concept of marriage. The institution is 'marriage'. 
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That making vows and exchanging rings counts as getting 
marrried is a' (not entirely arbitrary) cOnnection rrade by a 
jjýýicular human ccnTmmity. To be able to answer such 
questions as: were they married when we'ret them last year? do 
you have to be married to get this sort of tax relief? will 
you marry me? - in other words, to be able to use the concept 
of -marriage in Britain - one must be trained in the 
conventions of this ccmTunity. Cne must know that for a 
marriage to be valid, the vows must be taken voluntarity, the 
person cmducting the ceremny must be properly legitimated 
and sexual union must follow. Even to reject the concept of 
nurriage and opt for an alternative way of organizing your 
life, you must know what it is you are rejecting. (And you 
would still know what was meant by the question: but are you 
really married? ) 
,ý in most communities mates are taken and families and hames 
are - bui It, and in most human communities some, sort - of 
institution has grown up to control, encourage, enjoy and mark 
the beginning of this activity. When we see such activities 
in ccmmnities other than our own we can see that it is an 
institution with commn roots and so we call it marriage. But 
their concept of marriage is not ours, and we do not 
understand what counts as a valid marriage in their comnunity, 
and we do not know what rules govern the use of their concept, 
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until we receive sane training. in the# conventions. 
And if we go on and ask; yes, but apart from the 
conventions of any particular camunity, what really counts as 
getting rorried? we demnstrate that we have failed',. to 
appreciate the institutional nature of the activity. 
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SECTION 6. TOMMS AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF RELIGION 
6.1: Introduction 
An_ institutional theory of religion claims that religions are 
most helpfully seen not primarily as sorts of experiences (or 
sorts, of objects) or a sort of language, but as aspects of 
culture; that what is to be valued and considered authentic in 
religions is, in each community, substantially determined , by 
its social institutions. 
Having now a clearer view of the nature of institutions, 
the task of defending an institutional theory of religion will 
proceed by examining the. central concepts of religions -a 
religious activity, a religious object and a religious 
experience. The focus will be on the rules for the use of 
these concepts - how people decide to what they apply. I hope 
to demonstrate that their use is substantially determined, in 
each community, by its social institutions, and that there is 
nothing prior to, or independent of, the development of human 
conTrunities that has a significant role in regulating their 
use; - that they are 
in f act institutional concepts. 
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In order for a word to have a use it must be regulated. 
There must be scme things it can be used for and some things 
it can not; otherwise the word is useless. These rules vary 
from being vague and inclusive ('nice' or 'that') to being., 
precise and exclusive ('arachnid' or Imetrel). Words can have 
diverse, metaphorically extended or arbitrarily connected 
rules of use; they way be used creatively, idiosyncratically 
or in' a specialized way by different groups or individuals,,, - 
within any particular language ccnrminity. But looking at the 
way language is used and seeing what rules regulate the use of 
particular words is both a possible and a useful exercise. 
(even if it only leads to seeing what can not regulate the use 
of a particular word(l). ) 
While the essentialist question: what is religion? - is 
largely an unprofitable one, (2) it is instructive to ask what 
regulates the use of the word 'religion'. 
The noun 'religion' is used to describe mutually exclusive, 
sets of beliefs and activities - ways of talking and living - 
that, taken as a whole set, are connected with a family of, ' 
characteristics that are difficult to specify. They include 
beliefs in 'transcendent' or 'spiritual' beings (although 
exactly how these two words are used varies, not all religions 
contain such beliefs, and not all beliefs in spirits are 
considered to be religious. ) They usually include activities 
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that. seem to imply such beliefs, such as worship, prayer and 
burial rituals. They also specify sources of authority on, or 
answers to, questions about the ultimate nature or meaning of 
existence, and about how people ought to live (but so do many 
secular thought systems). 
Such 'a definition is not inconsistent with, and in fact 
seems to indicate, that religions are aspects of culture, but 
in' order to establish this it is necessary to examine more 
closely the activities, objects and experiences that people 
call"religious. 
iNotes- 
1) see eg Ludwig Wittgenstein on the use of 'pain' 
philosophical Investigations I paras 244ff 
2) See Section 4, on Institutional Theories of Art 
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6-2: Religious activities 
Human beings eat and sleep, they make tools and statues, and 
grow things, dance, sing, fight, worship, mate and die, paint 
pictures and tell stories, make pilgrimages, decorate' 
themselves, write letters, vote, make gifts and promises, 
build and destroy... Scme of the things that human beings, do. 
are described as religious activities, but what is it about a 
human activity that makes it a religious one? How do we know 
which activities are correctly described in this way? 
The answers to these questions will indicate how far, the 
concept of a religious activity is an institutional Concept, - 
in the sense that we learn how to use it by becoming 
acquainted with the conventions of human ccnTminities rather 
than natural qualities. 
Paradigm examples of religious activities across all 
religions are ceremonies of different kinds, including 
dressing up, telling or acting stories, chanting, songs and 
prayers, moral teaching, making pilgrimages, offerings and 
sacrifices, images, pictures and shrines, that are visited and 
shown reverence. The category also includes an individual's 
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prayers, study and meditation#, moral behaviour and service. 
6.2.1 People who live in relatively static, homogeneous cultures 
have few problem deciding which of their cammmity's 
activities are - religious. They are trained in the use of 
their,. language, and become aware of the coherence and 
continuity of sets of activities, the places where they are 
carried out and the people who use and control them. They 
know. what makes an activity religious because they know what 
their religious specialists - their clergy,. priests or holy 
men and wanen - do and what goes on in their shrines, churches 
. or -templ. es; they are 
familiar with the institutions their 
Convmnity calls religious (and are able to extend the use of 
the concept in a metaphorical way). 
Consider a live rendering of a Bach mass in a cathedral. is 




come fran the context, or setting, of the event. if it 
%us organized by a musical society, advertized as being one of 
the, finest examples of choral singing, followed by applause 
and evaluated by the music critics in the daily papers, we 
make a different judgement than if it was organized by the 
Cathedral staff, advertized as being in n =ry of a late Canon -e 
of the, Cathedral, followed by quiet prayer and reported in the 
church press. We know how to-tell which things are religious 
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and what religious things are like, because we know about the 
institutions that our ccmToinity calls religious. 
6.2.2: This explanation seem straightfoward and obvious, but when 
we consider it in more depth, especially in the context-of 
alien cultures, or mobile, pluralistic cultures, the question 
seems both to need more careful thought and to raise other 
possible answers. 
Does this decorated dance have a meaning? If so, is -it 
social, magic, military or religious? By sinply looking there 
is no way we can tell. And what if we discover that the 
participants have no concept of art, no way of distinguishing 
science frcm magic, social ends from religious ones, or are 
unable to give any reasons for the activity that make sense to 
us? 
Are the various individuals sitting silently in rows in the 
cathedral, listening to the Bach Mass, engaging in a social, 
aesthetic or religious activity? Just by looking we are 
unable to tell, and what if sare- of them came with mixed 
motives or can not say clearly why they cam? 
There are several levels at which we attenpt to answer 
these questions. The first have to do with whether, 'an 
activity has a symbolic meaning. The others with what sort of 
meaning it has, for it seems clear to me that it is only by 
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reference to established neanings that activities can be 
catýe4oiized as religious. 
ýButf an antagonist will ask, is it the case that if we are 
to'id4itify an activity as religious we nust first establish 
that"it is an institution? Are there no naturalo, direct, 
private activites that can be recognized as religious? (1) In 
many,, if not most, religions people worship, invoke, pray and 
maýe*sacrifices, tell stories, perform ceremonies, theorize 
and- make moral rules. Are none of these activities 
exclusively and necessarily religious, and could thus have a 
part"in regulating the concept of religion? 
''Jtý ý-seems not. Mere-are activities that are necessarily 
religious - worshipping Allah,, baptizing a new Christian, 
observing the Day of Atonement, making a pilgrimage to mecca, 
taking Communion, chanting the name of Krishna. But all these 
activities are institutions. - they are defined by convention 
andý, cannot be identified prior to, or independently of, 
p. ractices that have beccrre established in particular human 
ccnummities. 
If- we use more general descriptions for these activities 
they become no longer necessarily religious; they could 
,, equally well have a secular meaning, for people express 
'devotion, respect and praise to their fellow human beings, and 
even to their pets; people invoke, appease and make sacrifices 
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and requests to things other than their gods. 
It might be argued that in modern usage the word . 'worship, _ 
is confined to religious contexts. (2) The more decisive 
-I 
question is: is there any natural, direct, individual, 
activity that can be identified as religious worship without, 
establishing its social context - without asking 
worshippers what they think they are doing, or making 
assuirptions about what, or to whcm, the activity is directed? 
-A tribesrran falls down on his knees with his a rms 
outstretched to the rising sun. We recognize an expression. of 
wonder. But is it worship in the religious sense? Can, we not, 
imagine a modern atheist feeling exactly the same emotion, and 
expressing it - by writing a poem perhaps - without wanting to 
say that he was worshipping anything. Wonder is clearly, a 
root activity of religion, but wonder can be expresssed in a 
secular ýcontext. For an activity to be religious worship-it- 
would require a more omplicated response - scmething more, 
like the feeling William Golding puts in the mind of his 
stone-age character, Lok, as, with the ccining of the Spring, ý 
his family returns to their suuner hcre: 
., He stood up and peered over the earth and stones 
down the, 
- the ..,,. slope. The river had not gone away either or,,,, 
muntains. The overhang had waited for them. Quite 
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suddenly he was swept up by a tide ý of happiness and 
exultation. Everything had waited for them: Oa had waited 
for them. Even now she was pushing up the spikes of the 
bulbs, fattening the grubs, reeking the smells out of the 
earth, bulging the fat buds out of every crevice and bough. 
He danced on to the terrace by the river, his arms spread 
wide. 'loa! 
This exarrple eMhasizes what has already been noted, that 
itutions grow from their roots, like "the ccnpletely -inst 
satisfying progression frcm, a cobbled streeet to the snx)oth 
base"o fa building that grows" upward" from 'it". (4) This 
irrplies' 'that there is no hard distinction between 
institutional and non-institutional-activities (and therefore 
that , 'institutional theories necessarily have soft edges). 
. Nevertheless 
'before. we could confidently call a decorated 
dance; or an individual Is visit to a cathedral, a religious 
activity, we would have to assenble same evidence about the 
iieaning of the activity to the participants that they were 
Jn' scme sense 'dancing before their god, to thank, appease 
, 'or invoke hirn - or that sam of them had came, in some sense, 
t, In-eet God' rather than just to listen to the music. 
Wi thout establishing scmething 'of the sort it seems to ne that 
calling an activity religious would be speculative, and 
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vacuous. It is the nature of the peaning given to an activity 
by a human ccnuunity, rather than the nature of the activity 
itself, that takes it into the cateqory of the religious. 
6.2.3: Peter Winch appears to be opposing this view when he suggests 
that it might be posible to "identify a set of practicesl as 
'religious' independently of any beliefs associated with 
them". (5) A closer look however reveals, what anyone 
acquainted with Winch's writing would expect, that he is not 
talking about non-institutional activities. He describes the 
sort of practice he has in mind as, "an established social 
practice rather than the behaviour of individuals considered 
separately... set apart frcm behaviour associated with 
everyday practical concerns... in the sense that it is 
stylized,, ruled by conventional forms and perhaps thought of 
as stenming from long-standing traditions". (6) What Winch is 
suggesting is that there are institutions that, -although 'they 
have a shared meaning, in the sense of an established function 
in 
,a 
CCMI-Mity, have not yet attracted theoretical 
justifications in the minds of their users. They do not know, 
or can not say why they do it. He is not disputing the claim 
that there are no natural, direct, individual activities, that 
are characterizable as religious. 
., 
I do still want to disagree with Winch's suggestion 
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(although I see the disagrecment as having neither any easy 
resolution nor serious consequence for an institutional 
theory). It is a fact that institutions are frequently used 
without the participants knowing or understanding, or being 
able to say, why they do so, but I still find it hard to see 
how religious, social, magical and aesthetic institutitions 
can be distinguished frm one another without scne reference 
to beliefs, even if they are inplicit or imputed. scrae might 
feel attracted to the argument that all burial rituals are 
religious, even if they are performed by elephants. (Winch 
alrwst certainly would not. ) The force in this argument is 
the feeling that burial rituals inply belief in life after 
death. it is precisely their association with beliefs that 
rmkes people want to call them religious, even when there is 
no question of elephants believing anything of the sort. M-lat 
this exarrple actually demonstrates is the foolishness of 
I1 . 11. 
irnputing beliefs solely on the basis of what people, or 
elephantso do. 
winch, in his remrks, ernphasizes the social aspects of the 
pra ctices that can be called religious. As has already been 
discussed in Section 5, synbolic, rule following behaviour can 
only ezerge in a social context. It is for this reason that 
my disagreement with William James view of religion as "the 
feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their 
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solitude" (7) is, in contrast to my disagreement with Winch, 
radical and indissoluble. 
This does not however, as was discussed in- 5.3.3. 
completely rule out the possibility of private religious 
actions. Having learnt frcm acquaintance with institutions' 
what the features of a religious institution are, it 'is' 
possible to recognize these features in rituals that are 
private, in the sense of not being used by a ccrmunity but by 
an isolated individual - what in the early section were 
characterized as neuroses. 
6.2.4: When we look for religious activities in unfamilar 
ccirmu-Lities we look for sets of institutions with similar 
sorts of meanings to the institutions that we call religious 
in our own. we can see how this is done by considering 
another passage from a William Golding novel. 
In, Lord of the Flies a group of school boys are rrarooned on 
an uninhabited paradise island, but all does not go well. As 
they struggle with indecision and guilt they start to talk of 
a beast that stalks the island by night. At one stage in the 
story they stick the bloody head of a newly killed pig on a 
pole and leave it in a clearing. What are we to make of this 
strange action? How would we begin to judge if it -is, 
religious? 
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''Without any reference to the shared mean ing of this action 
to the, boys we are lost. It could have a secular meaning; 
they ý could have done it out of a general playfulness, * or to 
attract the flies away frorn their food store. Unless we have 
more clues that help us understand the shared symbolic meaning 
of the action we cannot recognize it as a religious one. 
-Golding gives us just such a clue. The boys consider the 
action appropriate, although perhaps not knowing why they find 
it so., ýJack, their leader, puts it's meaning into words: "This 
' head ý, is for the beast, " he says , "Its gift". (8) 
Iriviediately we recognize , the religious: it is an appeasing 
sacrifice --not a joke, not a lure for insects, but a gift to- 
a'malevolent spirit. 
6.2.5:, When considering the institution of narriage it was noted 
that people could recognize institutions in other cultures by 
recognizing the natural roots of the now conventional 
ac 
. 
tivity., Can we do thesame-in the case of religion? Do 
religious institutions have their roots in any distinguishable 
set, of natural activities or facts about the human condition? 
Peter Winch suggests that worship, "is a prinlitive human 
response to certain characteristic human situations and 
predicawnts, that it is, to use a phrase of Wittgenstein's, 
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part of the natural history of mankind". (9) Providing nx)re 
details to this admirable answer must be speculative, but it 
is plausible that the roots of religion lie in a particular. 
kind of response to the powerlessness, ignorance and wonder 
that human beings feel about their natural, social ýand 
personal wrlds. 
It is a fact of being hu-nan that, in our natural state, we 
do not understand where rain corres from and can not make it 
rain, feel exultant when it arrives after a drought and suffer, 
when it does not - that we are ignorant about how best to 
organize our societies, can not control aggression and greed, -, 
even in ourselves, feel ecstatic when our relationships, -work 
and hurt when they fail - that we do not know what happens 
after death but can not avoid it, fear our own end and, the 
loss of those we love and feel grateful when its shadow 
appears to have receded. 
These are same of the facts of our human situation, and 
communities respond to them in various ways - by pursuing, -for 
instance, scientific knowledge and magic power. The response 
that we associate with religions is that of looking-for 
solutions, relief and expression, in associating -or 
identifying with a personal, superhuman, source of wisdom 'and 
power - and by invoking, appeasing, interceding, worshipping, 
serving -and obeying it. It is when we see sets- of 
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institutions that seem to have meanings related to this sort 
of., response to the biological and psychological facts of the 
hun-an condition, that we feel inclined to include them in the 
categcFy of the religious. 
Pecple take mates and build families but these natural 
activities do not regulate a cmT=ity's concept of marriage. 
Questions such as: were they married last Septenber? was that 
a proper wedding? is this your wedding ring? - can not be 
answered by reference to them. These natural activities form 
the roots, not a basis for the definition of, the socially 
established institutions of marriage. Dancing before battle 
increases aggression and solidarity, but the natural 
activities of jumping and twirling do not regulate a 
ccnrLmtyls ccncept of the War Dance. Questions such as: did 
they do the war dance yesterday? do the wcmn join in the 
war dance? is that the mask used in the war dance? - can not 
be answered by referring to them. They form the roots of, not 
basis for a def initiOn of ,a socially established 
, -institution. 
People find relief fran the fear, guilt and suffering caused 
by ignorance and powerlessnes and a way of expressing joy, 
wonder and gratitude, in natural activites such as acting, 
chanting, story telling,, singing and dressing-up, but these 
natural activities do not regulate a ccmTmnity's concept of 
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religion. Questions such as: is this a holy place? was , that 
a religious experience? is this object sacred? - can not be- 
answered by referring to them. They form the roots of, not' a 
basis for, a definition of the concept of religious activity. -, '- 
If the idea of a religious activity is, in any ccmumity, 
an institutional concept, if it is our institutions'' that 
regulate our use of the concept, we would expect, in changing, ' 
pluralistic societies like our own, to find the use of 'th6 
concept varied, contentious and to same extent incoherent. I 
believe we do, and yet its use is still substantially 
detennined by the varied institutions that cohere and continue 
under the label of religions. People still know I ýftt 
activities are religious, and what religious activities are 
like, because they know what goes on in the churches, mosques, 
synogogues and tenples of their ccnplex world. 
Notes 
1) The nature of institutions as established, symbolic', 
ccnuunal activities, as cpposed to natural, direct' and 
individual activities is discussed in Section 5. The use- of 
these' . words' and of other ideas used in this section deýends 
upon the definitions established there 
2) The words "With my body I thee worship" are excluded frcxn 
the modern Anglican wedding service. on the other hand 
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judges, mayors and Masons still use derivations of the word in 
sane- of their titles. 
3) William Golding 7he Inheritors pp31/32 
4) Richard wollheim talking about the roots of art in Art and 
its objects pp117/8. This passage is discussed in 5.3 
5) Peter Winch "Meaning and Religious Ianguage" p196 
6) Ibid pp197/8 the other characteristics Winch thinks 
necessary for claiming scue ritualistic behaviour to be 
religious are that it is "associated with a sense of wonder 
and awe at the grandeur and beauty of aspects of the tribe's 
enviromrent and to be directed toward features of that 
enviroment having particular importance in the tribe' s life. 
lhýse'seem to me insufficient to distinguish between social, 
religious and aesthetic institutions. 
7) William James The varieties of Reliqious Experience p5o 
8) William Golding Lord of the Flies p122 
9) Peter Winch "Meaning and Religious Language" p202 
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6.3: Religious objects 
This section will consider the questions: how do we decide 
which objects are religious? howfararetherules by which 
we apply the word 'religious' to objects dependent upon-bur 
knowledge of institutions rather than our knowledge of natural 
qualities? are religious objects in this sense institutional 
objects? 
6.3.1: Institutional objects 
If we take as a definition of an institutional object - an 
object as described by a word that is regulated by an 
institution, we see clearly that wedding rings, voting papers, 
crowns and flags are institutional objects. They each have a 
natural description; they are metal rings, pieces of paper or 
cloth. Under this description they have natural properties, - 
functions and values. But they also have an institutional 
description which brings with it additional, culturally 
emergent, properties, functions and values. 
We can in general distinguish five distinct ways of 
applying descriptions to objects: 1) by way of its function 
(what it is used for - eg a table): 2) by way of its 
properties (what it is like - eg a triangle) 3) by way of its 
value (how desirable it is, or how much I want it -_eg a 
PAGE 280 
reward) 4) by way of its status (what social position has it 
been given - eg a president) 5) by way of a derivation or 
nietaphorical extension. We may, for instance, speak lyrically 
of a forest clearing as a green cathedral; we nay, to a child, 
refer to a duck' s mate as her husband; we may, for effect, 
call the weather funereal. Bat if pressed we would agree that 
it isn't really a cathedral, the drake isn't really her 
husband and there wasn't a funeral. 
Nowlit is clear that these ways of applying words are very 
closely intertwined. We use objects for certain functions 
because of their properties; we value them because of their 
uses; we give them a status because of their function; 
Mtaphorical uses slide into normal ones. But this does not 
n-ean that the rules of use of words are necessarily similarly 
intertwined. we call an object educational or refer to it as 
bed 
. 
because we know what it is used for; we call an object 
heavy or a triangle because we know its properties; we refer 
to an object as cheap or a pound because we know its value; we 
Call. an, object reputable or a contract because we know its 
status. - 
I-II 
An object is an institutional object if 1) we know it is 
. correctly 
described because we know of its function in 
relation to an institution (a wedding ring or a voting paper) 
2) know it is correctly described because we know of a 
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social status that has been ascribed to it (a National Parlý or 
a mayor) 3) the value, properties or functions that 'are 
relevant to its description derive from its relation'to an 
institution or an ascribed status.. 
It is relatively easy to see how the value of an object can 
derive from its use in an institution, or fran a status that 
has been ascribed to it, but it is also the case that 
properties can derive from both function and status. Giving a 
new function or status to an object means that a whole* new 
range of things can be said about it. A succession of sounds 
has several natural properties (It is loud, irritating or high 
pitched). If the sounds have the function of ccmunicating a 
message (They are a morse code signal), they have several 
other, culturally emergent, properties (The message is unkind, 
untrue, presuoptious, belated etc). And if the message is 
given the status of being a pruýise, it gains another set of 
properties (It is foolhardy, improbable, reassuring etc). 
6-3.2: Ascription 
An ascriptive declaration is the process by which objects 
acquire a new social status, an institutional description and 
a new set of functions, values, properties. It is a type of J 
L Austin's 'perfonmtive utterances'. (l) Turning scmething 
into an institutional object is one of the things you can do 
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with words, although, as it will beccime clear, it is rarely 
done with words alone and can equally well be done without 
.. -, It. is a complicated and confusing process which I shall try 
t6',, untangle by looking at scime examples: the first example is 
of a process which might appear to be an ascription but is 
not: 
, tA caTuunity-are 
looking for a-new source of food. Various 
things are put foward as, possible candidates. They are tested 
for their properties (taste, nutritional value etc). The 
experts reach an agreement and nake. a declaration; X is good 
to eat.,. Why, this is not an ascriptive declaration will beccrm 
clear, w-hen. we consider the following processes: 
1) A colour card-becon-es a standard 
A, -group of 
decoratorý need a standard colour card, for 
, orange,. Several candidates are suggested and discussed. "Vie 
all agree then, " one of them says at the end of the 
discussion, "We'll make, this card our standard., - 
2). A man becomes a leader 
A, group of scientists are engaged on a research task. Over a 
period of time it beccmes obvious to all the team that one 
nxmi>e_r. is taking, and being given, the leadership role - its 
tasks,, its responsibilities and its privileges. Nothing is 
said. 
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A wiman beccues President 
A club needs a new president. The qualities of the various 
eligible in3rbers are considered. Voting papers are passed- 
around among those eligible to vote, collected up and counted. 
"Mrs X has won the vote, " the secretary declares, "She shall 
beccine our President at the ceremony next week. " 
4) An assertion becomes a prcmise 
"I'll probably come tomorrow at around six, " the boy says-to. - 
his girl friend, " She pouts. "Well, all right I promise I 
will. 11 :: 1". 
5) A metal band beccrres a wedding ring 7 
A, couple get engaged and go to buy a wedding ring. They look 
under the label, 'wedding rings' and choose one. Before -, the, 
wedding she wears it to pretend, at an interview, that she is 
already married, but on the day, the best man looses it. -, * So 
they use a spare ring that the vicar produces and buy a 
replacement after the honeymoon. 
Several things can be drawn out of these examples aboutýthe- 
nature of ascriptive declarations. 
1) It is the declaration that makes the new name applicable 
and provides the object with a new set of properties. - This is 
not the 'case in the exanple regarding the food. Thelood 
always was good to eat; the testing discovered it to be -ýso; 
the declaration made no difference. In contrast the colour 
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card was not the standard sample until the declaration. The 
discussion led only to an agreement that it was eligible. 
2)-.,, The motivation for making the declaration can usually be 
seen in terms of the need for an institution to continue. if 
peWýe_ are to get married they have to have rings. If a club 
is to continue it needs a president. 
3) The choice of objects eligible for an ascriptive 
declaration is often made on the basis of the natural 
properties, values and functions of the candidates. It was 
the-, colour of the card and the qualities of mrs X that made 
theni'suitable choices for the ascriptive declaration. 
4)"An'-ascriptive declaration always involves established 
practices (or institutions). which properties, values and 
functions are appropriate'in candidates for ascription, and 
the. :,, -way in which it must be done, are determined by 
convention. This was not the case with the food, but the 
"Is decision that his statement was a suitable one to make 
into' a prcmise depended upon his acquaintance with the 
socially established practice of promising. 
, 5) The declaration need not be formal. ' The president was 
installed at a public ceremony (The declaration, I'mrs x has 
won'the election, " was not ascriptive. It stated what was the 
. case), 
but the decorators just said informally, "We'll make it 
our standard. 
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6) The declaration can be irrplicit and not articulated at all. ', '- 
The researchers never said, 'IX shall be our leader, " but they, -,. I' 
all behaved as though they had. An object can attract an'' 
institutional description werely by being used in the contoct'- 
of an institution. The papers were passed out. No one said, 
"These shall be our voting papers, ". 13eing used for that 
purpose was sufficient to make them so. 
7) The declaration can be an individual decision and can be 
made privately. The boy told his girl friend that his", 
statement was a prondse but (if we allow that it is possible 
to promise to yourself) he could have merely decided to treat'' 
it as such without telling her. (He could not of course baýre- 
established the institution of prornising on his own. ) 
8) Thereiationsh ip between an object and an ascription rieed' 
not be direct. The actual rings the couple called theirý 
wedding ri . Lngs were not the . ones blessed by the vicar at their 
wedding ceremony. The use of the word in general, rather than * 
in particular, is regulated by the institution of marriage. ' 
,, " -1 Nevertheless if they had been asked of either of the rings 
used before or after the wedding, "But is this really your 
wedding ring? ", they would probably have added scme 
explanation. 
9) Ascriptive declaration are bounded by conventions and they 
can fail if these are not corrplied with. It seems in each of' 
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these, diverse cases that declarations can go wrong and people 
can be, rrastaken about them. I 
The decorators can discover that, 
having elected a card to be their saiTple, it is too difficult 
or. expensive a colour to, produce, or a colour that people do 
not-.,, like. It would not, in this case be the declaration that 
went wrong but the choice of candidate. The ascription worked 
and-the card became their standard, but they later regretted 
having done it. They might then say, "This is our standard 
colour, but we don't use it. " 
- 11 
In the case of the researchers, one member of the group 
might have begun to take a leadership role which was resented 
and resisted by others in the group, who preferred not to have 
I. 
a specific leader, or to have someone else. Here a claim to 
-be --a suitable candidate for an ascriptive declaration is 
rejected. The ascription never takes place. In the case of 
the president, agreement, might be reached but. scimething go 
wrcng with the ceremony. The Imnediate Past President, who is 
meant to perform the ceremony, may be taken ill, or the chain 
of office be mislaid. Abortive atterrpts at a ceremony without 
such essential equiFinent may be considered inadequate and a 
decison made to repeat it on another occasion. Here the 
formal expression of the declaration has gone wrong and has 
not been ef fective. But something else can go wrong here too. 
I-' %r-, 
The club might find out after the ceremony, that mrs x was not 
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entitled to stand for the election in the first place because 
she did not satisfy sam prescribed condition. Sheý"had- 
perhaps not been a member for the required number of years. ' 
They could then decide' that even a correctly performe-d', 
ceremony had not made her into the President. 
In the case of the prcn-Lise, there are again candidates'týat- 
fall so far short of the requirenents for making prcmises that 
just saying it is a promise cannnot make it one. (2) If, for 
example, we promise sanething that does not make sense, ' that 
has already failed to happen or that we could not for scrw 
other reason, possibly bring about; if, frcm the tone and' 
context, we are clearly being ironical, joking, or acting a 
part, the declaration does not turn the statement into* a 
pranise. 
In every case ascriptive declarations are bounded by 
conventional rules, but, as we have seen, different rules 
apply in different situations. Sometirms different levels of 
agreement are necessary; scmtirms detailed proccedures have 
to be followed. It seems also that there is always scme 
requirement that has to be met by candidates, although these 
are probably more often in the nature of defeating conditions 
rather than prescriptions. In each case acquaintance with the 
relevant institution and its traditions and rules is required 
and must be ccrrplied with if the declaration is to work. 
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: These observations about how objects acquire institutional 
descriptions can be used to discover whether a specific 
description of an object is an institutional one. We can ask 
of an, object; does this object have two sets of properties, 
functions and values,, one natural set and me set derived from 
its-- relation to an institution? Has this object acquired its 
description by an ascriptive declaration (even it is not 
formal or explicit) or has it acquired it by the discovery of 
a'natural property? Is it a rmtter of convention which 
proper-ties make the description applicable and can failure to 
keep-within the conventions make the declaration fail? Is 
there- a natural function or property which could regulate the 
use of-the description? 
.i 
Before turning to look at religious objects we shall see 
-ýI 
how,, this works out byapplying this set of questions to the 
concept, of a leader., When we call smething or scmebody a 8 
leader are we giving thern a natural or an institutional 
description? We shall consider two cases -1) Three tortoises 
leave their hutch and move towards their drinking bowl. One 
moves faster than the others so we refer to her as the leader. 
2 The Labour Party goes through a ccnplicated and 
longý-winded election process to choose between several 
candidates certified as eligible to lead the party. Mr Y the 
man 
'considered 
by the majority to have the mst irrpressive 
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list of personal achievements, inpeccable socialist beliefs 
and charismatic personality, wins the election and is 
ceremcnially installed as the Leader of the Party. 
How do we know that the tortoise and Mr Y are leaders? 
The tortoise has acquired a new description; we know that it 
applies because of a natural property - her relative speed of 
travel. She could also have acquired a new function (If anyone 
has a use for fast tortoises). But neither of these"are 
derived from the tortoise's relation to an institution and she 
has not acquired any new properties. It does not therefore' 
appear that the declaration that she is the leader is an 
ascriptive one. 
Mr Y has acquired a new description which is derived frm a* 
socially established set of practices involving political' 
parties and their organization. He now has at least two 
descriptims and two sets of functions, values and properti es, 
one natural and one deriving frcrn his relation to an 
institution. His new narre is conferred by an ascriptive 
declaration. Winning the election does not, on its own, n-ake 
him the leader. The status of Leader is conferred in a form , al 
ceremony. Until that tin-e it did not apply. Although there 
are natural properties that wake him eligible, the process by 
which the title is conferred is established by convention and 
there is, in this particular use, no natural function or 
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property that could regulate the use of the word. 
-,, -,, The_ conclusion must be that the way language is used is 
ccriplex, variable and inprecise. The word 'leader' can be 
used as both a natural and an institutional description in 
different contexts. Between these two exarrples are spread 
many other uses where institutional and natural factors play 
more or less in-portant roles. The concept of leadership is 
firmly rooted in nature, but has, in scme contexts, acquired 
an-institutional Use. We should take this as a warning as we 
turn- to look at religious objects and not expect to find any 
less, ambiguity and ccnplexity in our results. 
6.3.3: Sacred Objects 
considering s(xne things as sacred is central to the concept of 
religion. Asking sareone if there is anything they consider 
sacred (asking them if they use the concept) is very much like 
asking them if they are religious. Asking them which objects 
they take to be sacred,, is very much like asking them which 
--religion they follow- Having said that we should also bear in 
mind that attitudes towards objects in religions are 
invariably enignatic; the idea of 'the heathen worshipping 
wood and stone' is born wore of misplaced cultural superiority 
than' fact. One of the n-ajor strands of the world's religions 
(The jewish tradition, fran which both Christianity and Islam 
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proceed) also has specific prohibitions about making in-ages of, 
divinity and definite reservations about the division of 
material things into the sacred and the secular. 
6.3.3.1: 1 begin with a brief glance around the world, picking out 
same examples of sacred objects. If we start with a typical', 
village Hindu family, (3) a few devata or images of gods will 
be found in their home. (They may say these are manifestations 
of the Supreme Spirit. ) They make offerings to these images 
to appease, ingratiate, and obtain requests. An individual 
worshipper is free to choose which devata to worship from an 
almost infinite list, and how such devotions shall be carried 
out. But, as Ursula Sharma points outr the general pattern' 
which these rites follow is fairly constant. She describes--a 
typical ritual act of a Tarkan wcmn worshipping Baba Balak 
Nath in thanksgiving for a good harvest and hope of another. 
She rises early, begins a fast, baths and puts on clean 
clothes. She replasters her kitchen floor with cow dung -and 
prepares sorm karah or sweet pudding. She takes out her image 
Of Baba Balak Nath, puts new cow dung on the floor of her 
veranda and places the image on a stool. No one in the 
household now approaches this area unless they have removed 
their shoes. She bathes the image with fresh water and offers 
flowers and incense before it. She takes red powder and 
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applies it to the forehead and takes same sacred thread and 
ties it around the image's %mist. She offers it a small 
q-? ýntity of karah by pressing it to its Imouthl. The rest of 
the karah is now known as prasad - the transmitter of the 
graceý of the devata - and it is distributed amng the 
household. Great care is taken that none falls to the ground 
or is left where it might come into contact with any impure 
substance. later the image is renoved and put away and the 
area. cleared. The remains of the items offered to the image 
are taken and thrown into a running stream. 
, _'Other things that such a villager would consider sacred 
would be the Sanskritic deities in the village shrine or 
-ýI' IC, _ 
temple, the Brah-nan priest and his mandalas and texts, the 
, -,. ý:, f. -, - 
wandering holy man or guru, the cow and the river Ganges. 
6.3.3.2: - 
Nearer to hare, what we, might call unsophisticated Ranan 
Catholicism raises a remarkably similar list of sacred objects 
the iniages of the Virgin, and of the crucified and risen 
Christ and the saints, might similarly be said to be aids or 
n-ediators in the Catholic's relationship with God. The 
equipnmt used in worship - rosaries, incense and holy water - 
are, similarly revered. The wafers and wine of the Mass are 
consecrated before an altar, built around the relics of a 
saint, and thus beccme the Body and Blood of Christ - the 
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me-ans of God' s grace. They are then shown the greatest 
respect and never allowed to fall on the ground or disposed of 
casually. Catholics too have their priests and holy t 
saints, relics and shrines. David Sox, in his book Relics and 
Shrines, bears witness to the continuing inportance of sacred 
objects in the Catholic faith: "To this day, the technical 
definition of an altar in Roman Catholic canon law is 'a tomb 
containing the relics of saints'... until fairly recently when 
liturgical regulations have become rather lax in same parts of 
the Catholic world, " he says, "no priest would celebrate Mass 
without this altar stone with its relic. "(4) He tells how in 
1983 he wrote to the Pope's Vicar General at the Vatican, who 
is "the day to day authority regarding rmst of the regulations 
concerning relics and their required placements in new 
altars. " He applied for a relic of St Rita of Cascia for his 
private use. It duly arrived with a certificate of 
authentication and a bill for 5 dollars to cover the cost of 
postage and packing. (5) 
6.3.3.3: In Ancient Judaism we can trace a gradual moveTwnt away from 
a materialistic concept of sanctity towards a nore spiritual 
concept - (6) The idea that ezerges forceably as the old 
Testament develops is that God is holy and has called out for 
himself a holy people. Other things, almost any other 
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things, becon-e holy as God, or his people, set them aside f or 
, special use. Thus the seventh day is blessed and made 
holy,. (7) An altar is consecrated. "Flor seven days make 
atonerwnt for the altar and consecrate it, " the law demands, 
, -"Then 
the altar will be most holy and whatever touches it will 
be holy. " (8) Priests are called out fran Aaron, s 
, 
descendants. (9) 
External rituals of sanctification, culminating in the 
, -. sanctification 
of the Tenple in Jerusalem, gradually give way 
to the call to inward holiness. The prophets go so far as to 
disparage the external observances of their religion when they 
are not accompanied by an inner practical holiness. ( 10) 
In modern Judaism, (11) the scroll of the Torah is the 
nearest thing to a holy object, with the one exception of the 
ruins, of the Temple in Jerusalem. Other shrines, such as 
Hebron - the burial place of -the Patriachs; - the tombs of 
great, Jews, and other, objects such as shawls, phylacteries and 
mezuzas, are rarely seen to have* anything more than an 
indirect significance. 
6.3.3.4: muslims if anything, take the Jewish proscription against 
in-ages and the sanctification of everyday life, even more 
seriously than - Jews. (12) Every act done with the 
consciousness ý that 
it fulfils - the divine will is an act of 
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: 1. 
worship and every created object can thus be sanctified. '' No 
images or holy objects are used in a muslim's daily worship. 
Their mosques are remarkable for their emptiness and lack of 
representational art. 
Prayers are directed to an empty niche that points the 
worshipper towards ýLecca. In Islam the sense of sacredness'is 
centered on the words of the Quran and the one holy place 
Mecca - the place of God's last revelation to the world. 
(Although David Sox reports that in spite of everything'two 
hairs from the Prophet's beard are kept in a reliquary in the 
Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem(13)) The ritual of the-EýIii 
the pilgrimage - reinforces the idea of Mecca as the "navel', of 
the earth". Muslims purify theffselves before they approach, - 
in the allotted month and perform rituals in detail to'fulfil, 
the requirements of God's comTand- 
6.3.3.5: Muslims and Christians rever their holy books; the Sikhs 
have been accused of being "blatant book worshippers. "(14)- 
Their book of scriptures, the Adi Granth, is treated in a 
manner very 'similar to the way the Hindus treat their temple 
images - installed in a special room, elevated and -kept 
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wrapped - in beautiful cloths; during worship Sikh's prostrate 
thEmselves before it, wave it with a fly whisk, rmke offerings 
to it and scmetimes even'leave it food and drink. 
6.3.3.6:: - In. the, African continent(15) the connection between spiritual 
power and physical objects is as ubiquitous and enigmatic as 
anywhere. In images and natural objects of every conceivable 
kind,, - in charms and amulets, medicines and potions, kings and 
sorcerers, the material and the spiritual world are intimately 
intertwined. Objects of, every kind act as the representation, 
the expression, -the focus, the catalyst and the receptacle of 
all kinds. of spiritual beings and forces. 
6.3.3.7: ý, Theravada Buddhist teaching(16) is Probably unique in its 
ccnplete rejection of the material world and its quest for 
trascendence and release. As the source of all deception and 
suffering . 
it must, at every Opportunity, be renounced. 
"In-Paterial things are more peaceful than material, cessation 
i. s more peaceful than inuaterial things, " says the Buddha. (17) 
6.3.3.8: _In 
contrast, the Eastern Orthodox cult of the ikon expresses 
the, belief, that all rmtter is spirit-bearing and ultimtely to 
be redeemed. The ikon, usually painted on wood, of Christ, 
his mother or one of- the saints, is used specifically to 
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remind the worshipper of the reality of the spiritual world. '-ý-' 
the divine image in man - and of man's vocation to manifest- 
the spiritual in and through the material and thus bring: 
harmony between spirit and matter. ( 18) 
Having brought to mind this motley collection of objects 
that people consider sacred we shal I now ask how they decide 
which objects are sacred; what regulates their use of the 
concept? Are we looking for natural properties -and 
functions or for institutional ones, conferred on objects-by 
ascriptive declarations? 
6.3.4: 1 shall divide these exariples of -sacred objects into four 
different, but to scme extent overlapping, categories. 
6.3.4.1: Objects and places that are set apart to assist in ritual-'' 
contact with the divine. This must be the basic use of'--the 
word .I sacred I- something dedicated to God - and the majority 
of-the objects we have considered fall easily into this 
category. The village Hindu woman could have made her inage 
herself from local clay. The sweet pudding she offers it is- 
not different from the pudding she regularly makes for her 
fardly. - The act of offering changes its names, its' 
properties, its -function and its value; a conpletely different, 
set of, attitudes and behaviour are now appropriate. 
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Rosaries, chalices, church buildings, holy water and books - 
all ý nmndane objects with 6ommon functions, refashioned or set 
apart' to represent the divine to us, to focus our attention, 
to'express scme truth, to remind us of our past, to arouse the 
right' , feelings, to assist our worship. The central sacred 
objects of the Christian faith - the bread and wine of the 
Eucharist - are perhaps the clearest example of rmmdane 
objects being formally consecrated for a holy purpose. The 
enormous range of beliefs about. the -mechanics or meaning of 
the-, -transfornation that takes place 
in that consecration all 
conform to the notion that it is effected by an ascriptive 
declaration that is bounded on all sides by convention. 
This institutional use is the predominantly Hebrew use of 
the'word $holy'. It is well expressed by Professor RA 
Finlayson: "In -the 'Old TestaTmnt holiness is designated of 
. placeSi, -things, seasons and 
official persons --in virtue of 
their., connection with the worship of God... In these instances 
holiness signifies a relation that involved separation from 
-cammon use and dedicatim to a sacred one. "(19) 
ljowever literally or n-etaphorically people understand the 
changes that take place when scimthing is consecrated, however 
real -br syn-bolic, direct or conditional, is the power it is 
. thought to acquire, this use 
is clearly an institutional one. 
, We -ýI know which objects are sacred because we know about an 
PAGE 299 
institution. The objects haLve.. two sets of prpperties, ý 
functions and values - one natural set and one set derived 
frcm its relation to an institution. They acquire their -new 
description, not by the discovery of natural properties but by 
ascriptive declarations, even if they are not formallor 
explicit, for their natural properties make them merely, 
eligible for ascription; they do not make the description 
'sacred' applicable. The motive for such a declaration is the 
continuity of the institution and it is, in every case, a 
matter of convention which properties make them suitable 
candidates, and which processes make the new description 
applicable. There is at the same time no natural property -or 
function that could regulate this use. 
6.3.4.2: Places or objects connected with the n-anifestation or 
revelation of the divine - places of religious experiences. 
People, seem to have a profound sense of the significance of 
times and places. ("This is the very place! " "A year ago ýto 
the day! "). in Genesis we read. of Jacob travelling a long way 
frcm home, stopping for the night in a strange place and 
having his famous dream of, "a stairway resting on the -earth, 
with its top reaching to heaven". When he woke he said, 
"Surely the Lord is in this place and I was not aware of it..,. 
How awesorre is this place! This is none other than the house 
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of .1 
God; this is the gate of heaven. 11 He took the stone he 
had placed under his head, "set it up as a pillar and poured 
oil on top of it. He called the place Bethel" (which mezm 
lhcýse of God') "though the city used to be called Luz. " (20) 
We see here both how places beccme sacred and how 
sacredness gets extended to cover objects connected with 
significant experiences. our Coronation stone, The Stone of 
Destiny, on which Scottish monarchs were crowned since the 
13th century, is meant to be 'the very stone' that jacob 
dreanx--d on that night. The fact that it was still, in 
cciqýatively recent times, regarded as, in scrm sense, sacred 
is illustrated by the fact that in 1950 when it was stolen 
fram 
" 
Westminster Abbey the BBC put a ban on jokes about 
it. (2 1 
This sense of tirre 
pilgrimage to mecca. 
says: 
and place is epitcrdzed in the Islamic 
Kenneth Cragg, in his Ocnmnts about the 
places and reanings seem so much to interdepend. Ebr man 
expresses himself and, so to speak 'locates' himself 
'spiritually 
by the use of symbols. Symbols, in turn, 
spring from associations in space and time - those twin 
c ategories of the human situation. When space and time 
met in historical event their double significance has, as 
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it were, a rendezvous where the faithful in turn can engage' 
with it. Geography and meaning then coincide in a 
religious focus. Place becm-e a kind of sacrament and 
travel to it an experience of identity with the meaning, a 
participation. (22) 
Here in Mecca God revealed himself, and here in this holy 
month the people of the revelation converge upon the holy 
place to rezember and to worship. 
The sacredness of the time, the place and the contents of 
God's revelation of himself permeates the other religions too-, 
with festivals, holy shrines, objects and books. G Parrinder 
says of African shrines, "The power of the natural object may 
be met with at one of the shrines which are like its trysting 
place with men. "(23) 
Devout Jews are reminded of the pinnacles of God's dealings 
with his people through the annual cycle of festivals; and a 
visit to the wailing wall, the only visible remains of the 
temple, where God met them through the centuries, is a 
treasured and emtional experience. 
Similarly each Easter millions of Christan celebrate 'the 
day of resurrection' and thousands visit 'the Holy Land' - the 
place where it all happened. 
Even the place where the Buddha received his enlightenment 
PAGE 302 
concerning the ultimate illusion of the material world is, 
against all the odds, visited and venerated. 
Perhaps for us one of the most interesting expressions of 
this sense of the holy place in modern U. Mes is the dedication 
of'shrines to appearances of the Virgin Mary - notably 
Lourdes, where there have been over 30 episodes of reported 
appearance - Fatima in Portugal, where she appeared to three 
children in 1917, and Knock in Ireland where, according to 
David Sox in 1985, a monsignor was "moving mountains to 
attract attention to the local shrine" where over 100 years 
ago "15 parishioners saw what they believed to be the Virgin 
Mary in the south gable of their Church". (24) The fact that 
Knock now boasts an international airport rrust reflect the 
rrieaýure of his success, and, even as I write, the newspapers 
report a controversy over the building of a basilica at the 
scene' of another apparition - in Surbiton! The local priest 
-Is'llpolitely sceptical, " and says, "It is not in-possible that 
these'are real messages, "while the Archbishop of Southwark is 
-dismayed" and "has rmde it quite clear that he does not 
approve". (25) 
-The question we now have to consider is - is this use of 
the, word sacred' to describe tines, places and associated 
objects, where the divine is thought to have approached, an 
institutional one? The practice clearly has its roots in the 
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treasuring of remarkable and valuable experiences and the 
desire to mark the tine and place where they occurred. 
Somehow the value of the experience gets transferred to the 
time and place and objects involved. ("This is the day we 
were married. " "This is the ring he gave me. " "This is where, ý 
we met. This process makes tines and places significant, 
and valuable to individuals, but for a time or place to beccme 
valuable to a caTmmity, some sort of ascriptive declaration,, 
based on same sort of agreement and authentication is., 
I 
necessary, and if we look more closely we can see that this is 
what happens. 
What we see, when we consider marian shrines is a curious 
mixture of popular acclaim and official authentication. The. 
Roman Catholic Church does not investigate individual claims 
of appearances of the Virgin, unless they arouse popular 
acclaim - unless the sense of the value, the meaning and the 
significance of the event is shared. They then have detailed 
guidelines on how to detect genuine appearances, and make 
official declarations on the outcome of their investigations, 
which are not always in accord with the sentiments of the 
devout public. I 
Do holy places then acquire their descriptions by 
ascription? The answer in these cases seems to be yes. The 
places acquire new sets of properties, functions and values 
PAGE 304 
and these are associated with the established institutions of 
religion. There are conventions about which properties make 
I- . ý' 
them, eligible and which processes make them holy. In general 
we know which places and times are holy because we know which 
have been given either popular or-official acclaim. 
But are there not also cases where the use of the word is 
regulated by an individual discovery of a natural property? 
It, may. look from the account of Jacob's dream at Bethel that 
he discovered the holy qualities of the place where he slept 
and declared its natural name -"This is none other than the 
house of God", just as he might have discovered that it was a 
cold place or a place where rattle snakes lived and called it 
windy Hill or Snake Ridge. But experiencing the cold, or 
finding rattle snakes is not like experiencing the presence of 
, God.,, A religious experience is not the same sort of thing as 
a weird feeling, a good experience or a vivid dream; it is a 
feeling, an experience or a dream to which a special meaning 
has been attached., If this is a religious meaning it depends 
upon. institutional practices and shared beliefs. If, as we 
shall argue later, there is no natural property of experiences 
-that makes them, religious but rather the concept of a 
religious experience itself is an institutional concept, 
transferring the value of an experience to the time and place 
of its occurrence is an institutional use of the word. 
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6.3.4.3: Objects connected with people who appear to have a specialý 
relationship with the divine. We have seen how the value of an' 
experience can be transferred to a time, a place or an object; 
Similarly the value of a person can be transferred to their 
mortal remains and possessions. Most religions have people 
set apart for special religious functions - priests and Imam, 
ministers, bishops, kings and presbyters. These are 
institutional roles conferred on eligible individuals. But: 
most religions have a separate category of people, who by 
their lives and characters seem to display some aspects of 
divinity - saints, gurus and holy men and wcmen. We see this 
supremely, 'in the doctrines of theophany and incarnation. 
Veneration of such people leads to the veneration of torrbs, 
statues and relics, things that represent or remind, things 
they have used or touched. 
David Sox tells us of cloths that have been made sacred by 
being hung down into the tcrrbs of martyrs and oil that has 
been made holy by being poured into torrbs and tapped off into 
bottles. (26) 
In May 1990 The Independent ran a story about the severed 
hand of a priest, martyred in 1679 which was regularly taken 
to parishioners "who were ill. or in need of spiritual succour" 
It was apparently being treated in a private laboratory, for 
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Ila type of woodworm infestation, " by a secret process that 
"should preserve this hand for another few hundred years. " (27) 
this use of the word 'sacred' institutional? Do we ccme 
to . -see son-eme as a saint or a guru 
by discovering their 
natural properties, or is sainthood also aquired. by same sort 
I '' ý of ascriptive declaration? 
In the New Testarrent the apostl es took on the word I saint 
'(haqios I or -'holy one') to refer to the new people of God. 
As God had separated out Aaron's family to be dedicated as 
priests, so God was now calling out a new "chosen pecple, a 
royal' priesthood, a holy nation". (28) In chapter four of his 
letter to the Rcmans, - where Paul develops his theme of 
justification by faith, he uses the word logidzcmai, eight 
times. The word is variously translated linputel, - 'reckon,,, 
! count I, or I credit'. , It roughly mans -I ascribe I; As Paul 
6cýlainsr the righteousness that brings with it the status- of 
saint' is credited to sinners who put their faith in Christ. 
in chapter nine where he develops his other great doctrine, of 
predestination, Paul quotes frm Hosea, "I will call them 'my 
people' who are not my people, and I will call her 'my loved 
who is not nTy loved one". (29) Thus God calls out sinners 
and, inakes thern saints by his declaration. This institutional 
use.; of the word 'saint' is continued in the protestant 
'churches. 
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Within a few centuries however another use had arisen - an 
honorific title for those with an especially Christ-like 
character. In modern Catholicism the official use of the 
title 'saint' is closely guarded. Candidates are proposed and 
examined and elaborate conventions direct the process of, 
cannonization. David Sox tells of an occasion when a 
declaration of sainthood by both popular and official acclaim 
failed. Saint Philamena became popular -in 1802 when an 
ampulla of blood and sarne bones were found in the catcadýs of 
St Priscilla bearing an inscription which was translated, 
"Philanena, peace be with you". A priest installed her relic 
in his church and made up a history for her. Several 
miraculous cures graced her installation and many churches 
were subsequently named after her. The Vatican authenticated 
her sainthood by permitting the cornpositon of a Mass in her 
honour and naming a feast day for her. Then a Jesuit scholar 
discovered there had been a misreading of the inscription; 
'Philcrwnal was- not a name; it just meant 'beloved one'. 
Saint-Philcn-ena ceased to exist, her veneration faded and in 
1962 she was officially taken off the books. (30) 
In other areas of religion there are different 
relationships between popular acclaim and official 
declaration. The Hindu holy man, it appears, needs merely to 
declare himself one and start behaving like one. In fact all 
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0 
devout old men are expectedj, in the final stage of their lives 
to beccme sannyasi, shed their possessions and family ties and 
set their minds on seeking spritual truth, and all who do are 
treated with the respect of a holy man. (31) 
If we examine more closely the varied exarrples of the 
recipients of these titles, the values and functions they 
aquire and the rules about eligibility and procedure, we 
discover th6y too have the characteristics of ascriptive 
declarations. There is no natural function or property that 
could regulate the use of the word, for within each religion 
the rules are quite different. A Catholic knows how to 
recognize a Catholic saint and a Hindu knows how to recognize 
a Hindu holy man, and it is the established practices of these 
different. religions that make them what they are. 
6.3_. 4.4: Objects which act as a focus. of spiritual Power. There is 
a-fourth category of sacred objects that overlaps to scme 
extent with others - objects that are not valued primarily 
because of special associations with experiences and people 
but that are perceived to have special power, to charm, harm, 
cure , 
or protect. Some_ of these also fall into other 
categories, like the holy water at Lourdes, a medal of St 
Christopher or an African charm containing texts from the 
Bible or the Quran, (32) or the bread and wine of the 
PAGE 309 
Eucharist. But they need a separate discussion because scme 
object in this category may appear to be discovered because of 
their natural properties rather than having a status conferred 
on them by an ascriptive declaration. 
There is, it appears, a natural human tendency to hoard and 
treasure unusually rare, beautiful or emotive objects. we can' 
see this tendency in children who often like to possess a 
curious collection of objects for- a curious collection of 
reasons. Why they are treasured (what we might call the 
reaning of the object to its owner) may not be clear to anyone 
and may be either private or shared. (Although it is only 
possible for the notion of objects having n-eanings to arise in 
ccmTunities. )(33) William Golding's stone-age family in The 
Inheritors, for example, have a small object, found in the 
root of a tree and named "the little Oa", that Lok's daughter 
carries around with her. (34) 
When such appreciation of objects is shared by a community, 
it becomes an institutional object and tends to attract 
theoretical justification - an explicit meaning - of scme kind 
or another, which we may or may not be able to categorize as 
aesthetic, social, magic, scientific, religious etc. Objects 
that are perceived to have power in themselves to harm, cure 
or protect fall, in nTy view, in the category of magic, or, if 
there are consistent physical explanations of how they work, 
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in - the, category of science. Religiously powerful objects, 
such as relics, holy water, charms and amulets are seen to 
cure and protect because they focus the power of the divine - 
by consecratim, contact, similarity or representation - that 
is, by scme sort of association. And it is just this elemnt 
of - association, this agreed meaning, that nakes such objects 
institutional. 
, Edward Plater, in his book about the Holy Coat of Trier, 
has'this to say about the power and value of the coat believed 
to have been worn by Jesus: 
The, veneration paid to the Holy coat is thus both relative 
,,, and'conditional; relative 
because it is really paid, not to 
., the material garnent, 
but through it to Our Blessed Lord; 
conditional, because it is only paid under a certain 
implied condition... Even supposing that this condition is 
not'fulfilled, the ultimate honour falls none the less on 
its-proper object, Christ Jesus our Lord. (35) 
In, order to know which objects beccme sacred in this way it is 
necesary to know about the institutions of a particular 
canrm-Lity and to know the conventions about which objects are 
suitable candidates and how they become sacred. The 
incredible variety of natural objects that can be taken up 
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into this. - category is enough to show us that there can be no 
natural function or property of objects that could regulate., 
this use of the word. 
6-3-5: Conclusion 
The use of the words 'sacred' and 'holy' as applied to objects 
is mainly regulated by the idea of setting mundane things 
aside for special functions in relation to religious 
institutions - for assisting in ritual contact with the 
divine. other uses are connected with the value that gets 
transferred to imterial objects from experiences and people 
that are seen to have special religious value, or frm same 
other association with divine power. In each case knowing 
which objects are sacred involves knowing about institutions 
rather-than knowing about natural properties. 
The sacred objects in all of these categories have two sets 
of properties, functions and values, one arising from their 
natural properties, and one arising frcm their relationship to 
an institution. They acquire the description by an ascriptive 
declaration (even if it is not formal or explicit), not by the 
discovery of a natural property. It is a matter of convention 
which properties make candidates suitable and which processes 
make the description applicable, and failure to reet these 
requirenents makes the declaration fail. There is no natural 
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function or property wtiich could be what regulates this use. 
But it is not possible to define institutions rigorously 
(they nerge into and grow out of natural, direct and 
individual activities), - uses of concepts such as sacredness 
are , always open to change and extension, and it is not always 
possible to decide if an ascriptive declaration has taken 
place, or whether the meaning attached to an Object is a 
religious one. Our conclusion that religious objects are 
institutional objects must always therefore be, to scne 
extent, tentative. 
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6.4: Religious experiences 
In ý order to ask questions about 
how far the concept of a 
religious experience is an institutimal one, it is necessary 
to. 'begin by raising sm-te other questions. For unlike the 
ýubject of the last section, there is a considerable 
philosophical literature concerning ýreligious experience. 
There has been debate about what sort of thing an experience 
is, , as well as what sort of. 
thing a religious experience is. 
This'-debate has largely been covered in Section 3 where the 
empiricist view of experiences as -I conscious mental goings 
ont,. and of religious experiences as the 'private perceptions 
of- spiritual objects's, is criticized. In non-philosophical 
contexts when people speak of religious experiences they do 
confine their talk to mental events nor to private 
perceptions. They refer, to a wide variety of events and 
feelings, insights and encounters. 
6.4.1: : This section will begin by asking: uiiat sorts of things do 
people call religious experiences? Carole Mayhall, in her 
book , From the Heart of a Wornan asks herself the question: 
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"When do I experience (the Lord) as my shepherd? ". most 
often, she decides, in the way he guides and protects her. 
She tells this story: 
A cloudburst had deluged our area just as I delivered Lynn 
to a church party about 30 minutes from our hcne. Starting 
back, I prayed for guidance whether to go the way I had-, 
ccn-e - the freeway - or to go back a longer way. God, 
seemed to indicate that the freeway should be avoided. -, 
That was one of the scariest drives of my life. Streets- 
were flooded. My brakes got wet, making it difficult to, 
stop the car; lawns were on fire fran downed power lines, - 
sending sparks crackling into the streets... Because many- 
streets were completely blocked by flooding, I had to gol 
miles out of my way to get hcm. - I finally arrived, _ 
exhausted and teary, two hours later... 
A news item on the front page of the paper the next day. 
told of a wanan and her 12 year old daughter who had 
atterrpted the very underpass which led on to the freeway., 
that I would have taken - at the exact tim I would have 
taken it. They had driven into 12 feet of water and a 
passsing motorist had to rescue them fran their subn-erged 
vehicle. 
Yes, I had experienced God as my guiding Shepherd, ' 
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caring for me in very specific ways, on many occasions. (1) 
This is an account of an event. No seeing, hearing or feeling 
of anything 'spiritual' or out of the ordinary (except perhaps 
that she believed God had influenced her decision to avoid the 
freeway) is recounted. She had a scary drive, but she saw the 
event as an experience of answered prayer and of the guidance 
and protection of God. It was a powerful confirmation of her 
faith. 
william James' book The varieties of Reliqious 
Experience we read the folla, 4ng account: 
I Shall I ever again have any of those prodigious reveries 
which some-tims came to me in foriTer days? One day, in 
youth, at sunrise... and again in the wountains under the 
noonday sun... once more at night. upon the shingly shore of 
, 
the Northern ocean, my back upon the Sand and my Vision 
ranging through the milky way; - such grand and spacious, 
immrtal, cosmogonic reveries, when one reaches to the 
stars, when one owns the infinite! Muents divine, 
ecstatic hours; in which our thought flies from world to 
world, pierces the great enigrra, , 
breathes with a 
respiration broad, tranquil and deep as the respiration of 
the ocean... instants of irresistable intuition in which 
one feels one's self great as the universe, and calm as a 
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god... The vestiges they leave behind are enough to fill us 
with belief and enthusiasm, as if they were visits of the 
Holy Ghost. (2) 
In this account the writer does not retell an event but 
decribes a feeling of a certain quality that he has had on 
several occasions -a feeling that is difficult to describe 
but that inclines him towards using language with a religious- 
flavour, and inclines him towards believing in God. 
Leslie Weatherhead recounts the following experience in his 
autobiography The christian Agnostic: 
I could not call rrryself a mystic, but on half-a-dozen 
occasions i have had experiences which for me made me 
certain of the reality of some supernatural Entity which, 
or whom, I label 'God' ... Vauxhall Station on a murky 
November Saturday evening is not the setting one would 
choose for a revelation of God! The third-class 
conpartment was full. I cannot remember any particular 
thought processes which may have led up to the great 
moment... But the great moment came... For a few seconds 
only, I suppose, the whole compartment was filled with 
light. This is the only way I know in which to describe 
the moment, for there was nothing to see at all. I felt 
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a 
caught up into sane tremendous sense of being within a 
loving, triumphant and shining purpose... A rrost curious, 
but overwhelming sense possessed me and filled me with 
ecstacy. I felt that all was well for rrankind... Al 1 nen 
were shining and glorious beings who in the end would enter 
incredible jcy... My puny message, if I passed my exams and 
qualified as a minister, would contribute only an 
infinitesirral drop to the ocean of love and truth which God 
wanted men to enjoy, but my me-ssage was of the same nature 
as that ocean... In that hour I knew the ministry was the 




includes what we might, call a quasi perception, 
for although he speaks of light he admits that there was 
nothing to see. It also includes a powerful feeling of 
well'being, but the aspect 
iI 
of the experience I want to 
highlight is the insight Dr Weatherhead received. He became 
aware of a truth about the world that gave a new significance 
to his future work -a new way of looking at and feeling about 
it mde him certain of the reality of God and of his 
vocation. 
This last account comes frCm Alister Hardy's book The 
Spir itual Nature of Man. (4) 
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At one time I reached utter despair and went and prayed God 
for imrcy instinctively and without faith in reply. That 
night I stood with other patients in the grounds waiting to 
be let into our ward. It was a very cold night with rony 
stars. Suddenly scmeone stood beside me in a dusty brown 
robe and a voice said "Mad or sane you are one of My 
sheep. " I never spoke to anyone of this but ever since it 
has been the pivot of my life. I realize that the form of 
the vision and the words I heard were the result of my 
education and cultural background but the voice though 
closer than my own heartbeat was entirely separate frcm 
m. (5) 
This account is of a certain sort of perception -a vision. A 
robed figure is 'seen, and a voice is 'heard', although there 
-I 4, 
is no suggestion that the quasi perception could have been 
conf used with a 'real' one. Although he distances himself 
frm the interpretation, the man recounting the story admits, 
that the fonn of the vision was associated in his mind with an 
indisputably religious figure. 
6.4.2: These few examples do not start to encompass the variety of 
things that people call religious experiences, but they do 




These -- can be inTriense and ccanunal like the Exodus of the 
Children of Israel from Egypt. They can cover the whole of a 
life-tine; ' one of Hardys' contributors says: "As I look back 
it seems that my whole life has been a religious experience, 
in the sense that my religious consciousness has grown and 
developed as inevitably as my body and mind. "(6) They can, on 
the other hand, be mundane and fleeting. In the novel The 
jdioý, Dostoevsky-tells how his Prince emerged from a religious 
depression, "I ccirpletely recovered from this depression, I 
remember, one evening at Basel, and the thing that roused me 
was. -the braying of a, donkey in the market place. I was quite 
extraordinarily struck with the donkey and for scme reason 
very pleased with it and at once everything in my head seemed 
to clear up. 11(7) or they can be so bizarre as to be frankly 
incredible. (8) In fact there hardly seems to be any sort of 
event'in which son-eone, ýin the context of the feelings it 
engendered or its result, could not see a special sort of 
significance, that made, religious language seem appropriate. 
A child's recovery fran fever is seen as an answered prayer; a 
cheque in the post as God's providence, (9) an enemy's downfall 




Other accounts do not primarily describe events so much asl- 
feelings, scmetimes of a general, and sometimes of, a yery, 
specific nature - feelings that have a special significance 
for the recounter. James mentions, in the course of his book, 
the feelings of ecstacy,, guilt, release frm guilt, joy,, 
happiness, delight, fear, unity with nature, 'loss of the- 
self', conflict, power, serenity, safety, rest and freedom. - 
In Alister Hardy's analysis of religious experience he has 20 
separate headings under the title of cognitive and affective 
elevents, that include 47 different uvrds describing feelings. 
These include excitement, nostalgia, indifference and 
detachment. ( 11 ) Frcrn the prick of conscience to the depths of 
moral despair, frcrn the warm glow of a still evening to the 
ineffable ecstacy of the mystic, it seems that no feeling is 
too bizarre or too mundane to be seen by scmeone, in -the 
context. of its setting or its result, to have the sort of 
significance that makes religious language appropriate. 
6.4.2.3: Insight 
People recount, as religious experiences, what %ve might call 




take on a new look, a new role, a new meaning, and life takes 
off in a different direction. Scme people claim to receive 
fa , ctual information through mystical experience. Jarms for 
exairple states: "It was given 'to Saint Teresa to see and 
understand in w1hat wise' the Mother of God had been assumed 
into her place in Heaven. "(12) This was timely. It is 
thought Teresa was canonized largely because her visions 
provided confinration of the newly declared papal dogma of the 
ýhe'Assumption. James also quotes fram Bartoli-Michel who in 
a quarter-hour of mystical experience, "saw and knew more than 
if II had, been many years together at an university. , For I -saw 
and'knew the being of all things". ( 13) 
1. - Hawever, since one of the characteristics of mystical 
exp . eriences is their ineffability, it is hard for such claims 
to -be, substantiated in practice. It seems more likely that 
what, is generally acquired during mystical experience is 'a 
feeling of knowing, that either cashes out in terms of things 
already known, or failsto cash out at all when the experience 
is over. what endures, then, is a changed attitude or 
intention. Brian Carter worked at the Hardy Institute on 
reports of "sudden apprehension or knowledge". He gives two 
examples: 
- (While meditating during a time of emotional stress) I had 
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- for how long I do not know - an intense feeling of having 
slipped out of time and, of knowing in a quite different way 
fran intellectual knowledge. Knowing with all my being 
what is reant by the concept God is love. I felt that I 
had experienced divine love in all its reality and 
inrrediacy. (14) 
A great inward light seemed to illuminate my thoughts, I 
experienced a magnificent sensation of arrival, I was 
filled with joy as though I had just. discovered the secret 
of world peace. I suddenly knew, The odd thing was that 
I did not know what I knew. Fran then I set out to define 
-it. (15) 
Carter goes on to suggest that the accounts he studied fell 
into two groups - those from people who were "essentially 
either Christians or theists, whose particular experiences 
provides them with affirmation of belief and/or supports hope 
or expectation, " and those who "had little or no time for 
organized religion or any traditional theistic or Christian 
beliefs. " These latter had "much greater difficulty in 
describing the knowledge content of the experience, or could 
not do so at all". (16) 
These exarrples do not of course give us evidence to rule as 
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false. all, claim of supernatural, knowledge, whether frcrn 
telepathYt prePogntion, dream, or nessages fran angels. I 
just note here that, more ccnum than claims of receiving 
divine,, infonmtion through, mystical experiences, is the 
reporýing of old facts arranging themselves in new patterns so 
that they ccm to have new meanings. 
6.4.2.4: perception' 
The sorts of perceptions that people recount as religious 
experiences cover all the senses. They range between the 
normal perceptions of everyday things, that for scme reason 
take on a special meaning, fo V-eladmittedly inadequate use of 
percepýual language for experiences that the recounter admits 
contained no normal perceptual objects. In Bdward Robinson's 
anthology of religious experiences Living the Questions a 
wcrnan tells how she saw a dead pansy. - 
ý,, - i, 
When_I was about 37 years old there was another experience 
which I felt was very much of a religious nature. I was 
deenly moved by it and have never forgotten it. It was a 
rnidsumTer afternoon... As I came up the front walk of our 
house, my eyes wandered over the flower bed... MY 
discontented thoughts were stopped short. I stared for a 
=a-ent at what I saw..., and then I saw it. My whole 
PAGE 325 
attention was fixed on it'as if nothing else was there. - It 
was a pansy wftich had gone to seed. it stood there, kind 
of stiff and dry, its seed nod had opened... It was tilted 
downwards, so that the seed would fall to the ground. I 
saw it as a living thing, and for a rrrment I experienced 
-he law it was so gracefully obeyinq. I was deeply noved 
by this. The feeling was of a religious nature. The 
thoughts were of grateful obedience, of confidence, of 
faith and of the supreme int: elligehce which operated in the 
law I was observing. (17) 
Others tell of evocative srn-lls when flowers are absent, (18) 
the touch of friends in which is felt the touch of God, and 
the sensation of being touched when. no-one is present. (19) 
Probably one of the most ccnmn types of experience in this 
category is an indefinable feeling of r)resence, and whether 
this really counts as a feeling or a perception is rot 
inportant; the fact is that scme people chose to use 
perceptual language in retelling such experiences. Cne of 
William Janes' contributors refects upon such an experience: 
In this ecstacy of mine God had neither f orm, rolour, odour 
not taste; moreover... the feeling of his presence was 
acccxrpanied with no determinate localization... The more I 
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seekýwords to express this intimate intercourse, the more I 
feel the impossibility of describing the thing by any of 
our usual images. At'bottcm the expression most apt to 
render wbat I felt is this: God was present, though 
invisible; he fell under no one of my senses, yet my 
6.4.3: 
consciousness perceived him. (20) 
The answer to our first question: what sorts of things do 
people call religious experiences? is therefore: events of 
every kind, an inmense range of feelings and emotions, 
insights, perceptions involving all the senses and quasi 
perceptions ranging. in each case fran the quite ordinary and 
trivial, to the unbelievably strange and portentious. In fact 
it seems to be the case that there is nothing that can be 
called an experience that can not, by sclTeone, in scme 
context,, be described as a religious experience. 
Vqhat is it about these experiences that nake people want to 
use religious language to describe them? It is in the answer 
to this question that we shall discover how far the concept of 
a religious experience is an institutional me - how far 
people need to be acquainted with the conventions of religious 
institutions in order to use the concept - how far what counts 
as 11 a religious experiences is decided by the conventions of 
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particular communities. For an institutional theory of 
religion to stand it is necessary to demonstrate that the use 
of the word 'religious' is substantially determined by 
institutions - that there is nothing prior to and independent 
of the conventions of particular human ccmmunities that can 
have a determining role in regulating its use. I have divided 
this discussion under three headings. 
6.4.3.1: Standard 
BY far the most ca=n use of the adjective 'religious, as 
applied to experience is me in which it is connected with a 
religion. (In much the same way as we might adapt the word 
for a set of activities such as 'nursing' or 'politics' into 
an adjective eg my nursing (or political) experiences. ) While 
the adjective 'religious' is notoriously slippery, almst 
every user of English can name an exarrple of a religion and 
knows what sort of activities (institutions) are associated 
with it. Experiences are most ccnmnly called 'religious' 
because they are seen to connect in scme way with one of these 
systems of belief and practice. We can, in these cases, 
substitute the adjective 'Christian' or 'Buddhist' or the name 
of another religion, without changing the meaning. 
There are of course many different ways in which this 
connection can be made. Experiences can be what we might call 
I 
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secOrld-harldo, that is we can watch and listen to others 
engaging in the practices of a religion. This may not be what 
we i=-ediately think of as a religious experience but we nust 
have scme of these second-hand religious experience before we 
can use the word to name any first-hand religious experiences. 
As part of the Alister Hardy research prograiTm, Bdward 
Robinson investigated religious experiences in childhood and 
several ccme into this category. (21) 
A slightly different way of making the connection is to 
call, 'religious' some of the things we experience while 
participating in the practices of a religion. In these cases 
it, is the context or setting of the experience that is 
decisive in the understanding of it: 
A friend persuaded me to go to Ely Cathedral to hear a 
performance of Bach. 's B Minor Mass... I was sitting towards 
, -the 
back of the nave. The Cathedral seaTed to be very 
cold. The music thrilled rrie... until we got to the great 
, Sanctus. I 
find this experience difficult to define. it 
was primarily a warning. I was frightened. I was 
treabling frcm head to foot, and wanted to cry... I heard 
no., 'voicel except the music; I saw nothing; but the warning 
was very definite... I was before the Judgen-ent Seat. I was 
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being "weighed in the balance and foLmd wanting". (22) ' 
Although judgement is a recurring feature in religions, one 
wonders if the same feeling of sudden fear, experienced in the 
supermarket, would have been so interpreted, or offered to the' 
research unit as a religious experience. 
Thirdly we can connect our experiences with institutional 
religions by choosing to interpret or describe them in the 
symbols of such a religion. We can see events in our lives as 
examples of the providence, guidance or judgement of the 
Christian God, see our feelings or insights as being directed 
towards, received from, or being about, the God of the Koran, 
we can interpret our dreams or visions as visions of Krisna or 
the Virgin Mry. 
Hardy recounts the experiences of a man who was alone in a 
lakeside cottage, agonizing about whether or not to be 
confirmed in the Anglican Church. 
Everyday throughout the week I prayed and thought. My 
major prayer was 'Dear Lord, what do you want me to do? ' 
It was a week of coldness and darkness with no indication 
of any kind - UNTIL on the evening before I was due to 
return to D)ndon I spent several hours by myself sitting on 
a sofa. I was unaware of tine. I then saw with great 
vividness THE = OF OUR LORD scme twelve feet from the 
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f loor and with that vision was the overwhelming thought of 
CRDINATION which hitherto had never entered my head. 
That was the answer to my prayer and in consequence I 
was ordained... The clarity of this 'vision' was to me 
unmistakable and I owe my vocation to it(23) 
How would a vision of floating feet be interpreted by an 
atheist or Hindu, one wonders-(24) 
-, The last connection 
is with the result of the experience. 
The accounts that began this section had as a cannon thread 
theidea that the experiences led to a confirmation or renewed 
commitment to -a religious faith. In recounting religious 
experiences people often tell of the events that led to. their 
conversion, or the things that happened during a period of 
considering, doubting or testing the practices or teachings of 
a religion. Miat is it, about a feeling of guilt or., acceptance 
that makes it a religious feeling? The fact that it moved 
scnleone to seek God, to join the Church or to believe in the 
Christian gospel are all plausible answers and ones that 
depend upon the presence of institutional religion. 
Interestingly experiences that lead to loss of faith are 
I 
somtimes put in this category too. William James recounts 
the %ransition from orthodoxy to infidelity" of the French 
philosopher jouffroy, couched in language so similar to his 
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accounts of conversion to faith that only the result seems to 
be at variance. (25) 
6.4.3.2: Cosmic 
This second group of ways of using the concept of a religious 
experience is well described by Tim Miles: 
There are three strands of meaning in the word 'religion' 
which I want to distinguish. In the first place a 
religious person may be thought of as one who-believes in 
God or in some more-than-human power; secondly, he may be- 
thought of as one who performs certain rituals, including 
participating in particular acts of worship; thirdly, he, 
may be thought of a one who holds certain 'cosn-dc views', - 
-ie views about the nature and destiny of man. (26) 
It is this sense of the word 'cosmic' that is intended here. - 
miles says: 
Once the mystifying verbiage is clearedr however, the 
, notion of''religious experience' beconLes perfectly 
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3. ntelligible. A person can describe his religious 
i 
experiences - that is, his experiences when he tries to 
cane to terms with cosmic issues - in the same way 
logically as he can describe, for instance, the experiences 
which he had last summer in Norway; in neither case does it 
make sense to ask if his experiences were mental events or 
-if they made him aware of scmething non-material. (27) 
people' call experiences religious that are connected in some 
way. 
not , with an , institutional religion, - but with their 
personal search for answers to questions about the nature and 
destiny Of human life. It could be argued that this quest is 
a- natural (individual) activity that occurs prior to human 
institutions. (It has already been suggested that it is one of 
the. root activities from which religious institutions grow. ) 
one argument against this position is that not all the 
experiences that are connected with this 'activity, are 
considered religious, while many experiences that are not 
connected with it are. In modern tirres the 'cosmic quest, can 
lead to materialism, Scientism, Cammunism, Humanism etc, and 
, it is only when the quest is connectd with scme specifically 
religious answers that an experience is appropriately 
- categorized as religious. 
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A stronger argument against it is that the search for 
answers to cosmic questions is always a continuing, camunal 
activity, never a purely personal one. 
6.4.3.3: QualitV 
David Hay investigated the religious experiences of Pcst 
graduate students at Nottingham University in 1972. He 
records these two accounts: "I believe there is sanething 
there, and it is very inportant to me that it is there, but 
this has no relation with official Christianity ( ) 
sanething I feel inside me, which I feel seems to be guiding 
me. It (28) Another contributer talks about an "immensely 
powerful benign force" and continues: "I'd say it was an 
intoxication with the sights, sounds and forces of nature- A 
feeling of power coming through my body from ý internal and 
external 'sources... I can't distinguish what is divinýe and 
what is teaporal. It's nothing to do with the Christian 
God. " (29) 
These experiences have not been recounted as examples - of 
religious experiences because they have a connection with any 
orthodox religion. That connection is explicitly denied. 
SCM argue they are put into this category because a 
recognized quality of the experience seems to make the 
adjective 'religious' appropriate. But is it the case that 
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there is a common quality to -the experiences people call 
religious, and that it is by recognizing this quality that 
people know that the adjective is appropriate? 
This is scmthing that has been quite widely clained from 
William Janes onwards. (30) In his book Reliqions, Values and 
peak Experiences Abraham Maslow says: 
The very beginningr the intrinsic core, the essence, the 
universal nucleus of everytknownihigh religion... has been 
the private, lonely, personal illumination, revelation or 
ecstasy of scm acutely sensitive prophet or seer... It is 
very likely, indeed almost certainp that these reports, 
phrased in term of supernatural revelation, were, in fact, 
perfectly natural, human peak experiences of the kind that 
can easily be examined today... to the extent that all 
mystical or peak experiences are the same in their essence 
and have always been the same, all religions are the same 
in their essence and have always, been the sama... Whatever 
is different about these illumination can fairly be taken 
to be localisms both in time and space, and are, therefore 
periferal, expendable, not essential. (31) 
maslow runs into the same problem as Hardy when he tries to 
investigate the nature of this experience. He ccuplains: 
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"Many people see -organized religion. as'the locus, the source, 
the custodian and guardian and teacher of the spiritual life", 
and adds in a footnote: 
As a matter of fact this identity is so profoundly built 
into the English language that it is almst impossible to 
speak of the 'spiritual life' ... without using the 
vocabulary of traditional religion. There just isn't any 
other satisfactory language yet... This makes an almost 
insuperable problem for the writer who is intent on 
demnstrating that the ccnmn base of all religions is 
human, natural, eiTpirical and -that so-called -spiritual 
values are also naturally derivable. But I have available 
only a theistic language for this 'scientific' job. (32) 
Hardy says: "Just as science is. science in any country of the- 
world, so the f undarrental nature of religious experience may 
be recognized as universal and as the basis of all the world's 
faiths. "(33) 
He talks of this universal experience as "spiritual 
awareness"t awareness of a benevolent "n6n-physical power", 
the feeling that there is "another dimension to life", (34) 
that there is a spiritual reality "with which the individual 
can have conmunion". (35) 
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Hardy Is book contains reports of precognition, telepathy 
-and__clairvoyance, supposed contact with the dead, ghosts and 
moving Ouija boards. 16 out of the first 3,000 replies Hardy 
received describe the experience often called deja vu. Hardy 
sees this as rather odd:, "These experiences cannot usually be 
considered as in any : way religious... They are generally 
thought, I believer to have a sinple psychological 
explanation. " But, he explains, "Som of those who experience 
them, however, seem to feel that, like the out-of-the body 
experiences, they may indicate a non--uaterial side of the 
everyday world, and so, for them at least, have religious 
significance. "(36) These experiences we might categorize as 
weird, in the sense that they are not, to the person recalling 
them, explicable in term of scientific theory. 
It is also indisputable that scre people include in the 
category-of religious experiences, experiences that can be 
described as nystical states of consciousness. 
So we have this family of experiences that people see as 
having, for them, a religious significance, but do they, as 
Maslow and Hardy claim, have a recognizable quality by which 
they can be categorized as religious prior to and 
independently of, human institutions? RC Zaehner takes up 
the challenge that he sees thrown down by Aldhous Huxley, , and 
by many more who think like him... that religion is a matter 
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of experience, alrost of sensation; that religious experience 
rwans 'mystical' experience, and that mystical experiences are- 
everywhere and always the same". (36) He continues: 
There seem to be two very strong objections to such a 
theory. The first is that few of these authors can or will' 
define what precisely constitues a mystical experience, and 
until that is done, we do not really know what we are 
talking about. The second is that to assert that all 
mystics speak the same language and convey the same rressage 
does not seem to be true even within me particular 
religious tradition. (38) 
He examines the radical differences between the Hindu and 
Christian ways of defining 'the unitive experience', and 
Huxley's descriptions of his experiences under the influence 
of n-escalin, and concludes: "To state, then, or inply, as 
Huxley does, that his own experience is either identical with 
or carparable to, either the Christian Beatific Vision or to 
what Hindus call Sat-cit-ananda... is to state or to irrply an 
obvious untruth. "(39) He then looks at nature mysticism and 
finds that the experiences recorded for exanple by Wbrdsworth 
and Tennyson have a quite different quality and maning from 
the religious mystics. He concludes: "The mystical state at 
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which , the religious man aims is the reverse of the natural 
mystical experience. "(40) 
His analysis of the types of mystical experience leads him 
to conclude that "there appear to be at least three distinct 
mystical states which cannot be identical". (41) He clairws 
there is "an unbridgeable gulf (between monistic and theistic 
mysticism) between those who seek God as inccmparably greater 
than oneself... and those who maintain that soul and God are 
one and the same and all, else is pure illusion". (42) 
James Bakalar considers the modern phencmena of drug 
induced religious experience which he says, "raises the 
difficult question of what is definably religious about 
personal experiences before they are given form by a doctrine, 
ritual and com. unity. "(43) 
The conclusion he caTýeas to is that "experiences alone, 
especially individual experiences,. 
-, 
do not - constitute 
religion". (44) Referring 'to Rudolf Otto's idea of the 
experience of 'the numinous'(45) he notes that Otto says that 
to make the numinous into religion requires 'Ischematization by 
morality and reason, " and adds "It also requires tradition, a 
discipline, sane practice or ritual, and a ccmminity or 
fellowship that allows the sense of the holy to be 
ccramn-Licated and transmitted. " (46) 
He illustrates his thesis by noting two legal decisions in 
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the United States. Firstly theapproval of the use ofýpeyote 
in the Native American Church(NAC) on the basis of"the First 
Ammndment and secondly the decision that the use of marijuana 
was not part of Leary's religious practice as a Hindu. He 
ccffmnts: 
The rationale is that the NAC is an organized traditional 
religion in which the use of the drug is essential to the 
form of worship... If religion reduced to individual 
feelings and ideas tends to lose its specifically religious 
character, the tendency becares particularly noticeable 
when drugs are involved. So the courts have pronounced 
that at least this one form of religious or numinous 
experience will not be legally permitted except within a 
traditional ccmninity and discipline. Although the courts 
expressly refuse to define what qualifies as religious, the 
practical effect of their decisions is that as long as 
drugs are involved, religion will be defined by 
institutions and a shared way of life, not by any 
individual experience or conviction. (47) 
The various altered states of consciousness that people call 
mystical, as well as not being uniform, are not necessarily 
interpreted in religious term. Many accounts of mystical 
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I experience areretold in the language of agnostism or atheism. 
Zaehner, for exanple, quotes the following account from 
Richard Jefferies. Frcm his "intense canmnion with nature" 
he concludes, "There is no god in nature... It is a force 
without a mind. I wish to indicate something more subtle than 
electricity, but absolutely devoid of consciousness and with 
no more feeling than the force which lifts the tides. "(48) 
. --, Zaehner concludes that the only method we 
have of judging 
betweeen divine and natural mysticism, between the ecstatic 
conviction of St Teresa and that of a lunatic, is from the 
re I sults - the experiences of the lunatic have no permanence 
while-that of St Teresa "effected a total transformation and 
sanctification of character". (49) Teresa became a saintly 
Christian. 
The fact is that the experiences mentioned in this category 
can 11 be,, and frequently are, experienced in a purely secular 
context and interpreted in purely secular terms, while many 
experiences widely accepted as genuinely religious are neither 
scientifically inexplicable, nor do they involve unusual 
states of consciousness. 
To say that people know which of their experiences are 
religious by recognizing a mystical or weird quality about 
them mkes nonsense of the way the expression is used by 
ordinary believers, who see God in the wbole of his natural 
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creation, interpret day by day events as examples of his 
providence, find his grace in bread and wine and meet him in 
the simple kindness of another. It implies that these nundane 
experiences are not really religious, while water-divining, 
telepathy, lunacy and drug induced experiences are. 
The Hardy research team is unperturbed by these facts; they 
overlook the way language works and the role it plays in 
making sense of, categorizing, remembering and recalling 
experiences. They do not ask why or how people chose which 
experiences to send them. 
They are trying to elicit accounts of a sort of experience 
recognizable by its quality - an awareness of a spiritual 
world - but the nature of that quality is indeterminate - as 
is evident frcm the miscellany of accounts they receive. Scme 
tell of unusual states of consciousness; scme of weird 
experiences the teller cannot understand or explain; smie tell 
of experiences that occurred in a religious setting or led to, 
or fram, allegiance to orthodox religious beliefs or 
practices, or to scm answers to cosmic questions that have 
some religious characteristics; some are quite mundane 
experiences interpreted by means of the symbols of a religion, 
or retold using religious language. The variety of the 
quality of these experiences is almost infinite. They can be 
intense, momentous, mundane or fleeting; they are experiences 
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power or gentleness, feelings of fear or guilt, joy, 
c; onfidence, courage, serenity or dependence; they bring peace 
in anxiety, harmony in conflict, challenge in torpor. They do 
not by any stretch of the imagination have a common quality. 
If a belief in a spiritual world that can be perceived by a 
-, special sort . of.. - perception- 
is rejected, as the criticism of 
the en-piricist position in Section 3 advocated, any coherence 
in the quality of this set of experiences disappears. if 
there are any ccnmn themes (light, love, mercy, justice, 
righteousness) these ref lect not the nature of the spiritual 
wor_1d, but people's understanding of the nature of divinity, 
which.. may not correspond to any orthodox beliefs, but is 
necessarily continous with and substantially determined by the 
institutions of their culture. If we imagine a cOmmmity with 
a, very- different divinity (capricious, dark, immoral and 
cruel), we can imagine a very different selection of 
experiences being recounted to their version of the Religious 
Experience Research Unit. 
our conclusion must be that there is no experience which, 
by, its quality alone, is necessarily religious. Any 
, 
_experience 
of any quality can be retold either in religious or 
in secular language. The Religious Experience Research Unit 
want to hear about a certain kind of experience, whatever sort 
of language the recounter chooses to use; the results of this 
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incoherent quest turn out to illustrate very clearly the 
institutional nature of the concept of religious experience. 
6.4.4: Conclusions 
Within a religious tradition there are guidelines as to what 
counts as an authentic religious experience. Alasdair 
MacIntyre asks how people know their vision is a vision of the 
Virgin ýbxy. (50) Devout Catholics do not have problems in 
recognizing her; they are aware of these guidelines and if the 
authenticity of their vision is questioned, there are further 
tests that can be applied and questions that can be asked. 
The RERU received many accounts fran people within such 
religious traditions (almost all Christian so far but it is 
now trying to widen its net). 
In Britain in the 1980s and 90s, however, most people are 
not-ccmTdtted to a religious tradition in this way, nor use 
its ways of understanding and talking about their experiences. 
What for them counts as a religious experience? This is a 
form of the question: yes, but apart fran the rules of any 
particular cormunity, what really counts as a religious 
experience? the question, if the concept is an 
institutional one, has no answer. It is like asking: yes but 
apart from the rules of particular ccmTunities what really 
counts as getting warried, or being made president? We only 
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I can learn how to use these sorts of concepts from acquaintance 
with particular institutions and beyond thEn, the concept of a 
marriage or a president has no definite or coherent use. 
The miscellany of experiences that arrive at the RERU 
shows-that, for many people in our society, the concept of a 
religious experience has no definite or coherent use. outside 
religious cammnities there are no explicit rules about how 
the', 
Iconcept 
is to be used. But even the most secular of 
people are acquainted with the beliefs and practices of 
religious institutions; they know the sorts of things 
religious people do and say. We could say they have a concept 
'of- divinity, or perhaps of spirituality, derived from the 
religious institutions they are acquainted with. 
This is the ccnmn thread that runs through the RERu 
material. Recognizing an experience as religious requires the 
possession of a concept of divinity; seeing, hearing or 
feeling the presence-of ;. God are things that can only be 
experienced, by people who know what a ccm=ication frm God 
is like. And people can only learn what God is like and how 
he ,, 
interracts with people from their acquaintance with 
religious institutions. In societies like this people have 
varied, individual, even idiosyncratic ideas about religious 
matters, but these are substantially determined by religious 
institutions. People also call religious experiences that 
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they connect with the quest to find answers about the nature 
and destiny of human life, but this quest does not necessarily 
terirdnate in religious answers and is always part of an- 
ongoing camnzol activity. 
But does an institutional analysis of religious experience 
reflect what religious believers themselves say about their 
experiences? I believe that it accords better with orthodox 
Christianity than an empiricist analysis. An institutional, 
analysis does not inply that God does not really communicate 
with people? Cnly that it is only possible to hear God 
speaking if we have first heard about him - as Paul says -in 
the letter to the Roffans: "How can they believe in the me of 
whom they have not heard? And how can they hear without 
scrne-one preaching to them? "(51) Neither does it raise 
difficulties for innovative religious experiences. For aspects 
of culture are not isolated frm one another. Although 
substantially determined by our experiences of religious 
institutions, a wide range of experiences can affect our 
understanding of the concept of divinity. ASee. for example 
the effect of the feminist movement on modern theology. ) Thus 
changing social and historical situations can change our view 
of 'God and our views about which experiences count as 
communications from him (See eg the case study on George Fox 
in Section 2). ' 
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An orthodcm (and instituional) Christian view of religious 
experience is well expressed in George Herbert's hyrm: 
Teach rre, my God and King, 
In all things Thee to see; 
And what I do in anything, 
To do it as for Thee. 
A rran that looks on glass, 
On it may stay his eye; 
Or, if he pleaseth, through it pass, 
And then the heaven espy. (52) 
Notes 
J)Carole mayhall From the Heart of a Woman pp28/29 
2) William James The Varieties of Reliqious Experience 
pp380/381, taken frcm Ameills Journal In Tim, i. 43-44 
3) Alister Hardy The Spiritual Nature of Man p53p taken from 
J, eslie Weatherhead The Christian Agnostic 
4) Section 1.4 contains a critical discussion of Hardy's 
philosophical assumptions and the use he mkes of the accounts 
of experience the Religious E>cperience Research Institute 
(RERU) in oxford gathers. These accounts are nevertheless a 
useful source of examples of the sort of experiences that 
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the concept. 
5) Alister Hardy The Spiritual Nature of Man p9l 
6) Ibid p70 
7) Dostoevsky The Idiot p82 
8) Alister Hardy The Spiritual Nature of Man p151 has an 
account of an experience of "a beam passing between our eyes 
and also a third eye in the middle of our foreheads" that 
apparently lasted for "about two hours". 
9) Ibid p66 
10) See Journals of George Fox John Nickalls(ed) pp504/505. 
Fox lists the ill fortunes which overtook his enernies. He 
concludes, "When I came into the county again all these 
aforesaid were dead and ruined in their estates and several 
others of our persecutors w-hcrn the Lord blasted and ruined; 
and though I did not seek to execute the law upon them for 
their acting contrary to their own laws agaist me, yet the 
Lord had executed his vengeance upon them. " 
11) Alister Hardy The Spiritual Nature of Man p27 
12) Willi&n Jan-es The Varieties of Religious Experience p397 
13) Ibid p396 fn 
14) Alister Hardy The Spiritual Nature of Man p109 
15) Ibid p110 
16) Ibid pp109/110 These cam-ents of Carter's display his 
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17) Edward Robinson(ed) Living the Questions pp106/107 
18) Alister Hardy The Spiritual Nature of Man p43 
19) Ibid p42 
20) William James The Varieties of Religious Experience, p83 
21) see Edward Robinson The Original Vision, pp97-99 "I was 
certainly influenced by the services in the Synagogue... there 
was an excellent choir; the music they sang in Hebrew used to 
stir me deeply. " 
22) Alister Hardy The Spiritual Nature of Man p85 
23) Ibid pp33/34 
24) one wcnders too if they would have such a vision at all, 
for it is not the case that Protestants and Hindus have 
visions of Mary and think it is scme other wman 
25) William James The Varieties of Religious Experience 
pp181/182 
26) T Miles Religious Experience p18 
27) Ibid p23 
28) Alister Hardy The Spiritual Nature of ýIan p147 
29) Ibid p149 
30) See eg William Jams The Varieties of Reliqjous 
Experience pp480/1 
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pp19/20 
32) Ibid p4 
33) Alister Hardy Science, 
_Religion 
and %brld Unity pl 
34) Alister Hardy The Spritual Nature of Man pl 
35) Ibid p132 For a book length, but still unconvincing,, 
expositon of this thesis see Daniel Goleman The Varieties of, 
the Meditative Experience 
36) Alister Hardy The Spiritual Nature of Man p38 
37) RC Zaehner Mysticism Sacred and Profane pp26/7 
38) Ibid 27 
39) Ibid p33 
40) Ibid p149 
41) Ibid p168 
42) Ibid p204 
43) Jar: es Bakalar "Social and Intellectual Attitudes towards 
Drug Induced Religious Experience" p45 
44) Ibid p57 
45) See Rudolf Otto The Idea of the Holy 
46) Jaims Bakalar "Social and Intellectual Attitudes towards 
Drug Induced Religious Experiences" p57 
47) Ibid pp62/63. Several papers in Steven T Katz(ed) 
MYsticism and Philosophical Analysis add to the argument that 
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SBCTION 7: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS ANSWERED 
7-1: Introduction 
An institutional theory of religion, by seeking to say 
saTiething about the nature of religion,, and by giving 
precedence to cultural processes and the products of human 
ccnTmmities, rray attract a variety of, scmtims inccnpatible, 
criticisms. 
Such a theory may seem to hTply an essentialist approach, 
or a strong fom of naturalism, or a strong form of 
relativism. If these inferences are well-founded, an 
institutional theory is either open to criticism or in need of 
further defence. If it inplies that we can give an 
essentialist definition of religion, it is open to the 
criticism that the terms in which religion is understood in an 
institutional theory are not sufficiently rigorous to be used 
in this way. If it inplies that religious believers do not 
believe in absolute truth and divine revelation or that such 
beliefs have no ueaning for them, it is made false by facts 
that are too obvious to need rehearsing. If it irnplies that 
believers are wrong to hold such beliefs it is necessary 
philosophically to defend a strong form of naturalism and a 
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strong relativism about religion. 
This section will argue that all these inferences are 
unfounded. 
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7.2: Essentialism and understanding 
Institutional theories in general seem to attract the 
criticism of essentialism. Cne of the strongest and Mst 
frequently voiced denunciations of institutional theories of 
art is that the question they appear to answer is one that is 
not worth asking. 0) Since the things we regard as art do 
not make up a natural class, trying to define art in term of 
what is essential to it is, as Kendall L Walton put it, "a 
useless and uninteresting" task. (2) 
Such a charge has never had quite the sane impact in 
relation to religion and, even in the case of art, the charge 
of essentialism has been scmewhat misdirected and the term 
'institutional theory' screw-hat abused. 
In scre senses the quest for an institutional theory, of 
either art or religion, can be seen as a response to the 
bankruptcy of the essentialist project -a turn away from a 
quest for a common nature towards a quest for greater 
understanding. Richard Wollheim's essay Art and its Objects, 
for instance, which he vigorously insists is not an 
institutional theory, Q) (in order to avoid the charge of 
essentialism), undeniably is an attempt to see how an 
examination of the institutional character of art illuminates 
its nature and its processes. (4) 
/ 
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As far as this project is concerned it has been stated 
clearly(5) that both the characteristics of institutions and 
the way language works, make any of the essentialist's. aims 
pointless and misleading. 
The eirpiricist's'emphasis on'the priority of experience in 
religion and others' emphasis on the priority of language, 
have not traditionally- been interpreted as exercises in 
creating essentialist definitions, but as exercises in 
understanding. A theory, therefore, that emphasizes the role 
of institutions in religion, and rather than distinguish 
religion from everything else, stresses what it has in ccnunn 
with other human activities, can with, little difficulty it is 
hoped, be interpreted in the same spirit. 
Notes 
1) For a discussion '. -of' these criticisms of institutional 
theories of art see Section 4.3.2.2 
2) Kendall L Walton A review of George Dickie's "Art and 
the Aesthetic: an Institutional Analysis" plOO 
3) Richard Wollheim "The Institutional Theory of Art" Art and 
its objects p157 
4) See Richard Wollheim Art and its objects. Paras 45ff 
discuss art as 'a form of life'. 
5) See Section 4.4.2 
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7.3: Relativism ard truth 
The subject of relativism is a minefield of misunderstanding. 
There are so many different kinds of relativism, and words 
like 'relative',, 'truth, 'facts', 'reality' etc are open to 
such a variety of different uses that great care needs to be 
taken in defining how they are being used on each particular 
occasion. 
I shall start by asking what sort of relativism an 
institutional theory of religion implies and then go on to ask 
whether it is caripatible with the absolute truth claim that 
are so characteristic of religious belief systems. 
7.3.1: An institutional theory of religion-states that religions are 
aspects of culture, that what is to be considered authentic 
and significant- in religion is substantially determined,, in_ 
each community, by its institutions. The fact that religious 
institutions are radically different from one ccnrunity to 
another suggests, and experience confirms, that the set-of 
propositions held to be true by one religious ccmTmity are 
radically different fran, and mutually incompatible with, 
those held by another. 
Religions, as well as many other things, involve language 
system, ways of thinking and speaking, rules for constructing 
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arguments, assessing evidence, interpreting and describing 
experiences and giving reasons, along with rules for the use 
of such words as 'genuine', 'real', 'good'. 'true', 
'objective' 'proved'' 'etc. ' These systems substantially 
detern'u'ne both how experiences are to be interpreted and how 
arguments are to be constructed - what is to be believed, on 
what 'groýndS- They determine what counts as a true 
proposition within the system. 
A Christian wants to know if her sins are truly forgiven. 
She is pointed to Jesus' promises, and demonstrations of his 
power . to forgive sins in the Gospels, to Paul's arguments 
about-the effectiveness of Christ's atoning sacrifice and ways 
of appropriating-its effects and to evidence of the presence 
of the Holy Spirit, in her life. 
A Hindu wants to know if it is true that his recent 
experience of Krishna Is help was genuine. He - is , pointed . to 
the Bhaqavad Gita and other Hindu scriptures and asked to 
ccopare his experience and its effects in his life with these 
authentic appearances of Krishna. 
This sort, of evidence and these sorts of reasons and 
arguments are not part of non-believers' cognitive resources. 
They just would not use those words in that way. They can see 
that they may be reasons for her, as a Christian, to believe 
that her sins are forgiven, or for him, as a Hindu, to believe 
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that his experience of Krishna was genuine, but not that 
either statement is true in any way that they want to use the 
word in relation to themselves. 
If our institutions substantially determine how we 
experience the world,, what we can say about it and how we 
construct reasons for believing which propositions are true, 
truth in religion, is, in this sense, relative; what are 
reasons and arguments for the Christian are not reasons and 
arguments for the Hindu, or the Muslim. 
But religious believers and non-believers use the word 
'true' in another way. They claim that what they believe 
not relatively, but absolutely true - that it corresponds in 
scrw way to the way things stand, independently of what anyone 
sees, thinks or believes. Monotheistic religions 
characteristically contain just such beliefs. If an 
institutional theory of religion implies that such beliefs are 
not held or have no meaning to those who hold them, then it 
implies something that is clearly false. If it implies that 
such beliefs are necessarily false, or in scm other way 
intellectually unreasonable, then this needs to be 
philosophically defended. But nothing that has been said 
in the setting up of this theory has suggested any such 
inplications. That people's religious beliefs are 
substantially determined by the religious institutions in 
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their culture implies nothing about the content - nor the 
legitimacy of such beliefs 
It therefore remains- to argue that the sort of cognitive 
relativism of religious truth described above is not 
inccnipatible with the making of absolute truth clairms. 
7.3.2: 1 shall begin by asking what is relative to the cognitive 
systems we inherit from our culture? - our perception, our 
experiences and our interpretations and descriptions of them, 
our ccncepts, our thinking and feeling, our ways of arguing, 
our ways of constructing reasons, vAiat we count as genuine and 
objective, as evidence and proof, our sense of what is. 
possible and what is real, our apprehension of facts. - all, 
these are substantially determined by the cognitive systEm we 
inherit from our culture. and share with our ccumunity. - They 
are relative. 
what then is not relative to our cognitive systems? The 
world that is not relative to our ways of thinking and talking 
is difficult to think or speak of, but it is a udstake to 
think that it is, therefore, non-existent. A useful word for 
it is the technical word Inoumnall (as opposed to 
lphencn-enall) - the world as it is in itself, independent of 
any h=an beings' perception, thought, or reasoning system. 
it is the absolutely real; facts about it are absolute facts. 
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Absolute truth clairrs, like those we find in monotheistic., 
religions, purport to be claims about this world. But can 
such claims have any meaning and can we ever be justified in 
making them? 
There are basically two problems about absolute truth 
claims. Firstly there is the problem of whether propositions 
expressed in human language systems can identify possible 
facts in the noumenal world. For a proposition to identify an-, 
absolute fact its words must correspond in some way to objects- 
and. relationships in the nourrenal world, but we have no,.. 
guarantee that they do so, since our perception of objects and., 
relationships is determined by our cognitive systems. --, 
Propositions are, on the. whole, not even very good, at 
identifying possible facts in the phencnenal world, although 
utterances (propositions in use) do it better. Since God is,,, 
not, in most traditions, even considered to be an- object, -; 
there are special difficulties in atterrpting, with, our words 
and sentences, to identify God as he is in himself, rather 
than God as we experience him. 
Secondly, if. we think we have successfully identified a: 
possible absolute fact with our proposition, we still have the 
problem of having access to the noumenal world to check what': 
is_ the case. For, as we have seen, our access to absolute 
facts is curtailed and distorted by our cognitive systems. 
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These two problem do noto, however, carbine to make absolute 
truth claims meaningless. We know what an absolute truth 
claim entails even if we do not know whether this particular 
proposition identifies a possible or an actual fact in the 
noumenal world. The difficulty of access does not rule out 
the possibility thýt it does both'i only that- we could never 
know for certain that', it does. - Absolute truth claims, 
therefore, make perfect sense. 
it is also easy to overstate the difficulty of access to 
the nourenal' world, for it is a factor in our perception and 
it doýs'have a'causal effect on our cognitive systems. The 
purpose of a cognitive system is to help us understand, 
organize and live successfully in our world, and cognitive 
systems are constructed, compared and chosen in relation to 
their effectiveness in these respects. ' 
Absolute truth claims-are not rreaningless, -but can we -ever 
be justified in raking them? In order for a rational*life to 
be pursued it is necessary that salle Propositions are held to 
be absolutely true. Joseph Runzo (in his book Reason, 
Relativism and God) although Cannitted to a strong cognitive 
relativism concedes that, because the nature of truth, meaning 
and knowledge acquisition are so fundamental to 'rational 
enquiry, what he calls epistemological relativism, "would seem 
to undermine rational discourse itself". (l) He continues: 
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Rational discourse depends on the assumption that,, 
_ 
fundamental canons of rationality are not mere relative 
truths... since the whole purpose of talking about the, 
relativity of truth and knowledge... is to arrive at a 
rational understanding of one's universe, the very concerns 
which give rise to and undergird relativism presuppose that 
not all truth is relative. (2) 
He suggests that, "At least the law of non-contradiction must 
hold in all possible worlds, irrespective of particular 
conceptual schemas, for it is itself a necessary condition of, 
there being any conceptual schems and any possible 
worlds". 0) It is not only rational but "only coherent... to 
treat one's own view of the nature and criteria of truth, of 
semantic neaning, and of knowledge acquisition as being, if 
true, absolutely true". (4) 
This, principle of treating sm, ýee propositions as absolutely, 
true for the sake of continuing to pursue a rational life, 
needs to be extended beyond the fundan-ental canons of 
rationality. (5) Tor any cognitive system there are scime 
propositions which so undergird the system that they must be 
held to be absolutely true if the system is not to be, 
effectively annihilated. To suhn-dt them to serious and 
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prolonged questioning is to give up that way of thinking and, 
unless one's cognitive life is to disintegrate entirely, to 
take up another way of thinking, undergirded by a different 
set of absolutely held propositions. 
cognitive caTrdtment is then an essential part of 
functioning as a rational being. The choices we make as-to 
where to put that commitment, since they cannot be made on a 
strictly rational level, have to be made on pragmatic grounds, 
guided by our, albeit distorted, interaction with the noumenal 
world. 
it-is good at this point of the thesis to return to William 
jamsý Entwined with the errpiricism, that we have rejected is 
james, suggestion of a reasonable form of epistemological 
pragmatism. "Our passional nature not only lawfully way, but 
must decide, " he says, to take action towards believing one of 
several options open- to us, if the'option we take is living 
(in the sense of meaningful and tenpting), forced (in the 
sense that we cannot avoid waking scme choice) and mcmentous, 
(as opposed to trivial), fand if it cannot be decided on 
intellectual grounds, "for to say under such circumstances, 
'Do not decide but leave the question open' is itself a 
passional decision just like the decision yes or no, and is 
attended with the same risk of losing the truth". (6) 
There is, I would suggest, nothing special about religious- 
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truth' claims. Some of thern are relative (Taking ccnrnunion on 
Sunday gives you strength for the whole week. ) and scne are 
absolute (There is no god but Allah and Mohanued is his 
prophet. ) Both of these sorts of truth claims make sense in" 
exactly the same way as secular truth claims, which can also 
be either relative or absolute. For all truth claims are 
expressed by means of a human language system and all reasons 
for believing are internal *to some system of reasons; w-hi 1e 
in 'all systems, religious or secular, absolute truth claims 
are held out of grammatical rather than logical necessity. 
But this does not mean that it is equally reasonable to make 
any truth claim or to cannit oneself to any belief system. We- 
use-many reason-systems at once and they overlap and can be 
assessed and ccapared in*terms of each other, in terms of how 
wide a range of social activities and experiences they help us 
understand and control, and in terms of what we see to be the-'-- 
general demands of rationality. As long as scme of our, 
beliefs are held absolutely at any time, others can be- 
questioned as we follow the pull towards cognitive integrity. ' 
Some belief systems - because they are consistent'with the 
basic canons of rationality and with a number of the other 
reason-systems we currently use, because they are wide ranging 
in application 'and seem useful in making sense of our 
phenonenal world, and because they give us answers to the 
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questions and problems that present themselves as the most 
pressing - are nore reasonable to hold than others, that are 
narrow in application, distant frcm logic, inccnpatible with 
the other systems we use and irrelevant to the problems of our 
daily lives. 
Religious beliefs do, however, have a characteristic 
feature, although it is by no means a necessary or an 
exclusive feature. They tend to becarie central to a person's 
life and so to dominate their thinking and behaviour. They 
become then not just a part of their total reasoning system, 
that can, bezearranged and repositioned without a great. deal 
of energy, but the foundation-of their whole life. They are, 
however, still the focus of faith rather than knowledge, as 
Runzo 'says, "The risk of faith is that our human truth claims 
do not correctly refer to the noumenal God. The ccutnitment of 
faith includes the trust that they do". (7) 
Notes 
1)Joseph Runzo Reason, Relativism and God Pa. 
2) Ibid p43 
3) Ibid p44 
4) Ibid p46 
5) Joseph Runzo goes on to make this piont pp. 155ff 
6) William Jarres, The Will to Believe p19 
7) Joseph Runzo Reason, Relativism and God p258 
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7.4: Naturalism and revelation 
There are again a great rany forms and varieties of 
naturalism, and of criticisms naturalist philosophers make 
against religions. I will begin by asking what sort of 
naturalism an institutional theory of religion inplies, and 
then ask if it is in any way ccnpatible with the concept of 
divine revelation, which is so characteristic of the world's 
most successful religions and inimical to a strong form of 
naturalism. 
7.4.1: An institutional theory of religion states that religions are 
aspects of culture that what is to be considered authentic 
and significant in religions is substantially determined in 
each ccmnunity by its institutions. This supplies what is, in 
one use of the word, a naturalistic explanation for the 
ph of religions, that is, an explanation that depends 
on reasoning frcrn evidence derived fran people's experience of 
the natural world. Religious activities, beliefs and 
institutions are generated and develop in human communities as 
they respond to their natural and social environment. 
The concept of revelation, prevalent in a major section of 
the world's religions, implies that there is a source of 
knowledge that, in some ways, transcends the natural world. 
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The creatorp or sustainer, of the natural world reveals 
himself - ccmmunicates with human beings in ways that make it 
possible for them to respond. If the Possibility of people 
holding such beliefs and finding sare meaning in them, is 
ruled out by the sort of naturalism that an institutional 
theory inipliest it is , made false by the facts. If an 
institutional theory implies that such beliefs are necessarily 
false or inherently unreasonable such a strong form of 
naturalism needs a philosophical defence. 
The institutional theory suggested, in this thesis, however, 
containes no implications about the content or legitimacy of 
people's religious beliefs. The fact that an institutional 
theory provides a naturalistic explanation for the phenomenon 
of religions way seem, on its own, to imply that there can be 
no external reality beyond the lives and minds which figure in 
this explanation, or beyond the natural world, which inspires 
and shapes these activities, beliefs and institutions; but of 
course it does no such thing. It does not sinPlY follow from 
the fact that there are naturalistic explanations of a 
phenonmenon that are satifactory in their own termsf that 
there is notj in addition, a use for non-naturalistic 
explanations. 
some naturalists, however, have another charge against 
religions, for they demand not only that acceptable 
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explanations must depend on reasoning fran experience of the 
natural world,, but also that they must be expressed in terms 
of categories and concepts that refer to objects and events, 
that we can observe, or perceive, in the natural world. They 
insist, for example, that we may not infer beyond the world 
to a supernatural cause, creator, sustainer, redeezer etc. on 
the ground that such an inference is logically 
unjustifiable. (1) An institutional theory in-plies that 
religious believers do make just this kind of inference, but, 
on the question of whether such inferring is or is not 
philosophically justifiable it has nothing to say. It implies., 
neither that it is nor that it'is not. 
An institutional theory thus defends a kind of 
methodological naturalism without prejudicing the terms of-- 
further understanding. The advantage of this is that it, 
thereby avoids the impasse between believers and unbelievers 
created by the theories it rejects. 
An institutional theory of religion in fact saves religions- 
from the charge that they are unacceptably non-naturalistic in 
the sense that they are responses to quasi-sensory experiences,. 
of another, 'spiritual', world. our investigation of 
religious experiences showed that it was neither necessary nor 
correct to view religious experience in this way. If there is 
a God who reveals himself, he does it through, or in, the 
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natural world of sensory experience. Religious activities and 
beliefs are naturalistic in the sense that they are attempts 
to find explanatims for the course of our normal sensory 
experience. The . -only 
God we could know is the God 
self-revealed in the only world we know. 
7.4.2: Mat then are the implications of an institutional theory of 
religion for an understanding of the concept of revelation? 
It does not imply thatthere is no possiblity of a source of 
revelation that is, in a sense, beyond the natural world, but 
it rejects the idea that such ccmnunication characteristically 
ccrnes in a form of private mysticism - the quasi-perception of 
another, spiritual, world. If God reveals himself it is in, 
or through, our normal sensory experience of the only world we 
know. An institutional theory also emphasizes the fact that 
cultural training is an essential precursor to recognizing and 
responding to divine revelation. 
These implications may cause problems for a traditional 
philosophical understanding of how. God could, or could not, 
ccmmmicate with his creatures; but the gods of philosophy are 
not always the same as the gods of religion. The biblical, 
rather than the patristic or medieval deity, is not, for 
instance, the utterly transcendent, impassive, immutable, 
timeless. God that Kai Nielsen finds so difficult to 
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ccnprehend; (2) he is intimately involved with, and affected 
by, his people's actims and decisions, and cmmmicates with 
them, not in mcments of private mysticism, but through the 
events of history, interpreted to the con=ity by the 
prophets. 
The idea of the physical embodiment of cultural entities 
explored by J Margolis(3) in relation to works of art (and 
applied to religious experiences in Section 6.4) will help us 
here. People and works of art can, Margolis says, be, 
recognized as having two sets of properties - one setlis 
identified as the proper-ties of a physical object, the other 
is recognized as the properties of a culturally errie-rgent 
entity. The relationship between the two sets of properties 
he characterizes as embodinent. Margolis draws an analogy 
with signalling. Tb recognize a signal within a bodily 
movement we must be conversant with the conventions of -a 
particular culture that we share with the signaller, for 
signalling can only occur only in a cultural context (like 
works of art and persons). To identify an act of signalling 
we need to identify a suitable event that by reference to an 
appropriate tradition or rule or custan, rray be taken as 
embodying it. Cultural aliens are puzzled, seeing only the 
physical event and not the culturally energent one embedded in 
it. 
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This idea illumines not only the concept of a religious 
experience but also the concept of revelatim. Flor the acts 
and the words of God are culturally ezergent entities, that 
people can find embedded in historical events. 
This institutional analysis of revelation is again more in 
line with a biblical view of revelation, and with usual 
Christian practice than"the empiricist analysis. Billy Graham, 
in his evangelistic'methods, may seem to assume that cultural 
training can be short-cut and people step from unbelief to 
belief in the instant of 'a decision'. But a closer scrutiny 
of the methods- of his organization and the way it has 
developed over the years in response to its resuAs, ' shows 
that it has moved more and more towards an emphasis on pre- 
and post-decision'' enculturization as the most effective 
niems of making Christians. (4) 
The Bible does not represent God as revealing himself in a 
cultural vacuum. Revelation is progressiveand to a community. 
The knowledge of God's nature and plan for mankind grows step 
by step, like an ongoing dialogue between God and the 
ccMminity of Israel. God is characteristically introduced as 
, the God of your fathers'. (5) In the New Testament the 
revelation has the same continuity with the past; who Jesus 
was, had to be understood in terms of past revelations, and 
then spread by God's new commmity - the Church. 
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The view of revelation that is incaTpatible with an 
institutional theory of religion is the one already rejected 
that God reveals himself to isolated individuals in a cultural 
vacuum via a sort of private mysticism -a view much discussed 
by philosophears(6) but one which is hard to find in the Bible. 
The biblical view of revelation - that God leaves trails of 
signals through nature and history (through the normal sensory 
experiences of individuals) that must be recognized and 
interpreted within the framework of a ccnuunity's growing 
understanding (its scriptures)(7) - is characteristic of the 
world's revealed religions. It accords well with an. 
institutional theory, and its implication that religious 
experiences are culturally energent entities embedded in the 
normal experiences of encountering objects and events in the 
natural world. 
7.4.3: Whether an institutional theory of religion is or is not, 
seriously in error, does not seem materially to affect the 
debate about the preference for naturalistic or 
non-naturalistic explanations. It seems to m there remains. 
the same freedom to prefer the more intellectually rigorous, 
but narrow and drab explanations of the naturalist, (8) or the 
more, satisfying and cc[Tprehensive, but perhaps mysterious 
explanations of the religious believer, or even the hybrid 
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explanations that try, not altogether satisfactorily, to hold 
the two together. (9) 
Each position seems, to require taking a metaphysical 
position of scme sort, as a result of trying to decide, 
hopefully with as much integrity as possible, which 
explanations seem best to fit our varied sensory experiences, 
including the ones which, seem, even to the most convinced 
naturalist, (10) to be pleading for scme concept of 
transcendence of, or out. of, that world. 
Notes 
1) For an exarrple of this sort of argument see Kai Nielsen An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 
2) See above 
3) J Margolis "Works, of art as physically embodied and 
culturally emergent entities" p187 - 
4) See Peter Brierley What Happened at Mission 189? 
5) See eg Exodus 3.6 
6) Probably best expressed by Alister Hardy in The Spiritual 
Nature of Man but also found in Anthony O'Hear Experience, 
E>cplanation and Faith and Alasdair MacIntyre 'Visions' New 
Essays in Philosophical Theology 
7) As expressed in eg Psalm 19.1-4, Acts 14.17j, Rcmans 1.18 
and 2.14 and 15. 
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8) Eg Kai Nielsen An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Religion 
9) Eg PF Strawson Skepticism and Naturalism, S Alexander 
Space, Time and Deity or even Paul Tillich Systematic Theoloqy- 
10) Nielsen does not deny that such experiences exist An, - 
introduction to the Philosophy of Reliqion p151, but adds' 
(with prejudice? ) that we make 'a deliberate category mistake' 
if we seek norr-naturalistic explanations 'to express what we 
antecedently feel'. p153 
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SE)=IOR 8: CONCLUSIONS 
8.1: The thesis opened with an observation - that the proposers of 
two incarpatible theories of religion (William Jams and 
Alasdair MacIntyre), when confronting the phenomenon of 
innovation in religion, invoke the same historical character 
as an exenplar. (Section 1) An examination of the two 
theories and their implications for innovation in religion 
inuiediately raise problem with both, (1.2 and 1.3) which are 
only reinforced by viewing contributions to the debate fran 
other people working fran an enpiricist base(l. 4) and other 
people who stress the priority of language in religion. (1.5) 
macintyre's argun-Pant against the principle of religious 
experiences being the source of religious concepts, based on 
wittgenstein's work, is disastrous to Jan-es. (1.3.2) But his 
characterization of religions as isolated and arbitrary 
rule-following systems also leads him into problem with 
radical imovation. (1.3.3) His own solution - that innovators 
make one of their own experiences a criterion by which further 
experiences can be tested - fails to resolve the 
problems. (1.3.4) 
Richard Swinburne, who attenpts to refute MacIntyre's 
position with talk of private perceptions and private objects 
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fails in his project. (1.4.1) Because of the special nature of 
religious concepts it is necessary that pecple are already 
acquainted with a concept of divinity, if they are to 
recognize the divine in their experiences. The problems 
Alister Hardy's research unit in oxýord meets when it tries to 
apply empiricist assumptions to an investigation into the 
nature of religious experiences serves to support this 
conclusion. 0.4.2) 
Peter Winch also enters into debate with Alasdair MacIntyre 
about the possibility of radical innovation in 
religion. (1.5.1) He talks about internal development within 
rule-following systerm, the open character of rules and the 
two-way relationship between practice (socially established 
rituals) and theory in religion, but continues to press the 
isolated and arbitrary aspects of rule-following behaviour. 
in' his early work, DZ Phillips' emphasis on the' 
exclusively internal role of theology, the exclusively 
expressive role of religious language and the isolation of 
religious beliefs fran external justifications, does nothing 
to resolve any of the problems. (1.5.2) However in later 
writing he moves towards a resolution by proposing that we see 
religious rites and practices then-selves as 'language-games', ' 
that can interact with religious discourse and that can change 
in response to changing events and activities. 
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8.2: -An historical case study of George Fbx, the chosen exeirplar 
of both William James and Alasdair Macintyre, was then 
undertaken to see if it threw light on the Problems related to 
innovation in religion that had been identified. (Section 2) 
The story quite dramatically fails to exenplify either Jarres' 
or MacIntyrels theory of innovation. (2.3) Fox was trained in 
the use of religious concepts, which he did not reject as a 
result of private experiences of a 'spiritual world', nor did 
he coin new concepts to name the things he had experienced. 
He rejected the religious authorities of his day, in the 
ccrpany of many of* his contenporaries, as an intelligible 
response to the general crisis of authority thrown up by their 
historical circunstances., His lasting contribution to the 
history of religions was not the setting up any of his own 
experiences as,, a criterion of authenticity or value, but the 
setting up of a new institution - the Quaker Meeting -a new 
source of authority in religion based on the democratic ideas 
emerging in the current political milieu. 
3: The thesis then clarif ied the theoretical probjerns of 
explaining radical innovation in religion f ran an enpiricist 
position and from a Position based on the priority of 
language. (Section 3) 
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The empiricist's anmalous use of the concepts of private 
perception and private objects is indefensible; the idea that 
experiences can be recognized as religious prior to the 
possession of the appropriate concepts can not be made to 
work; experiences cannot be used as evidence for the existence 
of a supernatural world, and there are serious problems-- 
involved in their role in the criticism and change of 
religious concepts and institutions. (3.1) 
Theories of religion based on the priority of language have 
problems explaining radical innovation because they see_ 
religions, priirarily as socially-established, rule-following,, 
systems. -of beliefs. (3.2) They emphasize their arbitrary 
nature and their isolation fram justification or criticism 
from external sources, such as independent rational, ý 
deliberation or experiences of an independently perceived 
world. - The implications of this position-seem to be that: 
changes in allegiance from one set of beliefs to another_ 
cannot be. seen as conclusions from evidence, or any sort of. 
rational inference from experience; theology has an 
exclusively internal role within the language-system that 
substantially constitutes the religion; the construction of 
new. religious belief systems is arbitrary. These apparent. 
implications however all appear, from acquaintance with the, 
way innovation occurs in religions, to be false. 14acIntyre'sr, 
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Winch's and Phillips'-s' atterripts-to r'esolve this dilenm are 
examined-and criticized. (3.2.2)- - Although hints are obtained 
as to how a resolution might be effected, no satisfactory 
explanation of radical innovation in religion is found. 
The clues suggested by the case study and by this 
theoretical analysis are brought together in the suggestion 
that these problems might be resolved by considering religions 
not primarily as a sort of experience, nor primarily as a sort 
of language, but as an aspect of culture, open to the 
influence -of people's changing natural and social environwnt 
- in other words, by setting up an institutional theory of 
religion. (3-3) A satisfactory explanation of innovation in 
religion'must be based on sound philosophical assumptions and 
correspond in a satisfying way to plausible accounts of 
instances of the phenamenon. This is taken to mean that it 
must begin with the assumption that there is no source of 
criteria for giving intelligibility or credibility to our talk 
or experiences that is independent of culture. On the other 
hand, to be credible, accounts need to accommodate the facts 
that: mny religions are, committed to the idea of' absolute 
truth and to explanations of the meaning and destiny of human 
life in terms of concepts that transcend, in scme way, the 
natural world; religions can act as a base for the criticism 
and change of culture; innovators can criticize and change 
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religions in ways that can be seen, to be intelligibly related 
to changing historical situations; the reception or rejection 
of new religious practices and ideas by individuals is not 
detacled from their experiences nor from-intelligible reasons; 
the role of theology includes relating religious ideas and 
practices to other aspects of a ccmwnity's intellectual and 
social rnilieu. 
8.4: The thesis then examined attenpts to set up institutional 
theories of art and their copious critics. (Section 4) The', 
rrajority of these attenpts largely fail because of the 
historical association of institutional theories with rigorous, 
essentialist theories, and because they tend to interpret, 
'institutions' in term of socially-established bodies of 
people, rather than socially established activities. 
The religious concept of consecration prcrdsed to shed 
light on the idea of waking objects into works of art. (4.4), An, 
institutional approach also prcmised to illuminate the concept- 
of revelation, the social functions of ritual activities and, 
their relationship to belief systE3ns and to the beliefs and 
experiences of individuals, the role of experiences and of 
tradition and authority in religion, as well as the central, 
concern of the thesis - the process of innovation in religion. 
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8.5: The thesis continued with an investigation into the nature of 
institutions. (Section 5) Institutions are defined as socially 
established (rather than natural) repeated, symbolic 
activities Ue rituals) that are shared by a canmnity (rather 
than being private). (5.3) This definition is not a tight 
one. In each case the distinctions being made are imprecise. 
An institutional theory can not therefore be used to construct 
a rigorous essentialist definition of religion, only as an aid 
to understanding. 
other characteristics of institutions are that they have 
roots in biological and psychological facts of the human 
condition (and in natural activities), but come to be 
governed and defined by conventions that are established in 
particular ccmn-udties-(5-3-4) They do not always have 
explicit meanings for their participants but tend to attract 
theoretical justifications. Although they are the property of 
cornminities and although, in scine senses, they determine the 
way individuals perceive and think, and mould their actions 
and beliefs, institutions are made by people, wbo feel, think, 
intend and act. Institutions are necessarily linked with the 
concept of authority - the inherent authority of tradition 
(of rule following activities), and the power of people who 
use and control them. They are, nevertheless, also 
characterized by being open to change - responsive to shifting 
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patterns of experiences, behaviour and authority structures. 
8.6: The idea of an institutional concept was then clarified; (6.1) 
a concept is institutional if its use is regulated by 
institutions - if decisions about the correct application of a 
word are substantially determined by acquaintance with 
institutional, rather than natural, functions, properties and 
values. The question was then put: how far are the concepts 
of a religious activity, a religious object and a religious 
experience institutional conceptsMection 6) 
Human activities are generally recognized as religious by 
their connection with the cohering and continuing set of 
institutions recognized as religious by an individual's 
cammunity. (6.2) People know what makes an activity religious, 
because they know what their religious specialists do and what 
goes on in their religious buildings. 
In alien or pluralistic cultures the process is more 
carplicated. Human activities can there be recognized as 
religious (rather than, for instance, aesthetic, military or 
political) by making reference to the supposed neaning of the 
activity for its participants (whether or not the maning is 
made explicit by the ccmnmity). There are no naturalt 
direct, private activities that can be recognized as religious 
without reference to such a meaning. All such activities can 
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have a secular meaning to their participants; religious 
worship, for example, is a ccniplicated activity that cannot be 
equated with the expression of wonder or respect. 
institutions can scrretimes be recognized frcrn their natural 
roots. (Marriage, for instance, can be recognized fran its 
roots in taking mates. ) But institutional activities are 
defined by the particular conventions that regulate them. 
There is no answer to questions such as: Yes, but apart fran 
the conventions of a particular cammunity, what counts as 
marrying? A religious activity is, in this sense, an 
institutional concept. 
The section on religious objects began with a discussion of 
institutional objects(6.3.1) and ascriptive declarations - 
the process by which objects acquire institutional 
descriptions, functions, values and properties. (6.3.2) This 
process is seen to be complex and imprecise. 
objects are considered-sacred in all religions because they 
have been set apart to assist in ritual contact with the 
divine, because they are connected either with places where 
significant religious experiences have taken place or with 
people who appear to have a special relationship with the 
divine, or because they are objects which seem to act as a 
focus of spiritual power. (6.3.3) But in each of these cases 
the use is institutional, for the choice of experiences, 
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people and objects and the process of acquiring the new status 
is regulated by conventions. In each case knowing which 
objects are sacred involves knowing about institutions, rather 
than distinguishing natural properties. Sacred objects 
acquire their status by the process of ascriptive declaration, 
even if it is not formal or explicit (as it is in the case of. 
consecration, cannonization etc. ) 
i 
The thesis investigated the experiences which people class 
as religious. (6.4.1) They are expressed in the language of 
events, feelings, insights and perceptions. In each category 
the range is inuense, covering almost everything that could be 
called an experience. 
There appear to be three main ways in which people use the 
adjective 'religious' to apply to experiences. (6.4.3) The 
standard use is one in which the experience is directly 
connected with a traditional religion, either because of the 
setting or context, the choice of symbols in which it is 
expressed, or its result in leading someone towards or away 
from religious belief and practice. what was called the 
'cosmic' use is one in which experiences are connected with 
the 'cosrdc quest' - the search for answers to questions about 
the nature and destiny of human life. This quest can, 
however, terminate in rrundane, secular, naturalistic or 
atheistic beliefs. It is also, in some senses, necessarily a 
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ccnnunal, rather than a personal, activity. 
son-e people claim that experiences can be classed as 
religious by the recognition of a certain quality, which 
includes the weird and inexplicable, and various unusual 
states of consciousness. - 
This use was shown to be incoherent; 
there is no quality, or fan-Lily of qualities, that identifies 
the experiences regarded as religiously significant and 
valuable by the religions of the world. Experiences of any 
quality whatsoever can be described in religious or in secular 
language. Any coherence in the experiences chosen to be 
recounted in religious terms is more plausibly explained in 
terms of currently available concepts of divinity. In each 
case therefore the- use of the concept of a religious 
experience is an institutional use. 
8.7: Som possible philosophical criticisms were then 
faced. (Section 7) An institutional theory of religion can 
reasonably be seen as a quest for understanding, rather than a 
quest for an essentialist definition of religion. (7.2) 
The kind of relativism an institutional theory inplies is 
not inconsistent with the absolute truth claims that are 
characteristic of many, religious belief systems. (7.3) The 
fairly strong cognitive relativism it inplies does not man 
that absolute truth claims are necessarily meaningless, nor 
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that there is no justification for making them, nor 
intelligible reasons for chosing between them. 
7he kind of naturalism an institutional theory of religion 
implies is also not inconsistent with the characteristic, 
religious concept of revelation, for while it inplies a kind 
of methodological naturalism it does not prejudice the terms 
of further understanding. (7.4) 
8-8: Towards an institutional theory of religion 
An institutional theory of religion denies that there is any 
property of objects, or quality of experiences, or kinds of 
activity, attitude, instinct or anything else, that can be 
identified as, or used to identify what counts as, religious, 
independently of, or prior to, cultural institutions; and 
that it is the historical continuity of these institutions 
which substantially determines what is, and what is not, to be 
valued and considered authentic in religion in each ccnTnunity. 
Institutions are seen, in this context, not as bodies of 
people (a view which contributed much to the failure Of 
institutional theories of art), but as activities or practices 
that have acquired special significance and authority within a 
particular community (like opera, elections or baptism). More 
specifically they are socially established (rather than 
natural), repeated, symbolic Ue ritual) activities that are 
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shared (rather than being private). 
Activities, objects and experiences are, therefore, 
correctly described as religious by virtue of their position 
in relation to an institutional framework -a set of 
culturally established practices - rather than by virtue of 
any natural property or quality or relationship. People who 
use the concepts of a religious activity, a religious object 
and a religious experience, do so (and can only do so) against 
the background of such sets of practices, even if they do not 
engage in them themselves. 
In general there are, therefore, no constraints on which 
activities, objects and experiences can be designated 
religious. But individuals, from within their own social 
context, are constrained by history - by the activities, ' 
objects and experiences which have been so designated by their 
ccmmmity (or other comrmnities with which they are familiar) 
in the past. 
Religions are not the product, nor the property, of 
individuals; they grow in, and belong to, can-nunities. 
individuals within a ccmmnity experience religious 
institutions to different extents and in various ways, but it 
is frcm their acquaintance with them that they learn how to 
use religious concepts, to recognize and interpret religious 
experiences and, in scme'cases, to build up a personal set of 
PAGE 387 
religious beliefs and patterns of behaviour. 
These institutions - not as isolated spheres of influence, 
but ýs aspects of a whole culture - form and determine the way 
people understand, interpret and reason about all their 
experiences, serving specific functions in the ccmnunity, and 
in the lives of individuals within it, that are related to and 
interact with their psychology and life histories. As aspects 
of a wider culture, they can be ccwpared with, and assessed in 
terms of, other aspects of that culture, and they can act as a 
base for its criticism and change. If they are going to 
survive and flourish they must continue to relate in scme way 
to the wider culture in which those who use them live. 
8.9: The advantages of an institutional theory of religion 
In the past the philosophy of religion has, to scme extent, 
been. preoccupied with the justification of religious beliefs - 
with questions about whether the creeds espoused by religious 
believers can, in any sense of the word, be true, whether they 
can be rationally assessed and if so how, and with what 
results. An institutional theory disconnects understanding 
and justification. It directs attention away frcm religions 
as *systems of oognitive beliefs which can or cannot be 
justified, towards religions as they are practiýed, within the 
wider cultures in which they are enbedded. 
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understanding is quite as legitimate a philosophical 
interest as justification. (It has always been a central 
concern of aesthetics for example. ) And seeing religions as 
institutions, embedded in other aspects of culture, makes a 
major contribution towards our understanding of them. 
particularly it highlights the importance of the tension 
between tradition and innovation within religions. Religions, 
in order to survive and flourish in changing historical 
circumstances, have to change. Rituals related exclusively to 
the harvest serve little function in an urban society; a 
theology based on feudal relationships and male chauvinism 
cannot flourish in a society transformed. by self-determination 
and feminist activity; missionary strategy based on a colonial 
mind-set is doomed in a developing world. 
But, on the other hand, religions must hold onto their 
traditions. As institutions, in the sense outlined in this 
thesis, the central core of their authority is their nature as 
established practices. Discussions within religious 
traditions about possible changes in their practices, and 
subsidiary questions such as who has the authority to make 
changes, threaten the feeling of coherence and security 
produoed by the inherent authority of a-tradition. 
This explains to some extent why changes in practice (such 
as the introduction of an alternative prayer book, or the 
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ordination of wctren) are so rigorously resisted (and not only 
by the members of the community in question; it is interesting 
to speculate on why philosophers so frequently seem to back 
the conservatives in these debates). But tradition is not the 
only source of authority in religions and what frequently 
happens in these sorts of situations is that religious 
communities look to other sources of authority to back the 
need for change against the authority of tradition. Thus 
George Fox appealed to the authority of the Meeting, led by 
the Inner Light$, Martin Luther appealed to St Paul's theology 
and Christian feminists go back to try and re-interpret the 
teaching of the New Testament. 
This internal tension is of course not only a problem for 
the Church of England, or European Christianity; in any 
situation where social relationships are changing, or where 
communities with different traditions live side-by side, there 
is a tension between the policy of retreating into an isolated 
sub-culture, and that of allowing one's tradition to beccme so 
changed that the sense of continuity is lost. Both policies, 
if pursued too rigorously, lead to the impoverishment, or the 
demise, of the tradition, with the risk of emotional upheaval 
and social dislocation. 
ý An institutional theory not only helps us understand the 
tensions within religions, but also the tensions between 
different religions, and religions and the wider culture, for 
PAGE 390 
changes in the secular aspects of a culture can insidiously 
erode the authority of a religion which is embedded in it. 
Religious traditions that are-transposed by immigration into 
cultures very different fran the ones'in which they arose and 
flourished have special difficulties here. This thesis noted 
how the rise of individualism and democracy in the political 
sphere eroded the authority of the established church in the 
seventeenth century; (Section 2.3) it could equally well have 
pointed to the way literary and historical scholarship was 
later seen to erode the authority of the Bible, or to the way 
Asian immigrant caTumities struggle to relate their religious 
traditions to their new cultural situation. 
on the other hand, this thesis has been written during the 
spectacular collapse of the authority of Ca=nism in Eastern 
Europe, the seeds of which can be seen to have been nurtured 
within the Christian comTunities. of those countries, whose 
very presence provided an alternative focus of authority. 
It is becoming clear that religions are not going to die 
out in Western society (as philosophers have fram time to time 
suggested) nor does it at the nxzent seem likely that 
syncretism will came up with any lasting answers. Religious 
pluralism is with us to stay. It therefore beccues 
increasingly important to understand the factors involved in 
the relationship beween different religious traditions and the 
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wider culture in which they seek to flourish, so that the 
tensions that arise within and between them might be 
channelled into creative, rather than destructive purposes. 
8.10: The advantages of an institutional theory in accounting for 
radical innovation in religion 
Put simply a theory of innovation based on an institutional, 
theory of religion would look like this: institutions, as 
they have been described in this thesis, serve social 
functions. They are used by groups of peopler who may ccnie to 
find them inadequate or irrelevant for all sorts of reasons,. 
probably best described as changes in their historical 
situation. Invasion, emigration, failure of the harvest, 
intellectual or technological revolution, a change in 
geographical location, in power, economic and social 
structures-and relationships, contact with other cultures-, 7 
etc., change people's life histories and their social and- 
psychological needs, their ways of thinking and their views 
about what is significant or important. It is these sorts of- 
changes that put pressure on people to abandon or change the- 
institutions which no longer seem to be necessary or-- 
satisfactory. 
At the same time the internal authority of rule-following 
activities, 'and,, the powier of the people who have an interest 
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in their continued existence, produce resistance to change. * 
Changes in the use of institutions can occur gradually. 
They can slowly lose their significance, be moved to the edges 
of a society and linger there, or die out. - Alternatively 
they can be revitalized by being gradually changed in a way 
that is seen as an intelligible development in the rules 
controlling their, use - the idea of 'going on in the same way' 
being interpreted in a different, but recognizably similar way 
(whether it is the activity that is changed or its meaning to 
its participants). 
Somtimes, however, in situations of tension like these, 
an individual innovator ccrres up with a radical idea -a 
proposal for a major change in a particular religious 
institutim, or for the introduction of a caTpletely new one. 
if the proposal seems appropriate to, and is accepted by, a 
sufficient nunber of people, a new religious tradition is 
fonred, but for this to happen the new institution has to be 
intelligibly related both to the institutions it replaces (in 
order to be recognized as a religious institution) and to the 
historical situation that provoked it (in order to satisfy the 
needs of its participants). 
An institutional theory of religion appears to be a 
fruitful base for further work in a wide variety of fields. 
The theory itself needs refining and develcping, particularly 
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in relation to the roles of tradition and experiencep and the 
different sources of authority, in determining the religious 
beliefs and practices of communities and individuals. 
Further case studies of innovation and change in different 
cultural settings could be helpful here, such as the 
development of Jewish theology during the exile in Babylon, 
Guru Nanek and the founding of the Sikh religion in early -1 6th 
century India, the developrrent of the Christian Eucharist from 
the Passover and its subsequent developuent in practice and 
waning through different periods of history, or the tensions 
and changes experienced in the religious traditions of Asian 
imnigrants to Britain. 
The social function of ritual activities could be further 
investigated, as well as the relationship between such 
activities and the belief systems that accompany them. 
The insights gained from this way of looking at religion 
could also be fed back into debates in aesthetics on such 
subjects as appreciation and education of taste. 
In these ways it seems possible to develop and defend an 
institutional theory of religion that is based on sound 
philosophical assumptions, corresponds in a satisfactory way 
with plausible accounts of how radical innovation takes place 
in religions and is a fruitful base for further work towards a 
better understanding of religion. 
PAGE 394 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
AARGAAPJ)-MOGENSEN Lars(ed) Culture and Art New Jersey: 
Humanities Press 1976 
ALEXANDER S Space, Time and Deity (Gifford Lectures 1916-18) 
London: Macmillan 1927 
ANSCONBE Elizabeth "On Brute Facts" Analysis 18 1958 
AUSTIN JL How to do Things with Words (William James 
I., ecture 1955) oxford: The Clarendon Press 1962 
AYER A J' Tbe-Oriqjins of Pragmatism London: Macmillan 1968 
AYUýER G E(ed) The Levellers in the Enqlish Revolution 
London: Thames-Hudson 1975 
BAKALAR James "Social and Intellectual Attitudes towards Drug 
Induced Religious Experience" Journal of Humanistic 
Psycholoqy 1985 Vol 25 No4 
BASHAM AL The Concise Encylopedia of Liv I ing Faiths RC 
Zaehner(ed) 
BEARDSLEY Monroe C "Is Art Essentially Institutional? " 
Culture and Art Lars Aagaard-Mogenson(ed) 
BEATTIE JHM. "Objectivity and Social Anthropology" 
objectivity and Cultural Divergence SC Brown(ed) 
BENTON Ted "Biological Ideas and their Cultural Uses" 
objectivity and Cultural Diverqence SC Brown(ed) 
BERENSON Frances "Understanding Art and Understanding 
PAGE 395 
Persons" Objectivity and Cultural Divergence SC 
Brown(ed) 
BLTJEMAN John Collected Poems London: Guild publishing 1984 
BIBLICAL references are from New International Version 
London: Hodder and Stoughton 1987 
BLIZEK William , An Institutional 7heory of Art" British 
Journal of Aesthetics Vol 14 1974 
BRAITHWAITE RB "The Nature of Believing" Ynowledge and 
Belief A Phillips Griffiths(ed) 
BRIERLEY Peter What Happened at Mission 189? (Research 
Monograph) London: Marc Europe 1990 
BRINTON Howard Guide to Quaker Practice Pendle Hill 1955 
BROWN Hedy and Richard Stevens(eds) Social Behaviour and 
aýerience Open University/Hodder and Stoughton 1975 
BROWN Stuart C Do Religious Claims make Sense? London: SCM 
1969 
(ed) Reason and Religion Ithaca: Royal Institute of 
Philosophy/Cornell University Press 1977 
(ed) objectivity and Cultural Diverqence Cambridge: Royal 
Institute of Phloscphy/CmTbridge University Press 1984 
COHEN Ted "The Possibility of Art: Remarks on a Proposal by-, 
Dickie" Philosophical Reviews Vol 82 1973 
CRAGG Kennth Islam and the Muslim Units 20-21 open 
PAGE 396 
University Course 208 CUP 1978 
CUpITr Don Taking Leave of God London: SCM 1980 
DANio Arthur C "Artworks and Real Things" Theoria Vol 39 
1973 
"The Artworld"(1964) reprinted in Culture and Art 
Lars Aargaard-Mogensen(ed) 
DICKIE George Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional 
Anaiysis Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1974 
"khat is Art? " Culture and Art Lars 
Aargaard-Mogensen(ed) Humanities Press 1976 
The Art Circle New York: Haven Publications 1984 
DIFFEY TJ "The Republic of Art" British Journal of. 
Aesthetics Vol 9 1969 
"on Defining Art" British Journal of Aesthetics Vol 
19 1979 
DILLISTONE FW Religious Experience and Christian Faith 
London: SCM 1981 
DILMAN Ilman and DZ Phillips Sense and Delusion London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1971 
DOSTOEVSKI Fyodor The Devils David Magarshack(trs) London: 
Penguin 1953 
The Idiot Constance Garnett(tr) London: Heineman 
1913 
DOUGLAS J D(ed) The New Bible Dictionary London: 
PAGE 397 
Inter-Varsity Fellowship 1962 
DOUGLAS Mary Evans Pritchard Brighton: Harvester Press 1980 
DURKHEIM Emile The Rules of Sociological Method WD 
Halls(trs) New York: Free Press 1982 
EIBL-EIBESFELDT I "The Ethology of Man" Social Behaviour and 
Experience Hedy Brown and Richard Stevens(eds) 
FEUERBACH Ludwig The Essence of Christianity George 
Eliot(trs) New York: Harper and Row 1957 
FINLAYSON RA The New Bible Dictionary JD Douglas(ed) 
FLEW A and A MacIntyre(eds) New Essays in Philosophical 
Theology London: SCM 1955 
FRAZER JarrLes The Golden Bouqh London: Macmillan 1922 
FREUD Sigmund The Future of an illusion WD Robson 
Scott(trs) London: Hogarth 1934 
FRIED Michael Catalogue Essay for Three American Painters 
an exhibition of Noland, Olitski and Stells, Fog Art 
Museum, Harvard University 1965 
GELLNER Ernest "Concepts and Society" Rationality Bryan 
Wilson(ed) Oxford: Blackwell 1970 
GOLDING William Lord of the Flies. (1954) London: Faber and 
Faber 1984 
The Inheritors (1955) London: Faber and Faber 1961 
Darkness Visible (1979) London: Faber and Faber 1988 
GOUNAN Daniel The Varieties of the Meditative Experience 
PAGE 398 
New York: Irvington 1977 
GOULDER Michael and John Hick Why believe in God? London: 
SCM 1983 
GOLDSTEIN David The Religion of the Jews Units 16-17 OU 
Course 208 CUP 1978 
GRIFFITHS A Phillips(ed) Knowledge and Belief, London: Oxford 
University Press 1967 
HAACK Robin "Wittgenstein's Pragmatism!, American 
Philosophical Quarterly Vol 19 No 2 1982 p163 
HAMILMN W The New Essence of Christianity New York 1961 
HARDY Alister Science, Religion and rworld Unity Oxford: 
Religious Experience Research Unit 1979 
The Spiritual Nature of Man Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1979 Science, Reliqion and World Unity Oxford: 
Religious Experience Research Unit 1979 
HARNACK A von Das Wesen des-. Christenturs R Bultman(ed) 
Leipzig 1900 
HEELAS Paul "Emotions Across Cultures" 
'Objectivity 
and 
Cultural Divergence SC Brown(ed) 
HICK john(ed) Faith and the Philosophers New York: St 
Martin's Press 1964 
(ed) The Existence of God London: Macmillan 1964 
Faith and Knowledge London: Macmillan 1967 
"Religious faith as experiencing-as" Talk of God GN 
PAGE 399 
A Vesey(ed) 
HILL Christopher et. al. Seventeenth Century England: a 
Changing Culture 1618-1689 Block 1 Open University 
Course 203 Open University 1982 
HORNER IB The Concise Encylcopedia of Living Faiths R. C 
Zaehner(ed) 
HOSKINS Anne and Alison Sharran(eds) Quakers in the Eighties 
London: Quaker Htme Service 1980 
HUDSON WD Ludwiq Wittgenstein London: Lutterworth Press 
1968 
Wittgenstein and Religious Belief London: Maanillan 
1975 
HUGHS Ann(ed) Seventeenth Century England: A Changing Culture 
Vol 1: Prirrary Sources Open University 1980 
JAMES William what the Will Effects(1888) Scribeners 
Magazine III 
"Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" 
(1898) The Writings of William Jams John i 
M. cDermtt(ed) Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
1977 
The Varieties of Religious Experience (1901-1902) (New 
York: The Modern Library 1936) Glasgow: Fontana 1977 
"The Sentiment of Rationality" The Will to Believe 
Fred Barkhardt(ed) Cambridge Mass: Harvard University 
PAGE 400 
Press 1979 
The Principles of Psychology Carrbridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press 1981 
JENKINS Davidr the Bishop of Durham; an interview with Walter 
Schwarz Guardian Weekly November 15 1987 
KATZ Steven T(ed) Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis 
London: Sheldon Press 1978 
IMIGHTLEY Alan Wittgenstein, GramTar and God London: Epworth 
1976 
KEMICK William "Camrents on the Artworld" Journal of 
Philosophy Vol 63 1965 
KIERKEGAARD Soren The Sickness unto Death Walter Iowrie(tr) 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1941 
LAmPEN John Wait in the Light London: Quaker Home Service 
1981 
. LASH Nicholas Theology on 
the Way to Emmaus London: SCM 1986 
LEVIN Bernard The Tirres November 26 1980 
LEVINSON Jerrold "Defining Art Historically" British 
Journal of Aesthetics Vol 19 1979 
LEwis CS Lewis surprised by Joy London: Fontana 1959 
LYAS Colin "The Groundlessness of Religious Belief" Reason 
and Religion Stuart C Brown(ed) 
mAcFAGUE Sallie metaphorical Theology London: SCM 1983 
MACINrYRE Alasdair "The Logical Status of Religious Belief" 
PAGE 401 
Metaphysical Belief Alasdair MacIntyre and Ronald 
Gregor Smith (eds) London: SCH 1957 
"Visions" New Essays in Philosophical Theol! 2! 3Y- A Flew 
and A MacIntyre(eds) 
"A Mistake about Causality in Social Science" 
Philosophy, Politics and Society second Series 
Laslett and RunciiTan(eds) oxford Blackwell 1972 
"Is Understanding Religion Cccipatible with Believing" 
Faith and the Philosophers John Hick(ed) 
MUCOLM Nornian "A Contenporary Discussion" The Existence of 
God John Hick(ed) London: Macmillan 1964 
"Wittgenstein on Language and Rules" Philosophy Vol 
64 No 246 1989 
MARGOLIS J "Works of Art as Physically Embodied and 
Culturally Emergent Entities" British Journal of 
Aesthetics Vol 14 1974 
MASLOW Abraham Reliqion, Values and Peak Experiences (1964) 
Harmondworth: Penguin 1970 
MAYHALL Carole From the Heart-of a Wcman Colorado: Navpress 
1976 
ýL= Graham "Wollheim. and the Institutional Theory of Art" 
Philosophical Quarterly Vol 35 No 139 1985 
MCKOWN Delos B The Classical Marxist Critiques of Religion: 
Marx, Engels, Levin, Kautsky The Hague: Martinus 
PACE 402 
Nijheff 1975 
MIES TR Reliqious Experience London: Macmillan 1972 p13 
MITCHELL Basil The Justification of Reliqious Belief London: 
Macmillan 1973 
MORMN Bruce N "A Review of George Dickie's Aesthetics: an 
Introduction" journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
Vol 32 1973 
MULLEN Johý Douglas Kierkeqaard's Philosophy. New York: New 
Anerican Library 1988 
NIELSEN Kai An Introduction to the Philosophy of Reliqion 
London: Macmillan 1982 
NICKALLS John(ed) . 
Journal of George Fox London: Religious 
Society of Friends 1975 
O'HEAR Anthony Experience, Explanation and Faith London: 
Routhledge and Kegan Paul 1984 
"Wittgenstein and the Transmission of Tradition" Text 
of a lecture delivered at the Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Novenber 1989. The course of lectures will 
be published by the OUP as a supplenviit to Philosophy 
OSBORNE Harold "Primitive Art and Society" British Journal 
of Aesthetics Vol 14 p290 
am Rudolf The Idea of the Holy(1923) London: oxford 
university Press 1958 
PARRiNDER Geoffrey African Traditional Religion (1954), 
PAGE 403 
I 
London: Sheldon Press 1974 
PERRY Ralph Barton The Thought and Character of William James 
Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press 1935 
PHILLIPS D Z(ed) Religion and Understanding oxford: 
Blackwell 1967 
Faith and Philosophical Enquiry London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 1970 
"Philosophizing and Reading a Story" Sense and 
Delusion Ilman Dilrran and DZ Phillips London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1971 
Religion without Explanation oxford: Blackwell 1976 
Belief, Change and Forms of Life London: Macmillan 
Press 1986 
PIAGET Jean The Principles of Genetic Epistemology Wolfe 
Mays(trs) London: Routledge and Kegan 1972 
PLATO The Republic AD Lindsay(tr) London: Dent 1976 
PRITCHARD Evans Nuer Religion Oxford: The Clarendon Press 
1956 
QUINTON Anthony(ed) Political Philosophy London: Oxford 
University Press 1967 
RADER Melvin "Dickie and Socrates on Definition" Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism Vol 32 1974 
RAMSEY Ian T Religious Language London: SCM 1957 
ROBINSON Edward(ed) The Original Vision Oxford: Religious 
PAGE 404 
Expe ience Research Unit 1977 
Living the Questions oxford: Religious Experience 
Research Unit 1978 
RuNZO Joseph Reason, Relativism and God Lo! Oon: Maanillan 
RUSE ýjichael and Edward 0 Wilson "Moral Philosophy as Applied 
science" Philosophy Vol 61 No 236 1986 
SCIAFANI Richard J "Artworksr Art Theory and the Artworld" 
Theoria Vol 39 1973 
"Art as a Social Institution: Dicý, iels New Definition" 
_Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism Vol 32 1973 
SHARMA Ursula Contributions to. Indian Sociology Vikas 
Publishing House 1973 
SHARROCK, W W and RJ Anderson "Criticizing Form of Life" 
Philosophy Vol 60 no233 July 1985 
SILVERS Anita, - 
'. 'The... Artworld -Discarded" 
Journal of- 
, 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism Vol 34 No 4 1976 
SOX David Relics and Shrines London: George Allen and 
Unwin 1985 
SPERBER Dan Rethinkinq Synbolism Alice I Morton(trs) 
Canbridge: Carrbridge University Press 1975 
STRAWSON PF Skepticism and Naturalism; some varieties 
(Woodbridge Lectures 1983) London: Mthuen 1985 
swimupm Richard The Existence of God Oxford: Clarendon 
PAGE 405 
Press 1979 
TABER John A "Ibe Philosophical Evaluation of Religious 
Experience" International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion Vol 19 Nos 1-2 1986 ' 
THCMAS Terry Sikhism: the Voice of the Guru Units 12-13 
Open University Course AD208 Open University 1978 
TILLICH Paul Systematic Theoloqy Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1951 
TRIGG Roger Reason and Ccomitment Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1973 
VESEY GN Med) Talk of God London: Royal Institute of 
Philosophy/ Macmillan 1969 
WAGENHAMMER H Das Wesen des Christentums Mainz 1974 
WALTERS Professor G The New Bible Dictionary JD 
Douglas(ed) 
WALTON Kendall LA review of Dickie's "Art and the 
Aesthetic: an Institutional Analysis" Philosophical 
Reviews Vol 86 1977 
WARE Archimandrite Kallistos The Orthodox Way London: 
Mowbrays 1979 
WEIL Simone First and Last Notebooks Richard Rees (trs) 
London: oxford University Press 1970 (Originally 
published in French in 'Cahiers' Paris: 1970) 
WEITZ Morris "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics" Journal of 
PACE 406 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol 15 1956 27-35 
WILLIAMS Raymond culture London: Flontana 1981 
WILSON Eaward o on Human Nature Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
university Press 1978 
WINCH Peter The Idea of a Social Science Routledge and Kegan 
Paul 1958 
"Understanding a Primitive Society" Reliqion and 
Understanding DZ Phillips(ed) 
"Authority" Political Philosophy Anthony Quinton(ed) 
"Meaning and Religious Language" Reason and Reliqion 
kiiart C Brown(ed) 
WITIGENSTEIN Ludwig Philosophical Investigations Oxford: 
Blackwell 1958 
"Lectures on Religious Belief" Lectures and 




Zettel GEM Ansccnibe and GH von Wright(eds) 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1967 
On Certainty GEM Anscombe and GH von Wright(eds) 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1969 
"Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough" The Human world 
No 3 May 1971 
mLLHEIM Richard Art and its Objects_ Hanrandsworth: Penguin 
PAGE 407 
1975 (originally published New York: Harper and Raw 
1968) 
"The Institutional Theory of Art" One of six essays 
published at the end of the 1980 edition of Art and 
its Objects Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
VMAGGE J Philip George Fbx London: Friends Home Service 
Ccmnittee 1950 
ZAEHNER RC Mysticism Sacred and Profane oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1977 
(ed) The Concise Encyclodedia of Living Faiths 
London: Hutchinson 1977 
ZIFF Paul "The Task of Defining a Work of Art" Philosophical 
Reviews 1953 58-78 
